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Abstract
Lloyd’s is analysed within the framework provided by Kay (1995) on ‘distinctive 
capabilities’ - architecture, innovation and reputation. An examination o f Lloyd’s 
reveals that a dominant feature o f the Society is cooperation between syndicates which 
occurs via a method o f trading - the subscription system - and as a consequence o f the 
rulings o f the Council o f Lloyd’s.
Lloyd’s has a reputation for innovation and entrepreneurism. This research argues that 
this is a direct result o f  four distinctive aspects o f  its architecture - syndicates are 
entrepreneurial organisations, the subscription system o f risk placement, the unique 
capital base o f  unlimited liability Names and the presence o f the Central Fund. The 
research reveals that Lloyd’s is centered on the primacy o f underwriting and that the 
existence o f the Central Fund encourages new syndicates to form. The dynamic o f a 
Lloyd’s syndicate is that o f a small business - a small number o f people working 
towards a common goal. Moreover the unique capital base, composed entirely o f 
individuals, does not have a voice in the day-to-day underwriting affairs o f the 
syndicates. This allows underwriters complete freedom to underwrite and to change 
underwriting policy if opportunities arise. The subscription system o f risk placement 
encourages innovative underwriting and ensures information flows between 
underwriters.
This author suggests that the introduction o f a new capital base, limited liability 
incorporated investors, may stifle the entrepreneurial nature o f Lloyd’s underwriters 
and pose a threat to the subscription system o f risk placement. These investors are 
purchasing Managing Agents, the management structure o f syndicates, as well as 
investing in syndicates. This research suggests that this new capital base challenges the 
appropriateness o f the current regulatory structure and well as posing a threat to the 
continued existence o f the Central Fund. This author recommends that Lloyd’s should 
abandon self-regulation and should instead be regulated by the Department o f Trade 
and Industry. Furthermore, this author suggests that the Market Board and Regulatory 
Board should be replaced by a Business Development Board.
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Introduction and Overview of Thesis.
In. 1 Subject matter of thesis
The subject matter o f this thesis is Lloyd’s o f London, the international insurance and 
reinsurance market. The aim o f the research is to analyse Lloyd’s within the 
framework provided by John Kay (1995) on distinctive capabilities, namely 
architecture, reputation and innovation, and from this analysis gain an insight into the 
possible future implications resulting from the admission o f incorporated capital to 
support the underwriting function. Much attention is paid to the structure o f Lloyd’s 
and the nature o f the change in this structure due to the admission o f a new capital 
base. The thesis is thus positioned in the area o f organisational structure. Arising from 
the examination o f Lloyd’s and through interviews with underwriters, brokers, capital 
providers and Members’ Agents, various hypotheses are made as to the future 
direction o f Lloyd’s.
The subject matter o f this thesis is challenging and very broad. Lloyd’s was not 
founded by one single person in a similar way to a firm, but has its origins in the 
gatherings o f shipping merchants who congregated in coffee houses in seventeenth 
century London. Lloyd’s is, arguably, the most famous name in insurance and it is also 
the oldest; the Society celebrated its 300th anniversary in 1988. To understand the 
Lloyd’s o f today it is necessary to see from whence it came and to understand its 
history. The present underwriters in the Room are the inheritors o f a 300 year-old 
tradition. Indeed, Lloyd’s is still steeped in tradition, even though many o f its 
operations are extensively computerised. The Lutine Bell, the symbol o f Lloyd’s,
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stands in a rostrum at the centre o f  the trading floor. Corporation staff, called waiters, 
who work in the Room wear frock coats, reminiscent o f their forebears who served 
coffee to the merchants who gathered in London’s Stuart coffee houses. Underwriters 
sit at desks known as boxes which are modelled on the seats from Edward Lloyd’s 
coffee house. Major shipping losses are recorded in the loss book by a clerk using a 
quill pen. These traditions might seem out o f place in a modem insurance operation, 
but they are reminders o f the rich heritage that the current Lloyd’s has from its past.
This thesis covers a wide area o f  study; it is o f  necessity broad because Lloyd’s is a 
sprawling organisation and to describe the structure and to evaluate the change in this 
structure it is necessary to look at all aspects o f its operations.
In. 2 Methodology
The theoretical underpinning o f the thesis comes from the work by John Kay (1995) 
on distinctive capabilities. Kay argues that firms may gain competitive advantage by 
possessing a distinctive capability - some feature o f  its relationships which other firms 
lack and cannot readily be replicated. He states that there are three sources o f 
distinctive capability - architecture, innovation and reputation. Kay also states that 
some firms gain competitive advantage, not through the possession o f a distinctive 
capability, but by having a strategic asset. Kay’s work is qualitative; it provides a 
framework for an analysis o f  an entity; it deals in concepts and ideas rather than 
prescriptive formulae. Kay thus provides a conceptual framework for the analysis o f 
an organisation - ideal for an amorphous entity such as Lloyd’s.
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The first o f Kay’s sources o f distinctive capability is architecture. Architecture is the 
network of relational contracts within, or around, the firm. Firms may establish 
relationships with their employees (internal architecture), with their suppliers or 
customers (external architecture) or among a group o f firms engaged in related 
activities (networks). Reputation is the second source o f distinctive capability. 
Reputation is a mechanism through which firms convey information to the consumer. 
Reputation is important in insurance because the nature o f the product is difficult for 
consumers to assess without specialist knowledge. The final source o f distinctive 
capability is innovation. Innovation may be defined as producing new products or re­
selling a current product in a different way to competitors. The essence o f a 
distinctive capability is that it is a unique attribute o f the firm and thus difficult to 
replicate by a competitor.
Kay recognises that a firm may have a competitive advantage over others based not on 
distinctive capabilities but on its dominance or position within the market, i.e. the firm 
possesses a strategic asset. Kay states that there are three main types: where a firm 
has a monopoly in a market, where the incumbent firm in the market has incurred 
substantial sunk costs and where the firm benefits from market restrictions - the 
product o f licences and regulation. This author does not believe that Lloyd’s 
possesses a strategic asset in the terms suggested by Kay. However, it could be 
argued that Kay’s three distinctive capabilities are themselves strategic assets.
Kay states that the first part o f the strategy-making process for a firm must be the 
identification o f its distinctive capabilities. The next task is to match these to
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appropriate markets in order to gain sustainable competitive advantage. It is not the 
purpose o f this thesis to develop a strategy for Lloyd’s. Indeed, Lloyd’s cannot have a 
single strategy, as the conclusions o f this thesis will show, as it is a collection of 
individual business units, syndicates, each o f which will have a different strategy. For 
instance, the strategy o f a U.K. motor syndicate will be different from the strategy 
adopted by a non-marine syndicate writing mainly catastrophe excess o f loss 
reinsurance. Moreover, Lloyd’s as a whole, i.e. the Society o f Lloyd’s, is governed by 
a body which cannot implement a single strategy for the whole o f Lloyd’s. The 
purpose o f this research is to examine the distinctive capabilities o f Lloyd’s as a whole, 
rather than the attributes o f individual syndicates.
There are two accepted approaches to empirical study in management. The first 
method is a cross-sectional approach where a large number o f firms are studied and 
data collected or a time series analysis o f  data, often financial data, for a single firm or 
a group o f firms. Hypotheses are tested against the data using statistical techniques. 
This method is not appropriate for this author’s research as Lloyd’s is a single 
corporate entity and neither does this thesis seek to analyse time series data on 
Lloyd’s. The second method is a behavioural study where an in-depth analysis o f a 
single firm, or a small group o f firms, is undertaken over a period o f time. This 
longitudinal approach examines the processes within the firm and charts the 
development o f the firm over time. The purpose o f this author’s research is not to 
examine the processes within Lloyd’s, but primarily to investigate its structure and the 
evolution o f the structure following the admission o f a new capital base. From this
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examination this author predicts the future structure o f Lloyd’s and makes 
recommendations for structural changes.
Such a research agenda requires an appreciation o f the history o f Lloyd’s and 
knowledge o f why and how it has evolved into the organisation it is today. 
Furthermore, the research requires the input o f  members o f the Lloyd’s community in 
order to test this author’s hypotheses as well as gaining insight into Lloyd’s and its 
structure as well as the forces that are influencing changes in the structure. The 
author’s initial approach was a pilot study whereby a questionnaire was sent out to 
twenty underwriters. Only ten per cent were returned - a disappointing response. 
Given the low percentage o f responses and through the author contacting some of 
those who had not responded, the impression gained was that there was a reluctance to 
divulge confidential information and opinions on a written questionnaire. 
Consequently, this method o f approach was abandoned.
A new method was thus needed, so the author decided that instead o f asking for a 
questionnaire to be filled in, to ask members o f the Lloyd’s community if they would 
be interviewed. The advantage o f holding interviews is that senior personnel can be 
reached who might otherwise pass a questionnaire to a junior member o f staff. Whilst 
a questionnaire can be produced, copied and mailed to many people, interviews are 
much more time-consuming and thus fewer people can be contacted over a given 
period o f time. However, the scope for discussion and the generation o f new ideas is, 
arguably, greater in an interview than in a questionnaire.
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there is little reason to consider that the interviewees were unrepresentative o f  their 
peers in their particular segment o f the Lloyd’s market.
This author is employed as an underwriter for a non-marine syndicate and much 
information was gleaned from this author’s observations on the way Lloyd’s operates.
In. 3 Sources of information
The main source o f statistical information is the Lloyd’s Planning Department and their 
annual publication “Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s” . This work is an extension o f the 
historical statistics produced by Doody (1979) from 1950 to 1977. Information on the 
company market has been gained through LIRMA and the ABI and their associated 
publications. There is little information in academic journals due to a lack o f research 
connected with Lloyd’s and also the unavailability o f  statistics and information to those 
who are not actively involved in the Society. Much o f the material from which this 
thesis is built has been derived from articles in the insurance and reinsurance press and 
through interviews with members o f the Lloyd’s community.
In. 4 Overview of thesis
The main work o f the thesis is divided into seven chapters, with the eighth chapter 
being a conclusion.
Chapter one: Overview and Statistics.
This chapter describes the business underwritten at Lloyd’s and an assessment is made 
as to the position o f Lloyd’s within the London market and the world market. This
xv
chapter also describes the operation o f Lloyd’s and briefly outlines the history o f the 
Society. The chapter ends with a note on the constituents o f the London insurance and 
reinsurance market.
Chapter two: Studies on Lloyd's.
This chapter outlines the literature published about Lloyd’s, focusing on the reports that 
have been commissioned by Lloyd’s, as these are primary sources that have influenced 
the development o f the Society.
Chapter three: The architecture o f Lloyd’s and the capital base.
This chapter examines the nature o f the structure or architecture o f Lloyd’s, Kay’s first 
source o f distinctive capability. This chapter pays particular attention to the capital 
base and an analysis is made o f the change in the structure o f Lloyd’s as a result o f  the 
introduction o f a new capital base - limited liability incorporated capital. The role o f 
the Lloyd’s broker is discussed and the influence o f information technology on this role 
is evaluated.
Chapter four: Two Structural Models: The Porter Model and the Market- 
Hierarchy-Network Model
In this chapter an analysis is made o f both the insurance and reinsurance markets and 
the position o f Lloyd’s within each o f these markets using the framework provided by 
Michael Porter (1980). The Market-Hierarchy-Network model is discussed and the 
structures existing within Lloyd’s are presented within the context o f this model.
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Chapter five: The nature o f cooperation within Lloyd’s.
This chapter examines a particular feature o f the architecture o f Lloyd’s, namely 
cooperation between syndicates. An analysis o f the nature o f this cooperation is made 
and the threats to its continuance with the introduction o f incorporated capital are 
discussed and a simple two-dimensional model o f Lloyd’s is proposed.
Chapter six: Innovation, entrepreneurism and Lloyd’s.
Innovation is the second o f Kay’s sources o f distinctive capability. The nature o f 
innovation and entrepreneurism in Lloyd’s is assessed and the threat to such innovation 
with the introduction o f incorporated capital is discussed.
Chapter seven: The reputation o f Lloyd’s.
Reputation is the third o f Kay’s sources o f distinctive capability. The nature o f the 
reputation o f Lloyd’s and the ownership o f the reputation are discussed.
Chapter eight: Conclusions and recommendations.
The conclusion discusses the main findings o f  this research and makes 
recommendations as to future structure o f Lloyd’s.
In. 5 Contribution to knowledge and recommendations for further research.
Many o f the writings on Lloyd’s have sought to describe the history o f the Society e.g. 
Gibb (1957), Cockerell (1984), Brown (1987). There have been books written on the 
profitability o f Lloyd’s e.g. Raphael (1994), Mantle (1992) and Lloyd’s has been the 
subject o f several reports at the instigation o f the Lloyd’s Council. These reports, such
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as those prepared by the Neill and Fisher working parties, have mainly focussed on the 
regulatory arrangements at Lloyd’s. There is thus a gap in the literature for a study in 
the structure o f Lloyd’s. This thesis represents the first attempt to describe the 
structure o f Lloyd’s in terms o f its trading units, the syndicates, and the threats to the 
change in the structure due to the admission o f a new capital base.
The thesis arguably raises more questions than it purports to answer, but the fact that 
these issues, such as the threat to entrepreneurism with the introduction o f 
incorporated capital, have been identified is, arguably, a conclusion in itself.
Further research is needed to explore the implications o f  information technology on the 
distribution o f insurance and reinsurance in general and the role o f  the broker in 
particular. Perhaps the most revealing research would be to re-write this thesis in ten 
years’ time in order to explore whether the conclusions reached have indeed come to 
fruition.
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Chapter One: Overview and Statistics
1.0 Introduction
This chapter gives an overview o f Lloyd’s o f London - its business practices and a 
selection o f terminology which it is necessary to define. This chapter gives a summary 
o f the workings o f Lloyd’s and discusses some statistics relating to Lloyd’s - the growth 
o f Lloyd’s, the type o f business underwritten and its geographical provenance. Lloyd’s 
share o f the UK insurance market is discussed and an estimate given o f Lloyd’s share o f 
the global insurance market.
1.1 An historical perspective
During the late seventeenth century there was an expansion in England’s overseas trade. 
Before 1650 English overseas trade had largely consisted o f the exchange o f woolen 
cloth for other manufactures, wine, and foodstuffs, including grain. During the latter 
half o f the seventeenth century tobacco and sugar (and later tea, coffee and chocolate) 
were important export commodities for England. This transformation o f the 
commodity structure o f England’s overseas trade was brought about by the 
establishment and development o f  the Atlantic colonies and by trading ventures to the 
Far East and Africa, such as the East India Company. Davis (1962) estimates that the 
total tonnage o f English merchant shipping rose from 115,000 tons in 1629 to 340,000 
tons in 1686 and then levelled off to 323,000 tons in 1702. The growth o f long trade 
routes and a more diversified trading pattern stimulated the growth o f marine insurance 
and credit facilities in London. These were often adaptations o f practices used in 
Amsterdam, but increasingly London insurance underwriters, who met at Edward
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Lloyd’s coffee shop in the City, captured business from their Dutch rivals. Coward 
(1994) suggests that the period o f English neutrality from 1674 to 1689, when the 
Dutch remained at war with France, was a vital one in the progress o f English overseas 
trade. During this period, English merchants overtook the Dutch in the colonial slave 
trade and the European carrying trade, with the result that London was well on the path 
o f becoming the centre o f the commercial world.
1.2 An overview of Lloyd’s
The Lloyd’s insurance market is a place where the business o f insurance and reinsurance 
is transacted between those who are seeking insurance - the insured or reinsured - and 
others who are prepared to offer insurance coverage - the capital providers.
The growth o f Lloyd’s from Edward Lloyd’s seventeenth century coffee house to a 
major international insurance and reinsurance market has been well documented 
(Cockerell, 1984; Gibb, 1957) and it is not the purpose o f this thesis to dwell on the 
history o f Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s is not an insurance company nor does it itself issue 
insurance policies. Prior to 1994 Lloyd’s consisted entirely o f individuals, known as 
underwriting members or Names who transacted the business o f insurance with 
unlimited liability “each for his own part and not one for another” . Insurance is 
contracted on the basis that each Name is liable to the full extent o f his wealth for the 
share o f the risk he accepts (“down to his last shirt button” as the traditional saying is in 
Lloyd’s). Whilst risks are normally shared between Names, liability is several and not 
joint, with “each underwriting member (acting) for his own part and not one for the
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other” (Lloyd’s Act 1982). A Name is treated in English law as a sole trader and thus 
has unlimited liability.
From 1st January 1994 incorporated investors could join Lloyd’s and, as these are 
limited liability companies, the shareholders are liable only to the extent o f  the value o f 
their shareholding.
Lloyd’s is constituted under various Acts o f  Parliament, thus reflecting the fundamental 
differences between Lloyd’s underwriters and corporate or mutual associations. The 
Lloyd’s Act 1871 gave Lloyd’s its legal foundation, incorporating principles that had 
been previously accepted by the Underwriters on a voluntary basis. The Act conferred 
on the elected governing Committee the powers to enforce the rules and principles that 
were previously adhered to on a voluntary basis. The Act incorporated the Underwriting 
Members o f Lloyd’s into the Society and Corporation o f  Lloyd’s and made provision 
for a Committee o f Members to manage the affairs o f the Society.
Subsequent legislation was enacted in 1888, 1911, 1925, 1951 and 1982. The Lloyd’s 
Act 1982 established a Council o f  Lloyd’s to manage and regulate the Society’s affairs 
with wider powers o f self-regulation than the Committee had previously possessed.
1.3 Lloyd’s Accounting System
A three year accounting system is followed by all Lloyd’s Underwriters. Under the 
system, the underwriting results o f the members are stated by “year o f account” . A new 
“year o f account” commences on 1st January o f each year and remains open for a period
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o f three years. During that period, all premiums received and claims paid in respect o f 
the policies signed during the first calendar year o f the “year o f account are attributed 
to that year o f account. All premiums are held in trust and none can be distributed until 
after the expiration o f the third calendar year o f a year o f  account. At the end o f the 
three year period the underwriter will calculate a reserve (known as the “reinsurance to 
close”) based on the known and unknown liabilities o f the year o f  account. Once the 
reinsurance to close is established, the year o f account can close and the reinsurance to 
close is transferred in full to  underwriting members participating in the same syndicate 
for the subsequent “year o f  account” . For example, a  new syndicate which started in 
1996 will close its first year o f account at 31st December 1998. The reinsurance to 
close will be transferred to  the 1997 year o f  account. The 1997 year o f  account closes 
on 31st December 1999 and the reinsurance to  close is calculated on the reserve 
required in respect o f known and unknown liabilities for both the 1996 and 1997 year o f 
account. Consequently the older a syndicate becomes the larger the reinsurance to  close 
should become because there are an increasing number o f closed years for which a 
reserve has to be calculated. The three year accounting system is designed to ensure that 
when a year o f  account is closed, written premiums have matured, return premiums have 
been accounted for, a large proportion o f the claims have been settled, and a realistic 
assessment o f outstanding claims and IBNR (incurred but not reported claims) can be 
attained.
1.4 The course of business at Lloyd’s.
The business o f insurance at Lloyd’s is conducted via the interaction between Lloyd’s 
underwriters and Lloyd’s brokers. All insurance business is brought to  underwriters
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through brokers who are regulated by the Council o f Lloyd’s, and are known as 
“Lloyd’s Brokers” . As o f 1st January 1996 there were 211 registered Lloyd’s Brokers.
The underwriting members o f Lloyd’s are subject to stringent financial requirements 
which are prescribed by Acts o f Parliament and the Council o f Lloyd’s and are intended 
to ensure that the security afforded by Lloyd’s is o f the highest order. Prior to joining 
Lloyd’s, each prospective member must prove that he has a minimum level o f wealth 
(qualifying means). With the exception o f those members who actually work at Lloyd’s, 
members are required to establish minimum qualifying means on joining o f £250,000. 
Only certain assets which are readily realisable qualify for inclusion as means. The 
combined qualifying means assets on 31st December 1995 were £6,758 million. Since 
the object o f establishing qualifying means is to demonstrate a minimum level o f wealth, 
it may reasonably be inferred that the actual wealth o f members exceeds this figure by a 
substantial amount.
Each underwriting member is required to deposit a minimum sum o f £25,000 at Lloyd’s. 
In the majority o f cases, however, considerably more is demanded as Names often 
underwrite more than the minimum. The exact amount will vary depending on each 
member’s underwriting limit but an external member will be required to deposit 30% of 
his underwriting limit in his Lloyd’s deposit. As at 31st December 1995, members’ 
deposits amounted to £4,696 million.
One o f the fundamental features o f  Lloyd’s is that each member must accept and fully 
understand that he has unlimited liability; thus each member is liable to meet his
5
underwriting losses to the full extent o f his wealth. A member’s underwriting capacity 
is administered by a Members’ Agent who will advise a member with which syndicates 
to place his capacity. Members’ Agents often require that members establish additional 
underwriting reserves with them which usually take the form o f personal reserves, and 
are held in the names o f trustees, whose consent must be obtained before funds may be 
released for any purpose other than meeting underwriting liabilities. The Members 
Agent may suggest that the member hold a special reserve as well. Both the personal 
and special reserves are available to support a member’s underwriting.
Insurance business can only be presented at Lloyd’s by approved Lloyd’s brokers. Once 
the broker receives instructions from his client (the insured), he prepares a slip . This 
will set out the type o f insurance, the sum insured, the period o f insurance, the location 
where applicable, and various clauses applicable to  the particular type o f  insurance. 
Most insurance at Lloyd’s is transacted by the physical attendance o f the broker at the 
underwriter’s “box” in Lloyd’s. Certain underwriters are recognised as market leaders 
in particular classes o f  insurance, for instance the Cassidy syndicate at Lloyd’s is known 
as a market leader for kidnap and ransom insurance and syndicate 435 (D.P. Mann and 
others) is known as a lead for US liability business. It will be to one o f these leads 
that the broker approaches in order to obtain a quote for his client. The leader will 
decide the price required for the insurance and/or any terms, conditions or warranties 
and will underwrite a certain percentage o f the risk. The broker will offer the 
underwriter’s quote to his client and, if acceptable, he will then go around the 
appropriate market until he has secured additional lines making up one hundred per cent 
o f the risk that he is seeking to have underwritten. Having placed the risk in this
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manner, the Lloyd’s broker is then under a duty to prepare the insurance policy on the 
appropriate form on which the insurance has been placed, and the broker then submits 
the slip and the policy to the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office (LPSO).
The insurance slip is the complete and final contract fixing the terms upon which the 
insurance cover has been granted. The slip is a legally binding document and reference 
may be made to  it for the purposes o f  ascertaining the parties’ intentions in preparing 
the policy (Ionides v  Pacific Insurance Co (1871) L.R.6 Q.B. 674). It is specifically 
provided for in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 that where there is a policy issued by 
underwriters, reference may still be made to  the slip, and the Court is given power to 
rectify a policy so as to make it correspond with the terms expressed in the slip.
1.5 Centra] resources of Lloyd’s
Individual underwriting members are liable for their own underwriting commitments. 
However, should the assets held on their behalf at Lloyd’s or their personal resources 
prove insufficient to meet their liabilities, the resources held centrally by Lloyd’s are 
available to  meet their obligations. These central resources comprise the Central Fund to  
which all members contribute by way o f an annual levy on their overall premium income, 
and the assets o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s.
The Central Fund was established to protect the policyholder and not the underwriting
*
member; it is not an asset o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s. The Central Fund was 
constituted in 1927 for the purpose o f meeting the underwriting liability o f  any Lloyd’s 
member in the event that the assets constituting his premium trust funds, underwriting
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reserves, personal wealth and Lloyd’s deposit prove insufficient to discharge his 
underwriting liabilities. As at 31st December 1995, the net value o f the Central Fund 
was £541 million and the assets o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s totalled £245 million.
1.6 Technical Reserves at Lloyd’s
The technical reserves (loss reserves) o f a syndicate, which are broadly comparable to 
those o f an insurance company, comprise: (1) the reinsurance to close (loss provisions) 
in respect o f the closing year and all preceding years; and (2) the provision for estimated 
future liability on the two open years (IBNR - incurred but not reported claims). The 
assets supporting the technical reserves include the underwriting balances which must be 
held in trust in a form acceptable to the Department o f Trade. These assets are available 
for the payment o f claims, expenses and other outgoings o f the members.
Whilst the underwriting balances are largely used to meet underwriting payments, they 
produce investment earnings to increase the funds available. It is not until all 
underwriting payments have been made and provision made for outstanding liabilities,
i
j that the underwriting profit, if  any, may be released to underwriting members. At 31st
|
December 1995, the value o f assets encompassing the total underwriting balances o f 
! Lloyd’s members was £19,686 million. The assets were in the form of cash and
I investments (including the American and Canadian Trust Funds held in New York and
i
|
Toronto, respectively, totalling approximately $12,214 million and Can$951 million)
•r
plus the amounts due for payment by Lloyd’s brokers through the Central Accounting 
System.
i
i
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The total declared resources o f the underwriting members o f Lloyd s, either in the form 
o f assets held in trust at Lloyd’s, or representing their means certified to Lloyd s at 31st 
December 1995 were £27,326 million. Given that the Names financial resources will 
exceed their deposits, this figure represents a conservative valuation o f the resources of 
members.
1.7 Statistics relating to Lloyd’s.
The first major publication on Lloyd’s statistics was “Lloyd’s o f  London: A Detailed 
Analysis o f Results 1950 - 1977” by Doody (1979). Doody analysed the Global Returns 
submitted annually by the Corporation o f Lloyd’s to the Department o f Trade and 
Industry over the period 1950 to 1977. Doody (1979) described the growth o f the 
membership o f Lloyd’s and the development o f premiums and claims over the period 
1950 to 1977. However, his figures did not extract the reinsurance to close figure from 
the premium, so it is difficult to evaluate how the premium income has actually 
developed. The reinsurance to close figure has been extracted by the Lloyd’s Planning 
Department in their annual publication “Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s” . The figures in 
“Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s” are extracted from the annual returns that syndicates 
make to the Department o f Trade and Industry, together with information that the 
syndicate has to disclose to the Corporation o f Lloyd’s - such as stamp capacity, number 
o f supporting Members’ Agents and the types and numbers o f members comprising each 
syndicate.
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1.8 The capacity of Lloyd’s, the number of syndicates, net premium income and 
profitability
When an insurance or reinsurance contract is underwritten at Lloyd s, the premium is 
collected by the broker from the insured or reinsured. The policy is then sent to the 
Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office in Chatham, Kent to be “signed”, i.e. allocated a signing 
number and date. The LPSO debit the premium from the broker and credit the 
syndicates who have underwritten the contract. Each insurance or reinsurance contract 
at Lloyd’s is allocated a unique signing number and date. This enables the LPSO to 
identify and track the contract.
The capacity o f a syndicate is the maximum gross premium, i.e. before deductions for 
outwards reinsurance premiums, in any one year o f account that a syndicate can accept. 
Thus a syndicate with a capacity o f  £70 million for a given year o f  account can have a 
gross premium income o f £70 million for that year. Premiums are credited to  
syndicates in three currencies - Sterling, U.S. dollars and Canadian dollars. To 
determine how much o f a syndicate’s capacity has been utilised these three currencies 
are converted to sterling at rates o f exchange specified by Lloyd’s - the premium income 
monitoring (PIM) rates o f exchange. These rates are published by Lloyd’s at the 
beginning o f a calendar year and are constant for that year. A syndicate has to make 
quarterly returns to Lloyd’s in order for the Solvency Department to check that the 
syndicate is not writing in excess o f  its capacity. This check ensures that sufficient 
assets uphold the liabilities accepted by the syndicate.
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Figure 1.1: The Capacity o f Lloyd's. (Source: Statistics Relating to Lloyd's, 1996)
The graph (Fig 1.1) shows the growth in Lloyd’s capacity from 1967 to  1996. The 
graph may be divided into four sections: (1) from 1967 to 1977, (2) from 1977 to 1984, 
(3) from 1984 to 1987 and (4) from 1987 to 1996. From 1967 to 1977 capacity at 
Lloyd’s grew by almost three and three-quarters from £503 million to £1,882 million, an 
average growth o f £137.9 million per year. From 1977 to 1984 capacity grew at a faster 
rate, an average o f £458.3 million per year. During this period capacity more than 
doubled from £1,882 million in 1977 to £5,090 million in 1984. In the four years from 
1984 to 1987 the capacity o f  Lloyd’s more than doubled from £5,090 million in 1984 to 
£10,290 million in 1987 an average increase in capacity o f  £1,733 million per year. The 
rate o f growth of capacity slowed between 1987 and 1991 to an average increase o f 
£273 million per year. Capacity peaked at £11,382 million for the 1991 year o f account 
which represents just over a 10% increase on 1987. Capacity dropped from £10,046 in 
1992 to £8,878 for 1993 although recovering to £9,994 for the 1996 year o f account. 
The 1996 capacity comprises £6,950 million from traditional Names and £3,044 million 
from corporate members.
The graph o f the number o f members o f Lloyd’s (Fig 1.2) follows the pattern o f the 
growth in capacity. Figure 1.2 shows the number o f  active members o f  Lloyd’s for each 
year o f account. It therefore excludes those members who are on open years o f account 
- members who are unable to leave Lloyd’s because the syndicate has been unable to
close. There was a great increase in the number o f  Names during the period from the
►
late 1970s to the late 1980s. Membership peaked at over 32,000 for the 1988 year o f 
account but then dramatically fell away at an average rate o f over 2,300 per year. It is 
interesting in the period 1988 to 1991 the membership dropped from 32,433 to  26,539 -
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Fig 1.2: Number ofNames as at 1st January. (Source: Membership Department, Corporation o f Lloyd's)
a decrease o f 18%; however, the capacity o f Lloyd’s increased over that period from 
£11,018 million to £11,382 an increase o f 3%. The drop in the number o f Names may 
be explained by the significant losses experienced by some syndicates, but the increase in 
capacity suggests that those members who did not leave Lloyd s were increasing their 
overall premium income limits.
Figure 1.3 (a) below shows the profit or loss paid to Names over the period 1950 to 
1992 and the percentage “pay-out” to  Names. Names’ profits are described by 
Members’ Agents as a percentage “pay-out” o f  their capacity i.e. the monetary amount 
o f profit (or loss) divided by the Name’s capacity on the syndicate.
From 1950 to 1987 Lloyd’s continuously declared a profit to Names apart from small 
losses for the years 1964,1965 and 1966 due to  Hurricane Betsy. For the 1988 to  1992 
years o f account Lloyd’s has made enormous losses totalling £8,729 million. From 
1950 to  1987, a  period o f 38 years Lloyd’s paid out to  Names a  total o f  £4,005.3 
million. The pre-tax profit or loss to  Names over years o f account 1950 to  1992 is 
shown on the graph in figure 1.3 (b). The loss making years are due to a  combination 
o f large natural disasters during the period 1988 to 1992 and also numerous asbestosis 
and pollution claims on old years o f accounts. The losses have caused many Names to 
leave Lloyd’s from 1988 onwards as is seen by the graph in Figure 1.2.
It is interesting to look at the column entitled ‘Tercentage Pay-out” in Figure 1.3 (a). 
The percentage pay-out is the pre-tax profit divided by the capacity o f the market. 
Lloyd’s has rarely paid out more than 10% profit on capacity. Indeed, the Society has
12
only paid out 10% or more for four years o f account during the 24 years from 1967 to 
1990. The Lloyd’s Business Plan (1993) states: “We aim to achieve a pre-tax return o f 
10% on underwriting capacity over the underwriting cycle” (Page 12 Section 1.16). 
Given the historic picture o f the profitability o f Lloyd’s, this seems to be an ambitious 
target.
Y ear of Gross Pre-tax Percentage
Account capacity
(£m)
profit/loss to 
Names (£m)
pay-out
1967 503 2.2 0.44
1968 592 38.5 6.50
1969 741 55.1 7.44
1970 761 63.0 8.28
1971 839 71.4 8.51
1972 891 89.1 10.00
1973 1,045 113.1 10.82
1974 1,162 97.1 8.36
1975 1,365 142.0 10.40
1976 1,828 126.1 6.90
1977 1,882 141.4 7.51
1978 2,417 198.6 8.22
1979 3,049 229.0 7.51
1980 3,415 352.7 10.33
1981 3,562 248.3 6.97
1982 4,111 161.7 3.93
1983 4,381 119.6 2.73
1984 5,090 278.2 5.47
1985 6,682 195.5 2.93
1986 8,511 649.4 7.63
1987 10,290 509.1 4.95
1988 11,018 -509.8 -4.63
1989 10,956 -2,063.2 -18.83
1990 11,070 -2,319.1 -20.95
1991 11,382 -2,047.8 -17.99
1992 10,046 -1,192.9 -11.87
1993 8,878 225.20 2.54
Figure 1.3(a): The profitability o f Lloyd’s (Source: Global Accounts, Statistics Relating 
to Lloyd’s)
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Figure 1.3(b): Profitability o f Lloyd's. (Source: Global Accounts; Statistics Relating to Lloyd's, 1996)
The graph in figure 1.4 shows that from 1967 to 1980 there was an overall increase in 
the number o f syndicates from 237 to 437. The capacity o f Lloyd’s increased over this 
period from £503 million to £3,415 million. The average size o f syndicate increased 
from £2.1 million to £7.8 million over the same period. From 1980 to 1987 the number 
o f syndicates decreased at a mean average rate o f just over ten per year. There 
slight increase in the number o f syndicates from 1987 to 1990. However, there has 
a dramatic decrease in syndicate numbers since 1990, from 401 in 1990 to 167 in 19 
as a result o f the loss experience o f Lloyd’s over the same period. Capacity ha , 
however, remained relatively static, thus suggesting that those syndicates that have not 
ceased trading have increased in size either through merger or through raising new 
capital. The distribution o f syndicates by size is shown below in figure 1.5 which shows 
that in 1990 there were fifteen syndicates with a stamp capacity o f over £100 million, 
but .by 1994 the number o f syndicates with a capacity o f over £100 million had doubled. 
The mean average syndicate capacity in 1990 was £27.6 million whereas in 1994 this
had increased to £60.9 million.
During the period 1989 to 1994 there have been numerous mergers and takeovers 
among underwriting agencies. One example is the underwriting agency A.J. Archer, 
which acquired the KeUett Group late in 1992 for £1.3 million plus an amount 
contingent upon the profits o f Kellett’s agency business through 1995. In July 1993, 
Archer acquired Castle Underwriting for £5.2 million. The Castle acquisition increased 
Archer’s 1993 capacity (for all the syndicates it manages) from £201 million to £389 
million and its members’ agency business from 145 to 745 names. One o f the benefits 
that Archer anticipates is consolidation of administrative and service functions into one
14
Figure 1.4: The number o f Lloyd's syndicates from 1948 to 1996. (Source: Membership Department, Corporation o f Lloyd's)
organisation. These benefits however did not come without a further price: Archer 
announced a pre-tax loss o f £0.8 million for the year ending September 1993 (compared 
with a profit o f £1.2 million in the previous year), in part due to restructuring.
Syndicate size 
£ million
Y ear of Account
1986 1990 1994
0-19.99 254 209 31
20-39.99 53 102 45
40-59.99 12 32 41
60-79.99 10 18 24
80-99.99 7 10 8
100-119.99 1 7 8
120-139.99 0 2 8
140-159.99 2 2 2
160-179.99 0 2 1
180-199.99 2 1 4
200+ 0 1 7
Total no o f synds 341 386 179
Total capacity o f Lloyd’s 
(£m) 8,511 11,070 10,954
Average capacity o f a 
Syndicate (£ million) 24.96 28.68 61.20
Figure 1.5. Distribution o f syndicates by size. Source: Chatset figures 1986, 1990, 
1994.
Figure 1.6 is a graph o f Lloyd’s net premium income. Net premium income is defined as 
gross premium income less the amount for reinsurance to close and reinsurance ceded. 
This shows that the net premium income has increased over time, although it decreased 
for the 1993 year o f account. The rate o f increase was very dramatic from 1978 
onwards which reflects the growth in capacity o f the market over this period. A more 
revealing graph is Figure 1.7 which shows net premium income as a percentage o f gross 
capacity i.e. capacity utilisation. From 1967 to 1993 year o f account there has been a 
gradual trend towards a lower utilisation o f capacity. This suggests that the rate o f 
increase in Lloyd’s capacity over this period was not matched by a similar rate o f
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Figure 1.6: Net premium income to Lloyd's. (Source: Statistics Relating to Lloyd's, 1996)
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Figure 1.7: Ratio o f net premium income to gross capacity. (Source: Statistics, Relating to Lloyd's, 1996; this author's analysis)
increase in premium income. Probable reasons for this were a lack o f new business 
coming into Lloyd’s and competitive pressures forcing a lowering o f price. This author 
suggests that the reason for the decrease in premium income for the 1993 year of 
account, which was closed at 31st December 1995, was a result o f  the losses declared 
by Lloyd’s over the preceding five years o f account. These losses raised questions over 
the solvency o f the Society and caused an exit o f business out o f Lloyd’s.
1.9 Business written in Lloyd’s
Figure 1.8 below displays business written at Lloyd’s divided into the categories defined
by the Department o f  Trade.
Yrof Accident & Motor vehicle Aircraft Ships Goods in
A/C Health damage & liability dam/liab dam/liab transit
1984 194.7 356.1 355.6 1,265.2 361.2
1985 172.3 420.2 405.9 1,253.4 340.7
1986 184.9 483.0 565.5 1,537.2 362.8
1987 213.7 561.1 695.3 1,794.2 395.0
1988 222.7 627.9 588.1 1,799.4 371.5
1989 268.7 688.1 672.6 2,205.4 391.6
1990 429.2 748.7 957.9 3,128.4 457.7
1991 629.4 1,047.6 1,023.5 2,678.8 367.5
1992 630.5 1,326.7 861.3 1,948.7 322.3
1993 512.2 1,362.7 836.6 1,878.1 309.0
Y rof Property General Pecuniary Life
A/C damage liability loss TOTAL
1984 1,000.8 653.5 1.0 5.3 4,193.4
1985 1,081.3 699.8 0.9 5.5 4,380.0
1986 1,274.0 821.7 0.9 5.3 5,235.3
1987 1,494.1 903.0 91.0 7.2 6,154.6
1988 1,349.2 835.7 97.8 7.3 5,899.6
1989 1,805.6 935.0 96.4 10.9 7,074.3
1990 2,252.5 1,208.2 126.2 17.1 9,325.9
1991 2,219.4 1,491.1 194.8 23.3 9,675.4
1992 2,342.0 1,461.1 198.3 39.3 9,130.2
1993 2,021.5 1,363.2 • 173.5 34.5 *8,491.3
Figure 1.8: Gross premium income (net of reinsurance to close but gross of ceded 
reinsurance and net of brokerage and commissions. Excludes inter-syndicate transactions) in 
jpullion. Source: Statutory Statement of Business_____________________________________
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To estimate the size o f each o f Lloyd’s five traditional markets (Marine, Non-marine,
Life, Motor and Aviation) the above premiums have been allocated thus:
Marine = ships damage and liability; and goods in transit.
Non-marine = Accident and health; Property damage; Pecuniary loss; and 
General liability.
Aviation = Aircraft damage and liability.
Motor = Motor vehicle damage and liability.
Life = Life business.
The percentage split across the five markets has remained relatively constant throughout 
the period 1984 to 1990. The largest market is Non-marine with about one half o f all 
business written at Lloyd’s. Figure 1.9 suggests that approximately 50% o f Lloyd’s 
premium income is non-marine, 25% marine, 10% aviation, 15% motor and negligible 
life business.
Year of 
A/C Marine Non-marine Aviation Motor Life
1984 1,626.4 1,850.0 355.6 356.1 5.3
1985 1,594.1 1,954.3 405.9 420.2 5.5
1986 1,900.0 2,281.5 565.5 483.0 5.3
1987 2,189.2 2,701.8 695.3 561.1 7.2
1988 2,170.9 2,505.4 588.1 627.9 7.3
1989 2,597.0 3,105.7 672.6 688.1 10.9
1990 3,586.1 4,016.1 957.9 748.7 17.1
1991 3,046.3 4,534.7 1,023.5 1,047.6 23.3
1992 2,271.0 4,631.9 861.3 1,326.7 39.3
1993 2,187.1 4,070.4 836.6 1,362.7 34.5
Percentage allocation 
Year of
A/C Marine ''Jon-marine Aviation Motor Life
1984 38.78% 44.12% 8.48% 8.49% 0.13%
1985 36.40 44.61 9.27 9.59 0.13
1986 36.29 43.58 10.80 9.23 0.10
1987 35.57 43.90 11.30 9.11 0.12
1988 36.80 42.47 9.97 10.64 0.12
1989 36.71 43.90 9.51 9.73 0.15
1990 38.48 43.06 10.27 8.03 0.18
1991 31.49 46.87 10.58 10.83 0.24
1992 24.87 50.73 9.43 14.53 0.43
1993 25.76 47.94 9.85 16.05 0.41
Figure 1.9: Classification of business written at Lloyd’s into the five
traditional markets. (Gross premium income in £ million)
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Figure 1.10 shows net premium income and an allocation to the five markets.
Y ro f Accident & Motor vehicle Aircraft Ships Goods in
A/C Health dam & liab dam/liability dam/liability transit
1980 89.0 237.1 120.0 525.9 231.3
1981 108.3 265.2 173.5 683.4 253.9
1982 169.8 273.6 242.0 910.8 294.0
1983 188.4 283.4 188.7 768.5 254.3
1984 162.2 323.8 229.9 903.6 303.6
1985 143.6 382.6 252.7 832.1 287.2
1986 152.8 435.5 368.8 1,014.4 302.2
1987 173.2 516.0 428.3 1,135.5 331.4
1988 179.0 582.8 320.9 955.4 308.1
1989 214.0 643.5 281.0 1,013.3 312.4
1990 331.8 695.7 324.0 1,377.7 325.7
1991 485.9 959.5 432.2 1,165.7 269.9
1992 483.0 1,165.8 449.1 1,145.6 252.2
1993 362.9 1,141.8 462.8 1,176.0 249.9
Y ro f Property General Pecuniary Life TOTAL
A/C damage liability loss
1980 434.1 223.1 0.3 1.5 1,862.3
1981 510.6 260.8 0.4 1.9 2,258.0
1982 653.5 346.1 0.5 2.2 2,892.5
1983 570.4 312.4 0.7 1.9 2,569.7
1984 666.3 364.8 0.9 4.0 2,959.1
1985 737.9 415.1 0.8 4.0 3,056.0
1986 910.4 523.5 0.8 3.6 3,712.0
987 932.7 607.8 65.4 4.6 4,194.9
988 875.3 414.7 72.7 4.8 3,713.7
989 902.4 522.1 68.9 7.9 3,965.5
990 1,245.0 877.4 90.7 12.6 5,280.6
991 1,397.0 1,135.4 151.2 17.2 6,014.0
1992 1,510.1 1,131.4 162.8 31.2 6,331.2
993 1,353.8 999.3 145.1 24.6 5,916.2
Table 1.10. Net ceded premium (net o f  ceded reinsurance, reinsurance to  close and 
brokerage and commissions. Excludes inter-syndicate transactions). JEmillion. 
Source: Statutory Statement o f  Business__________________
As before, the business may be allocated to the five traditional markets (Figure 1.11 
below).
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A/C Marine Non-marine Aviation Motor Life
1980 757.2 746.5 120.0 237.1 1.5
1981 937.3 880.1 173.5 265.2 1.9
1982 1,204.8 1,169.9 242.0 273.6 2.2
1983 1,022.8 1,071.9 188.7 283.4 2.9
1984 1,207.2 1,194.2 229.9 323.8 4.0
1985 1,119.3 1,297.4 252.7 382.6 4.0
1986 1,316.6 1,587.5 368.8 435.5 3.6
1987 1,466.9 1,779.1 428.3 516.0 4.6
1988 1,263.5 1,541.7 320.9 582.8 4.8
1989 1,325.7 1,707.4 281.0 643.5 7.9
1990 1,703.4 2,544.9 324.0 695.7 12.6
1991 1,435.6 3,169.5 432.2 959.5 17.2
1992 1,397.8 3,287.3 449.1 1,165.8 31.2
1993 1,425.9 2,861.1 462.8 1,141.8 24.6
Split by percentage:
Y ro f
A/C
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Marine Non-marine Aviation Motor Life
40.66% 40.09% 6.44% 12.73% 0.08%
41.51 38.98 7.68 11.75 0.08
41.65 40.45 8.36 9.46 0.08
39.80 41.71 7.35 11.03 0.11
40.80 40.36 7.77 10.94 0.13
36.63 42.45 8.27 12.52 0.13
35.47 42.77 9.93 11.73 0.10
34.97 42.41 10.21 12.30 0.11
34.02 41.51 8.64 15.70 0.13
33.43 43.05 7.09 16.23 0.20
32.26 48.19 6.14 13.17 0.24
23.87 52.70 7.19 15.95 0.29
22.08 51.92 7.09 18.41 0.49
24.10 48.36 7.82 19.30 0.42
Figure 1.11: Classification o f net premium income into the five traditional Lloyd’ 
markets.
Figure 1.11 shows that even on a net basis the non-marine market is the biggest o f the 
five markets with about half o f premium income - a percentage that has increased over
time.
19
1.10 Reinsurance and direct business written at Lloyd’s
Section 1.9 allocated Lloyd’s premium income into nine classes. However there was no 
indication what the percentage split is between direct business and reinsurance. It is 
market practice to include facultative reinsurance (i.e. the reinsurance o f an individual 
risk) with direct business. The term “reinsurance” thus only refers to treaty 
(proportional) reinsurance and excess o f loss (non-proportional) reinsurance. Lloyd’s 
only produces statistics on direct and reinsurance business based on a calendar year 
analysis. This information is contained in the Statutory Statement o f Business. Figure 
1.12 shows the calendar year split between direct and facultative and reinsurance.
From 1982 to 1995 there has been a gradual, but not marked, increase in the amount o f 
reinsurance written compared to direct and facultative. Approximately one-third o f 
business written at Lloyd’s is reinsurance and two-thirds is direct and facultative. 
Overseas business dominates the Lloyd’s market. In 1995 almost two-thirds o f 
premium income was derived from outside the UK. However this percentage has been 
in steady decline since 1982 when the percentage o f non-UK business was 71.3%, 
probably due to competition from foreign insurers and reinsurers. Over this period UK 
business has become a larger percentage o f the overall calendar year premium income.
Figure 1.12 suggests that Lloyd’s is an important market for non-UK reinsurance 
business with over seventy per cent o f reinsurance premium income derived from 
territories outside the UK. The data in Figure 1.12 are extracted from the Statutory 
Statement o f Business that Lloyd’s submits annually to the Department o f  Trade and 
Industry.
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Calendar Direct & facultative Reinsurance (ex fee) All
Year UK Overseas Total UK Overseas Total Premiums
1982 671.6 1,376.2 2,047.8 142.2 648.7 790.9 2,838.7
1983 727.7 1,506.0 2,233.7 164.6 848.7 1,013.3 3,247.0
1984 845.4 2,023.9 2,869.3 248.7 1,213.2 1,461.9 4,331.2
1985 909.6 2,048.7 2,958.4 273.2 1,150.9 1,424.1 4,382.5
1986 1,136.6 2,469.9 3,606.5 338.6 1,443.9 1,782.5 5,389.0
1987 1,251.4 2,081.9 3,333.3 334.2 1,202.5 1,536.7 4,869.9
1988 1,369.3 2,027.8 3,397.1 407.7 1,241.7 1,649.4 5,046.5
1989 1,471.1 2,122.0 3,593.1 559.4 1,431.9 1,991.2 5,584.3
1990 1,570.3 2,245.0 3,815.3 67.7 1,474.8 2,242.5 6,057.8
1991 1,801.5 2,812.5 4,614.0 871.1 1,687.0 2,558.1 7,172.1
1992 2,268.2 3,423.7 5,691.9 869.4 2,083.5 2,952.9 8,644.8
1993 2,548.0 3,500.8 6,048.8 656.9 1,899.9 2,556.8 8,605.6
1994 2,472.4 3,221.1 5,693.5 491.6 1,667.1 2,158.7 7,852.2
1995 2,180.8 3,233.4 5,414.3 345.2 1,591.6 1,936.8 7,351.0
The above is consolidated thus:
Calendar
Year % UK % Overseas % Direct & fee % Reinsurance (ex fee)
1982 28.7 71.3 72.2 27.8
1983 27.5 72.5 68.8 31.2
1984 25.3 74.7 66.2 33.8
1985 27.0 73.0 67.5 32.5
1986 27.4 72.6 66.9 33.1
1987 32.6 67.4 68.4 31.6
1988 35.2 64.8 67.3 32.7
1989 36.3 63.7 64.3 35.7
1990 38.6 61.4 62.9 37.1
1991 37.3 62.7 64.3 35.7
1992 36.3 63.7 65.8 34.2
1993 37.2 62.8 70.3 29.7
1994 37.8 62.3 72.5 27.5
1995 34.4 65.6 73.7 26.4
Figure 1.12: Calendar year gross premiums split into direct and reinsurance (premiums are gross 
of ceded reinsurance and net of brokerage and commissions. They exclude premiums in respect
of inter-syndicate reinsurance), f  million. 
Source- Statutory Statement of Business Form 3.
In attempting to  estimate the amount o f reinsurance business underwritten at Lloyd’s it 
is necessary to extract the facultative reinsurance figures from the block direct and 
facultative figures in Figure 1.12. An estimate o f  the relative proportions o f  both these
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business types is given in “Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s” where it is stated that the split 
is 80% direct insurance and 20% facultative reinsurance. The data in Figure 1.12 allow 
estimates o f the amount o f reinsurance business underwritten at Lloyd’s assuming that 
the proportion has remained constant at 80/20 respectively. Figure 1.13 shows the 
breakdown between direct and reinsurance business. Using this allocation, direct and 
reinsurance business are underwritten in a ratio o f approximately 3:2 respectively.
Calendar
Year % Direct % Reinsurance (ine facultative)
1982 57.7 42.3
1983 55.0 45.0
1984 53.0 47.0
1985 54.0 46.0
1986 53.5 46.5
1987 54.8 45.2
1988 53.9 46.1
1989 51.5 48.5
1990 50.4 49.6
1991 51.5 48.5
1992 52.7 47.3
1993 56.2 43.8
1994 58.0 42.0
1995 58.9 41.1
Figure 1.13: Breakdown o f calendar year gross premium split into direct and
reinsurance (premiums are gross o f ceded reinsurance and net o f  brokerage and
commissions. They exclude premiums in respect o f inter-syndicate reinsurance).
Source: Statutory Statement o f Business Form 3.
A survey o f slips processed through the LPSO was undertaken by the Lloyd’s Planning 
Department during 1987 to 1989 the results o f which are given in Figure 1.14 below. 
The data in Figure 1.14 do not match the data in figure 1.12 as not all premiums to 
Lloyd’s are handled by the LPSO; premiums due to motor syndicates are often credited 
direct to the syndicate from the broker. However, we may use the data in Figure 1.14 
to derive some estimate for the breakdown o f business underwritten at Lloyd’s. Figure
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1.14 suggests that the mix o f business in Lloyd’s is 50% direct insurance, 15% 
facultative reinsurance, 23% non-proportional treaty reinsurance and 12% proportional 
treaty reinsurance. Approximately, therefore, twice as much non-proportional business 
(i.e. excess o f  loss) business is underwritten as is proportional business.
1987 1988 1989
Direct 2,409 (50%) 2,234 (50%) 2,376 (49%)
Facultative 739 ( 15%) 660(15% ) 664 (14%)
Non-proportional 1,113 (23%) 1,027 (23%) 1,192 (25%)
Proportional 559(12% ) 538(12% ) 596 (12%)
TOTAL 4,820 4,459 4,828
Note: The premiums are gross o f ceded reinsurance, but after deduction o f brokerage; 
intersyndicate reinsurance is excluded in the total, estimates o f  which are:
Intersyndicate 712 872 1,199
reinsurances
Figure 1.14: Lloyd’s premiums processed through LPSO (Source: Lloyd’s Planning
Department) Figures in £m
1.11 Lloyd’s share of the UK Insurance and Reinsurance Market
Carter and Falush (1995) estimate that for the 1993 revenue year, 48% o f business in 
the London market (in terms o f total gross premium underwritten) is underwritten at 
Lloyd’s with the company market underwriting the balance. However, this figure may 
not be accurate as Carter and Falush (1995) used gross data and there are reinsurances 
between Lloyd’s underwriters and the company market (and vice versa). Thus some 
business will be double-counted. Using data that are net o f  ceded reinsurance will 
overcome the double-counting problem but the figures will be distorted because o f 
reinsurance payments to overseas companies. On a net basis “Statistics Relating to 
Lloyd’s” states that Lloyd’s proportion o f the London market is sixty per cent.
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Whilst Lloyd’s proportion o f the London market has been estimated both by Lloyd’s 
and Carter and Falush (1995), no estimate has been made o f Lloyd’s proportion o f the 
UK insurance market i.e. UK domestic business and overseas business underwritten in 
the UK. It has therefore been necessary to calculate these figures using data published in 
the ABI Statistical Bulletin o f UK Market Statistics 1984-1992. Unfortunately, this 
author was unable to find these ABI statistics for post 1992. The ABI (Association o f 
British Insurers) publishes General Business Net Written Premiums which give 
premiums on a calendar year basis net o f  ceded reinsurance but gross o f brokerage. It is 
essential to compare the net premiums, before deduction o f brokerage, o f  UK 
Companies with the net premiums o f Lloyd’s. In this way there is no double counting 
due to a Lloyd’s syndicate reinsuring a UK Company or vice versa. Taking the 
premiums gross o f brokerage gives a better understanding o f the amount o f  insurance 
that is actually purchased from UK Companies and Lloyd’s. The ABI figures comprise 
data from Insurance Companies (both ABI members and non-members), Lloyd’s, 
mutual clubs and associations. The “UK Insurance Market” is defined as business 
written in the UK by all insurers operating in the UK on an establishment basis. The 
figures include home-foreign business written in the UK and reinsurance accepted in the 
UK (whether written by a UK registered company or by the UK branch o f an overseas 
registered company), but excludes any business written by UK insurers to their 
subsidiaries and branches overseas.
Figure 1.15 below reproduces the General Business gross written premium income data 
in the ABI statistics and figure 1.16 below reproduces the General Business net written 
premium income data in the ABI statistics. The figures in brackets represent the
24
proportion that the net figure bears to the gross figure (i.e. Figure 1.16 divided by 
Figure 1.15).
Revenue Year Direct and Fac Reinsurance Total
1985 13,780 4,312 18,092
1986 16,594 4,773 21,367
1987 18,406 4,474 22,880
1988 20,512 4,642 25,154
1989 22,339 5,320 27,659
1990 24,503 6,227 30,730
1991 27,490 7,221 34,711
1992 32,579 8,176 40,755
Figure 1.15. General Business gross written premium income in £m. Figures are gross
o f brokerage and gross o f ceded reinsurance. 
Source: ABI Statistical Bulletin.
Revenue Year Direct and Fac Reinsurance Total
1985 10,839(0.7866) 2,964 (0.6874) 13,803
1986 13,212 (0.7962) 3,400 (0.7123) 16,612
1987 15,190 (0.8253) 3,422 (0.7649) 18,612
1988 16,979 (0.8278) 3,368 (0.7255) 20,347
1989 18,684 (0.8364) 3,716 (0.6985) 22,400
1990 20,133 (0.8217) 4,198 (0.6742) 24,331
1991 22,329(0.8123) 4,914 (0.6805) 27,243
1992 25,832 (0.9729) 5,636 (0.6893) 31,468
Figure 1.16. General Business net written premium income in £m. Figures are gross o f  
brokerage and net o f ceded reinsurance. (Figures in brackets are Table 1.16 divided by 
Table 1.15)
Source: ABI Statistical Bulletin._________ ________________
To estimate Lloyd’s proportion o f the UK insurance market it is necessary to produce 
Lloyd’s statistics in the same format as the ABI statistics in Figure 1.16. In Lloyd’s 
Statutory Statement o f Business published annually there are revenue figures which give 
premiums net o f brokerage and gross o f ceded reinsurance. The Global accounts give 
an average brokerage figure for each revenue year. Using this figure it is possible to
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create Lloyd’s premium figures gross o f brokerage and gross o f ceded reinsurance. In 
the global accounts are figures for each revenue year giving premiums net o f ceded 
reinsurance and gross o f brokerage i.e. in the format o f the ABI figures in Figure 1.16. 
However, the proportion between reinsurance and direct is not given. This split may be 
“best guessed” by assuming that the reinsurance ceded from the Lloyd’s market is in the 
same proportion as for the whole UK insurance market. Therefore, by applying the 
proportions in brackets in Figure 1.16 to Lloyd’s gross premiums, it is possible to create 
Lloyd’s net premium income figures (i.e. net o f  reinsurance ceded and gross o f 
brokerage). When using this technique it was found that there was a margin o f error 
between the calculated net premium income figures and the actual net premium income 
figures published in the global figures. In some instances the calculated figure was 
lower than the actual figure, but in other cases the calculated figure was more. The 
maximum margin o f error was 8.2% though in many cases the error was much lower. 
Pro-rata adjustments were made to the calculated figures to absorb these differences.
Figure 1.17 gives the gross premium income figures for Lloyd’s net o f brokerage as 
published in the Statutory Statement o f Business.
U.K Overseas
Year Direct/fac Reinsurance Direct/fac Reinsurance Total
1985 909,638 273,219 2,048,712 1,150,898 4,382,467
1986 1,136,594 338,643 2,469,927 1,443,992 5,389,156
1987 1,251,386 334,178 2,081,884 1,202,495 4,869,943
1988 1,369,300 407,722 2,027,810 1,241,659 5,046,491
1989 1,471,094 559,362 2,122,015 1,431,862 5,584,333
1990 1,570,270 767,687 2,245,046 1,474,873 6,057,876
1991 1,801,482 871,125 2,812,514 1,687,032 7,172,153
1992 2,268,245 869,405 3,423,672 2,083,466 8,644,788
Figure 1.17: Lloyd’s revenue figures. Gross o f  ceded reinsurance, net o f  brokerage 
Excluding intersyndicate transactions. (£000) 6
Source: Statutory Statement o f Business
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Figure 1.18 shows the same data as Figure 1.17 but gross o f brokerage. The percentage 
brokerage used is also shown.
U K . Overseas
Year Direct/fac Reinsurance Direct/fac Reinsurance Total
1985 1,116,120 335,238 2,513,757 1,412,145 5,377,260
1986 1,391,180 414,496 3,023,166 1,767,432 6,596,274
1987 1,529,812 408,531 2,545,090 1,470,043 5,953,476
1988 1,676,010 499,048 2,482,020 1,519,778 6,176,856
1989 1,802,811 685,493 2,600,509 1,754,733 6,843,546
1990 1,926,712 941,947 2,754,658 1,809,660 7,432,977
1991 2,204,996 1,066,248 3,442,490 2,064,911 8,778,645
1992 2,776,310 1,064,143 4,190,541 2,550,142 10,581,136
Year Brokerage (%)
1985 18.5
1986 18.3
1987 18.2
1988 18.3
1989 18.4
1990 18.5
1991 18.3
1992 18.3
Figure 1.18 Lloyd’s revenue figures. Gross o f  ceded reinsurance, gross o f  brokerage 
Excluding intersyndicate transactions. (£000) Source: Statutory Statement o f  Business 
brokerage per cent from Global figures._________________
Figure 1.19 gives Lloyd’s calendar year premium income net o f ceded reinsurance but 
gross o f brokerage. Thus Lloyd’s figures are presented in Figure 1.19 in the same 
format as the ABI figures o f Figure 1.16. Figure 1.19 also gives Lloyd’s proportion o f 
the UK insurance market.
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Year
%>qfUK 
Direct & Fac Market Reinsurance
% o f UK 
Market Total
% o f UK 
Market
1985 3,086 28.5 1,299 43.8 4,385 31.8
1986 3,830 29.0 1,693 49.8 5,523 33.2
1987 3,518 23.2 1,503 43.9 5,021 27.0
1988 3,582 21.1 1,524 45.2 5,106 25.1
1989 3,705 19.8 1,716 46.2 5,421 24.2
1990 3,701 18.4 1,784 42.5 5,485 22.5
1991 4,524 20.3 2,102 42.8 6,626 24.3
1992 5,752 22.3 2,595 46.0 8,347 26.5
Figure 1.19: Lloyd’s revenue figures net o f ceded reinsurance and gross o f brokerage. 
Excluding inter-syndicate transactions. (£m) Source: Statutory Statement o f  Business 
and Global accounts(amended)________________________________________
The figures in Figure 1.19 suggest that Lloyd’s underwrites approximately one-quarter 
o f the UK Insurance Market. This percentage has decreased from just over 31% in 
1985. Lloyd’s income has increased by 90% over the period 1985 to 1992, but Lloyd’s 
market share has fallen from 31% in 1985 to 26% in 1992. Market share has fallen 
probably because o f the expansion o f direct writers o f business such as Direct Line 
which is owned by The Royal Bank of Scotland. Lloyd’s market share o f  the UK 
reinsurance market has remained at over 40% whereas Lloyd’s proportion o f the UK 
direct and facultative market has decreased from 28% to 22% . Figure 1.19 highlights 
the importance o f Lloyd’s as a reinsurance market.
1.12 Lloyd’s proportion of the world non-life insurance and reinsurance market
The 1969 Cromer Report (paragraph 10) states that premium income from non-life
business underwritten in Lloyd’s in 1966 represented just under 2.5% o f the world total. 
Cromer states that Lloyd’s transacts about 16% o f the world aviation insurance and a 
larger percentage o f the world’s marine insurance business. Franklin (1980) comments
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that in 1965, Lloyd’s share o f the world insurance market in 1965 was about 2.0% and 
in 1975 Lloyd’s world market share had dropped to about 1.4% . “Statistics Relating to 
Lloyd’s” gives Lloyd’s world market share as 1.8% for the 1994 revenue year, the latest 
year for which statistics are available. This percentage has remained relatively constant 
since 1985. “Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s” further states that for the 1994 revenue year 
Lloyd’s had a 13.5% market share o f  the world’s marine business, 1.8% o f the world 
non-marine insurance, 25.7% o f the world aviation market and 0.7% o f the world motor 
market. Since 1985, these percentage market shares have remained constant other than 
aviation which has risen steadily from a 19.9% market share in 1985.
1.13 The geographical split of Lloyd’s business
In many countries, insurance can only be provided by locally-based, licensed insurers. 
However, Lloyd’s underwriters have been authorised to provide insurance under local 
insurance legislation in a number o f countries including Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, South Africa and several countries in Europe including France, Germany, Italy, 
Ireland and Switzerland. In many o f the countries where Lloyd’s underwriters are 
authorised, they are required to fulfill a number o f local requirements, which may 
include the appointment o f  a general representative, the maintenance o f local deposits 
and the filing o f statistical reports. “Additional Securities Limited” is a wholly owned 
subsidiary o f Lloyd’s which provides funds for such deposits.
In other countries, Lloyd’s underwriters are able to accept business without having to be 
licensed insurers. For example in the USA, although licensed to write direct insurance 
only in Illinois, Kentucky and the US Virgin Islands, Lloyd’s underwriters are eligible to
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accept excess or surplus lines business. This is business which has been offered to the 
local insurers but declined - either because the local insurers are unwilling or unable to 
underwrite that business. There are Lloyd’s brokers such as Bell and Clements Limited 
and Harman Kemp Limited that specialise in excess and surplus lines business. Lloyd’s 
is able to trade on an equal footing with other insurers in the USA only in the states o f 
Illinois and Kentucky. The insurance authorities in these two states require that a 
deposit must be held there and the “Illinois and Kentucky Dollar Agreement 1942” was 
an undertaking that underwriters would themselves provide the deposit instead o f 
“Additional Securities Limited” on their behalf. Lloyd’s underwriters are also able to 
underwrite reinsurance business throughout the world even in cases where they are 
unable to underwrite on a direct basis.
Figure 1.20 gives the breakdown o f business by territory. Some premiums cannot be 
reliably allocated and these are shown in the column marked ‘T otal unallocated 
premium”. These unallocated premiums are understated since some double-counting o f 
“allocated premiums” arises caused by the allocation o f some premiums to more than 
one country (to comply with regulations in each). Given these caveats any detailed 
analysis o f the data is perhaps unwise, however it is possible to draw conclusions from 
the figures. In respect o f direct business the U.K. is the most important region with 
some 40% o f premiums coming from the U.K.; this is not surprising as Lloyd’s is based 
in London. However, in respect o f reinsurance business the USA is the most dominant 
territory with approximately 40% o f all premiums coming from the USA. For direct 
business the next biggest territory is the USA and for reinsurance the second largest 
source o f premium income is the U.K. . About 60% o f all direct business comes from
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C alendar R est o f Asia A frica  & O ther T o ta l allocated Total unallocated  |
Y ear U K . U.S.A . C anad a Europe Pacific M idd le E ast Countries prem ium prem ium  1 TO TA L
1983 D irect & Fac 728 32.57% 568 25.41% 120 5.37% 120 5.37% 68 3.04% 52 2.33% - 0.00% 1,656 74.09% 579 25.91 % | 2,235
Reinsurance 165 16.29% 593 58.54% 38 3.75% 47 4.64% 42 4.15% 3 0.30% - 0.00% 888 87.66% 125 12 34% ! 1,013
1984 Direct &  Fac 845 29.44% 671 23.38% 140 4.88% 149 5.19% 84 2.93% 51 1.78% _ 0.00% 1,940 67.60% 930 3 2 .4 0 % l 2,870
Reinsurance 24 9 17.03% 748 51.16% 5 0 3.42% 58 3.97% 51 3.49% 3 0.21% 0.00% 1,159 79.27% 303 2 0 .7 3 % l 1,462
1985 Direct &  Fac 910 30.76% 925 31.27% 148 5.00% 174 5.88% 79 2.67% 48 1.62% . 0.00% 2,284 77.21% 674 22 .7 9 % ! 2.958
Reinsurance 273 19.17% 909 63.83% 47 3.30% 67 4.71% 49 3.44% 3 0.21% - 0.00% 1,348 94.66% 76 5 .3 4 % | 1,424
1986 Direct &  Fac 1,137 31.52% 1,153 31.97% 153 4.24% 222 6.15% 58 1.61% 48 1.33% _ 0.00% 2,771 76.82% 836 23 18%  j 3.607
Reinsurance 339 19.01% 1,101 61.75% 46 2.58% 82 4.60% 35 1.96% 3 0.17% - 0.00% 1,606 90.07% 177 9 .9 3 % ! 1,783
198? D irect &  Fac 1.251 37.53% 1.059 31.77% 145 4.35% 225 6.75% 53 1.59% 58 1.74% . 0.00% 2,791 83.74% 542 16 .26% ! 3,333
Reinsurance 334 21.74% 944 61.46% 45 2.93% 87 5.66% 32 2.08% 3 0.20% 0.00% 1,445 94.08% 91 5 .9 2 % | 1,536
1988 Direct & Fac 1 ,369 40.29% 889 26.16% 141 4.15% 209 6.15% 58 1.71% 60 1.77% 40 1.18% 2,766 81.40% 632 18 60 % ] 3,398
Reinsurance 408 24.76% 830 50.36% 73 4.43% 79 4.79% 36 2.18% 3 0.18% 32 1.94% 1,461 88.65% 187 11 3 5 % j 1,648
1989 Direct &  Fac 1,471 40.94% 922 25.66% 149 4.15% 232 6.46% 70 1.95% 67 1.86% 60 1.67% 2,971 82.69% 622 17.31 % | 3,593
Reinsurance 559 28.08% 932 46.81% 85 4.27% 82 4.12% 43 2.16% 4 0.20% 49 2.46% 1,754 88.10% 237 11.90% * 1,991
SLIP Direct &  Fac 1.270 37.84% 1,095 32.63% 118 3.52% 426 12.69% 94 2.80% 100 2.98% 253 . 7.54% 3,356 100.00% _ 0 .0 0 % l 3,356
SURV EY  Reinsurance 938 34.72% 830 30.72% 68 2.52% 505 18.69% 128 4.74% 5 0.19% 228 8.44% 2,702 100.00% - 0 .0 0 % | 2,702
1990 Direct &  Fac 1 ,570 41.16% 1,024 26.85% 148 3.88% 292 7.66% 104 2.73% 79 2.07% 94 2.46% 3,311 86.81% 503 13.19% l 3,814
Reinsurance 768 34.24% 1,019 45.43% 9 0 4.01% 121 5.39% 48 2.14% 7 0.31% 67 2.99% 2,120 94.52% 123 - 5 .4 8 % | 2,243
1991 Direct &  Fac 1,802 39.05% 1,103 23.90% 169 3.66% 509 11.03% 142 3.08% 101 2.19% 186 4.03% 4,012 86.93% 603 13.07% [ 4,615
Reinsurance 871 34.05% 1,146 44.80% 92 3.60% 243 9.50% 127 4.96% 6 0.23% 139 5.43% 2,624 102.58% 66 -2 .58% j 2,558
1992 Direct &  Fac 2 ,268 39.85% 1,148 20.17% 189 3.32% 585 10.28% 138 2.42% 107 ’■1.88% 231 4.06% 4,666 81.97% 1,026 18 .03% | 5 ,692
Reinsurance I ’ 8 6 9 29.43% 1,208 40.91% 85 2.88% 353 11.95% 166 5.62% 16 0.54% 144 4.88% 2,841 96.21% 112 3 .79% | 2 ,953
1993 D irect &  Fac 2 ,548 42.12% 1,474 24.37% 158 2.61% 654 10.81% 154 2.55% 118 1.95% 400 6.61% 5,506 91.02% 543 8.98%1 6,049
Reinsurance 657 25.69% 1,247 48.77% 87 3.40% 305 11.93% 207 8.10% 9 0.35% 145 5.67% 2,657 103.91% 100 -3.91 % | 2,557
1994 D ire c t* F a c 2 ,472 43.41% 1,222 21.46% 132 2.32% 659 11.57% 187 3.28% 112 1.97% 721 12.66% 5,505 96.68% 189 3.32% 5,694
Reinsurance 492 22.79% 1,103 51.09% 48 2.22% 242 11.21% 186 8.62% 13 0.60% 128 5.93% 2,212 102.45% 53 -2 .45% 2,159
1995 Direct & Fac 2.181 40.28% 1,316 24.31% 142 2.62% 664 12.26% 200 3.69% 110 2.03% 649 11.99% 5,262 97.19% 152 2.81% 5,414
Reinsurance 345 17.81% 912 47.08% 44 2.27% 191 9 8 6 % 165 8.52% 10 0.52% 219 11.31% 1,886 97.37% 51 2.63% | 1,937
Figure 1.20: Geographical provenance of Lloyd's gross premium income (gross of ceded reinsurance and net of brokerage), £ million.
Source: Statistics Relating to Lloyd's (1996).
Notes:
1. Some premiums oannot be reliably allocated to any oountry, and these are shown separately. Unallocated premiums are understated in the 
table since some double-oounting o f  "allocated premiums" arises caused by the allocation o f  some premiums to more than one country
(to comply with the regulations in eaoh).
2. In 1990 a slip survey was carried out by the LPSO (sample size = 1% o f population) which enabled all premiums to be allocated to countries.
the USA and the U.K. and approximately 70% of reinsurance premiums emanate from 
these two countries. Europe (excluding the U.K.) has played an increasingly important 
role since 1983 but in 1992 only accounts for just over 10% o f all direct and reinsurance 
premiums. With the collapse o f many Eastern Bloc Communist regimes, there is the 
potential for Lloyd’s to seek business in these countries. Indeed a company, Maisons 
Ltd, has been set up by a number o f Lloyd’s underwriters to look at the feasibility o f 
writing Eastern European business.
In conclusion, UK domiciled business accounted for 34% o f business at Lloyd’s during 
the 1995 calendar year. The next largest territory is the USA which accounts for 30% 
o f business written. Continental Europe accounts for 12% of premium income. No 
other individual territory constitutes more than 5% o f Lloyd’s premium income. Almost 
two-thirds o f  Lloyd’s premium income comes from the UK and USA, thus it is not 
surprising the Lloyd’s Business Plan (1993) states on page 5: “Our business 
development objectives are:... to build Lloyd’s position in new markets, particularly 
Continental Europe and the Asia/Pacific region.”
1.14 Summary of statistics
This chapter has analysed data that Lloyd’s publishes in order to evaluate the type o f 
insurance business that Lloyd’s is underwriting. The business is approximately split 
60% direct and 40% reinsurance. Lloyd’s underwrites approximately one quarter o f all 
business underwritten in the UK and is an important market for reinsurance business 
where the Society has about 40% of the UK market. Lloyd’s is heavily reliant upon
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USA and U.K. business with nearly two-thirds o f its business emanating from these two 
territories.
1.15 A note on the constituents of the London Market
The core activity o f the “London Insurance and reinsurance market” is the underwriting 
o f internationally traded insurance and reinsurance business. This business is almost 
exclusively non-life (i.e. general) insurance and reinsurance, with an emphasis on high- 
exposure risks. Despite the growth o f other international centres in the world, London 
is the world’s leading international insurance and reinsurance market.
The London Market forms an important part o f  the world reinsurance market, and is a 
major source o f UK invisible earnings, being the principal medium through which 
overseas insurance business is brought into the U.K. The London market is largely a 
“subscription market”, in which most business is handled by brokers. Often insurances 
and reinsurances are placed with two or more insurers (or reinsurers) who subscribe to a 
“slip” which is prepared by the broker. The leading underwriter quotes the premium 
required for the risk and then signs the slip stating what percentage o f the risk he wishes 
to  accept. The broker will then go to other underwriters in London who, if they wish to 
underwrite the risk, will note on the slip the percentage o f the risk they wish to accept. 
This process continues until the broker has sufficient underwriters on the slip for the risk 
to be fully, i.e. one hundred per cent, placed. The whole o f  the London Market is, in 
essence, a “club” where reputations are made and jealously guarded. The broker will 
present his client’s case in the best possible light but he must give an honest picture to
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the underwriter. There is a whole background o f opinion, based on tradition and 
experience, modified by current results, on which the underwriter arrives at a decision. 
Among international markets London is unique in that it is geographically highly 
concentrated. It comprises many insurers and intermediaries located in the City o f 
London and its vicinity. Often an individual broker will know the personal strengths o f 
many underwriters in the market. Brokers will use their knowledge o f underwriters in 
order to get the best terms for their clients. The London market is supported by many 
firms supplying ancillary services, such as accounting, legal services and information 
technology.
In addition to Lloyd’s, there are a considerable number o f companies active in the 
London Market which fall into the following categories:
(a) A small number o f large professional reinsurance companies, both o f United 
Kingdom and o f European origin, writing through UK branch organisations (e g. 
Mercantile and General, Skandia Re, Munich Re.)
(b) The “Home Foreign” or reinsurance departments o f UK composite companies. 
“Home Foreign” business consists o f  business written in London, where the risk 
originates from overseas; thus it is virtually synonymous with the London Market, e.g. 
Eagle Star, General Accident, Commercial Union.
(c) UK subsidiaries (or branches) o f overseas insurance or reinsurance companies. To 
an increasing extent the branches are being converted into subsidiaries and there now 
remain very few active branches. The parent companies are extremely widespread 
geographically but there are considerable concentrations in the USA, Japan, Scandinavia
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and the EEC. Most (but not all) such companies are designated (Parent’s Name) 
Insurance Co (UK) Ltd. e g. Kemper Re (UK), St Paul Re (UK).
(d) Captive companies owned by UK or overseas industrial or commercial companies. 
Examples o f  this type include Athel Reinsurance Co (Tate & Lyle) and GTE Insurance 
Co (GTE Corporation, US).
(e) Small professional reinsurance companies set up by (or acquired by) large broking 
firms for the specific purpose o f transacting London Market business. Such companies 
include River Thames (Sedgwicks) and Sphere Drake (Alexander Howdens) and 
Sovereign Marine and General (Willis Faber). Following the move to separate broking 
and underwriting concerns under the 1982 Lloyd’s Act, such subsidiaries have, to a 
large extent been sold off or been subject to management buy-outs.
(f) There are two pools operating in the London market, International Oil Insurers and 
the British Insurance (Atomic Energy) Committee. Both operate on a net line basis i.e. 
insurers participating in the pool retain for their own accounts the business they 
underwrite.
In addition, a certain amount o f marine business is written by Protection and Indemnity 
Clubs (P & I Clubs), which are essentially mutual insurance companies for groups o f 
shipowners. These organisations specialise in marine liability insurance, including the 
provision o f indemnity against damage to harbours and the cost o f removing wrecks.
Besides the P&I Clubs, the combined membership o f the Institute o f London 
Underwriters (ELU) and the London Insurance and Reinsurance Market Association 
(LIRMA) provides a good indication as to the number o f  companies operating in the
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London market. As at the beginning o f 1996 there were 162 members companies 
actively underwriting business. The ILU is the trade association for companies 
underwriting marine, aviation and transport business in the London company market. 
LIRMA is the major organisation which represents international insurance and 
reinsurance companies writing primarily non-marine insurance and reinsurance business 
in London.
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Chapter Two: Studies on Lloyd’s
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the literature that has been published that has had an influence 
on the operations o f the Lloyd’s market and also includes an evaluation o f the Acts o f 
Parliament from 1871 to 1986 pertaining to Lloyd’s. A detailed analysis o f the 1992 
Task Force Report is provided as this is the first report to discuss the competitive 
strengths o f Lloyd’s. The Task Force Report culminated in the publication o f Lloyd’s 
first Business Plan in 1993 and an analysis o f this is given.
2.2 Overview of Lloyd’s regulatory status.
The Insurance Companies Act 1982 governs the business o f insurance in the United 
Kingdom. Under its provisions it is unlawful to operate an insurance company unless 
the regulations o f the Act are followed. Having stated that “no person shall carry on 
any insurance business in the United Kingdom” unless authorised by the Department o f 
Trade and Industry, the Act makes three exemptions: trade union strike funds, 
registered friendly societies and Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s is thus immune from direct legislation 
which gives it a measure o f self-regulation. Underwriters at Lloyd’s are not, however, 
entirely exempt from the Act. The policyholder must still be protected and the Act lays 
down three requirements on Lloyd’s underwriters: all premiums must be held under a 
trust deed from which claims may be settled; the underwriter’s accounts must be 
audited each year and a certificate produced that the underwriter is solvent; and the 
Council o f  Lloyd’s must file an annual return summarising the extent and character o f 
the insurance business transacted by the members o f Lloyd’s. The first two provisions
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relate to each member individually so that there must be a separate trust fund and 
solvency certificate for each member o f Lloyd’s.
2.3 The Lloyd’s Act 1871.
During the second half o f the nineteenth century the main activities o f the Committee of 
Lloyd’s were the provision o f premises for the transaction o f marine insurance and 
arranging for the collection of shipping intelligence. In 1870 the Committee o f Lloyd’s 
attempted to exclude a member from Lloyd’s (Forwood v Goschen). However, this 
was not possible because once a man was elected a member and had paid his entrance 
fee, he was beyond the Committee’s control. In response to this situation Lloyd’s 
secured a private Act o f Parliament - the Lloyd's Act 1871.
The Lloyd’s Act 1871 incorporated the membership o f Lloyd’s into the Society and 
Corporation o f Lloyd’s. This made Lloyd’s a legal entity, creating a single body which 
could enter into contracts binding upon the Society, could hold property and assets on 
behalf o f  the Society and could issue its own seal. The Act gave Lloyd’s a written 
constitution and entrusted the Committee o f Lloyd’s with the management and 
supervision o f the affairs o f the Society. The Act established an elected committee of 
twelve and gave the Society the power to make bylaws - this could only be exercised by 
the membership at a General Meeting, however. Although the Lloyd’s Act 1871 
referred only to  the “carrying on o f marine insurance business by members”, Lloyd’s 
was now underwriting non-marine business. A later Lloyd’s Act (1911) amended the 
1871 Act to “the carrying on by members o f the Society o f the business o f insurance o f 
ery description ” According to sections 21, 22 and 23 of the 1871 Act a member
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would have his membership terminated on the conviction o f an infamous crime, on 
conviction or adjudication o f fraud, on bankruptcy and on non-payment o f  subscription. 
There were only two disciplinary offences for which the Act provided a penalty:
(i) Violation o f the fundamental rules o f the Society (Lloyd’s Act 1871, section 20); 
and
(ii) discreditable conduct (Lloyd’s Act 1871, section 20)
Both offences made a member liable to  expulsion. There first had to be determination 
o f guilt by the award o f two arbitrators, and then a vote with a four-fifths majority o f 
those present at a general meeting, provided that at least one hundred members voted.
The constitution that the 1871 Act established remained in force until 1982 when a new 
Lloyd’s Act received Royal Assent. Four Lloyd’s Acts were passed between 1871 and 
1982 (in 1888, 1911, 1925 and 1951). However, many o f their provisions are now 
repealed and the constitution o f the modem Lloyd’s is found in the 1982 Act.
2.4 The Cromer Report.
In 1965 a severe American hurricane led to historic changes in Lloyd’s. Hurricane 
Betsy produced losses on a scale that Lloyd’s had never seen before. Names lost on 
average £6,000 in 1965 and over £3,000 in 1966. In the twenty years following 1946 
Lloyd’s membership had grown steadily from 2,000 to over 6,000. Then, as a result o f 
Hurricane Betsy, the membership o f Lloyd’s began to fall and only recovered in 1971. 
As a result, in 1968 Lloyd’s commissioned a working party chaired by Lord Cromer to 
recommend what Lloyd’s should do to encourage an efficient and profitable market.
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The Report states in paragraph 28: “One o f the reasons why (the) enquiry was initiated 
was that there were complaints about difficulties in placing risks at Lloyd’s because o f 
lack o f capacity. This raises the question how to attract more capital into Lloyd’s....” . 
The Committee o f  Lloyd’s gave the working party the following terms o f reference:
(1) To agree a target growth rate for insurance capacity at Lloyd’s over the 
next ten years, having regard to the estimated annual world growth rate in 
insurance requirements;
(2) To estimate the likely growth of underwriting membership under present 
arrangements and to examine any methods of encouraging a steady flow of 
new members;
(3) To examine the existing capital structure of underwriting membership 
and consider whether there is potential for increasing premium limits 
bearing in mind that security is paramount;
(4) To examine alternative methods of providing capital backing for 
underwriting (other than individual wealth of members) coupled with the 
legal and security implications of any such proposals.
The Cromer Report was the first major study commissioned on Lloyd’s. The Report 
examined the role o f Lloyd’s in the insurance market, the organisation o f its syndicates 
and markets, the role o f  brokers, and the taxation o f Names. A large section o f  the 
Report deals with the sources o f capital at Lloyd’s and the capital structure (Lloyd’s 
deposits, Special Deposits, Personal reserves, the central fund etc.). One chapter looks 
at Names’ premium income limits and the relationship between a Name’s Lloyd’s 
Deposit and his overall premium income limit.
Cromer concluded that Lloyd’s must stay in the business o f  insuring large risks and 
that it must therefore increase its capacity. As a result o f the Report, the means test 
for UK Names who were not engaged in commerce nor in work at Lloyd’s was 
reduced from £75,000 to £50,000 and that for overseas Names reduced from £100,000 
to £75,000. It took some time for the number o f members to increase but in the ten 
years that followed the Report, membership grew threefold from 6,000 in 1970 to over
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18,000 in 1980. The lowering o f wealth requirements was an extraordinary proposal 
as it inevitably allowed more people to join the Society who were less wealthy than 
previous Names. This proposal weakened the security behind the Lloyd’s policy.
Lord Cromer’s committee showed considerable foresight when it said:
....it (is not) surprising that the recent run of losses should lead to a more 
critical attitude by some Names towards agents. We think it would be a 
mistake to assume that this more critical attitude is a passing phase. Many 
names are waiting to see what comes out of the present review of the 
organisation of Lloyd’s. Many Names have also made substantial losses 
which only a long series of profitable years will wipe out. In present 
conditions Names are likely to look for something akin to the relationship 
which would exist if they were shareholders in a company and expect at 
least the same degree of accountability and consideration as is generally 
extended to the shareholder. (Cromer Report, para 195)
Cromer pursued this theme and called for Lloyd’s to require agents to publish audited 
syndicate accounts to their Names, to give a report on prospects for the two open 
years, and not to increase a Name’s share in a syndicate or transfer him to another 
syndicate without his approval. Annual meetings o f Names on syndicates were also 
proposed.
The Cromer working party recognised many of the difficulties associated with the 
regulation, under pre-1982 powers, o f a Society likely to grow substantially in size. 
The problem faced by the Cromer working group was the need to provide more 
comprehensive regulation to govern relationships between Names and their agents 
which would be o f a more commercial kind rather than the then present system of 
personal relationships o f trust. The Cromer Report addressed a number o f important 
regulatory issues such as the admission o f agents, a model form o f agency agreement, 
agents’ charges, the provision o f information to Names, and the ownership and control
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o f underwriting agencies. The report also proposed that the Committee o f  Lloyd’s 
should have more power to regulate the Society and a strengthened staff headed by a 
Chief Executive to assist them.
The Report made a number o f recommendations which led to changes and
simplifications in the calculation o f members’ premium limits as well as their required
show o f means. Cromer suggested simplification o f rules governing the permitted
extent o f  reinsurance and made recommendations regarding the authorisation o f
underwriting agents. One interesting recommendation that the Report makes is the
admission o f limited liability capital. The Cromer Report states in paragraph 81:
It seems doubtful whether Lloyd’s can expect in the next few years to get 
the number of names that it needs to maintain its position in the insurance 
market. While, therefore, we can understand the widespread preference for 
retaining the present methods of financing syndicates, we consider that 
Lloyd’s should introduce, under proper safeguards, a limited amount of 
company participation.
The Report goes on to say that the total o f all company participation in a syndicate 
should not exceed ten per cent o f the syndicate’s capacity. The Report discusses the 
concept o f  unlimited liability versus limited liability. Interestingly the Report states that 
insurance brokers “did not attach great importance to unlimited liability as a selling 
point for Lloyd’s policies” (Paragraph 57). The Report discusses the concept o f risk- 
based capital although the authors reject the notion that “there should be differentiation 
in premium limits according to the degree o f ‘exposure’” on the basis that relating the 
solvency margin to exposure had not been tested. However, the Report does not 
discount the possibility o f this happening at a future date.
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Very little notice seems to have been taken o f these recommendations for over a 
decade; indeed the Cromer Report was not made available to Names until October 
1986, almost seventeen years after it was presented to the Committee o f  Lloyd’s.
Whilst the Cromer Report was commissioned to investigate how Lloyd’s should 
increase its capacity, there is no discussion about any strategy to increase the Society’s 
premium income, such as new insurance products or new territories to  target. It could 
be inferred, therefore, that the Committee o f  Lloyd’s expected the capacity to be 
consumed by natural growth in premium income.
2.5 Self-regulation at Lloyd’s.
Regulation may be best divided into three types: structural regulation, prudential 
regulation and investor protection (Pawley et al, 1991 p 235). Structural regulation 
refers to the type o f  activities that different categories o f  financial institution are 
permitted to carry out, and prudential regulation refers to  supervision in terms of, inter 
alia,, liquidity, capital adequacy and solvency o f  financial institutions. The term 
‘supervision’ is used here to mean the monitoring o f financial institutions for investor 
protection, prudential regulation, and structural regulation purposes combined 
Investor protection legislation overlaps with both prudential and structural regulation 
in that the investor is in theory protected from financial institutions becoming insolvent 
through excessive risk-taking and protected from conflicts o f  interest by separation o f 
types o f  business (Pawley et al, 1991 pp 235-6). These three types o f regulation may 
be carried out through a formal legislative code or through self-imposed rules (self- 
regulation) or a combination o f both. A further form o f regulation is the operation o f
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monetary policy such as the raising o f interest rates which will reduce the demand for 
credit.
The main difficulty with a regulatory regime is to strike a balance between competition 
and regulation and care must be taken to ensure that regulation does not impede the 
efficiency o f  the financial service. A major concern is the extent to which regulation 
stifles innovation within financial services. The more rules that exist, then the more 
likely a new product development will be prohibited by the rules. Excessive regulation 
may be an effective barrier to entry thus discouraging new participants to enter the 
market. However, companies that are excluded may take their business elsewhere thus 
losing potential business to overseas competitors.
Self-regulation is a peculiarly British method o f supervising financial markets and 
Lloyd’s is a good example o f  a self-regulated institution. Hay Davison (1987) 
suggests that for self-regulation to work effectively there are a number o f  
preconditions. Firstly there must be a closed circle o f members to whom the rules are 
to be applied, and it must be advantageous for the member to be part o f that body and 
financially disadvantageous to operate outside the closed circle. Secondly, the self­
regulation must be supported by statutory backing so that a member with a  grievance 
cannot defeat the system by recourse to the courts. Thirdly, the members o f the self- 
regulated society must be willing to accept that the proper rules are more helpful to the 
conduct o f  business than a complete free-for-all. Fourthly, the process o f  self­
regulation will not work unless there are adequate procedures for consultation both 
from within the society and outside the society. It is important that as Parliament vests
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legislative powers in a private body, it follows that any proposed subordinate legislation 
should be open to public scrutiny in the same way as Bills o f Parliament. Lloyd’s is 
unique in that its investors, the Names, have unlimited liability, a feature not found in 
other financial services. Regulation must protect the interests o f the policyholder and 
the Name. In a competitive market there will be successful companies and others that 
are not successful. Because the capital base o f  Lloyd’s consists largely o f  individuals, 
the vast majority o f  whom have little insurance knowledge, the regulatory regime must 
ensure that there are no “losers” in the market, because with unlimited liability the level 
o f  loss could far exceed the wealth o f the Name. With the introduction o f corporate 
capital - limited liability capital - the level o f loss that an investor can sustain is the face 
value o f his shareholding. It could be argued that the level o f investor protection 
afforded under a limited liability capital structure need not be so great as that required 
for an unlimited capital structure.
Self-regulation has various attractions for Parliament. Firstly it is less expensive, as 
market practitioners draft the rules rather than civil servants. Secondly, practitioners 
are better able to define the questions that need to be addressed and to prepare rules to 
prevent malpractices because they are more familiar with the market than are external 
legislators. Self-regulation is more efficient than statutory regulation as the rules can be 
easily adapted to a change in the market; the rules can be made more easily than having 
to wait for a suitable gap in the Parliamentary timetable. Furthermore, rules that are 
made by practitioners in the market are more likely to be observed by the members o f 
the market than rules that are formulated by outside legislators.
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However, the major disadvantage o f self-regulation is that it gives freedom to vested 
interests. Unless the market practitioners show restraint, there will always be the 
danger o f rules being inadequately enforced against friends o f the rule makers or being 
exercised harshly against competitors. The key to effective self-regulation must, 
therefore, be adequate arrangements for control and to obstruct vested interests.
2.6 The Fisher Report and Self-Regulation
Many o f the ideas raised in the Cromer Report were re-examined by a working party 
appointed in 1979 under the chairmanship o f a former High Court judge, Sir Henry 
Fisher. The working party was set up at a time when there were two disputes which 
attracted adverse publicity. The first o f these cases was the so-called “Sasse affair” 
where losses were sustained by Names arising out o f  property insurances written on 
their behalf in North America under binding authorities. (Hay Davison, 1987) The 
second dispute was the “Savitona” case which involved a disputed claim o f about 
$700,000 for Fiat cars involved in a ship fire. The working party was set up because 
the Committee o f Lloyd’s was “(conscious) o f the lack o f powers to deal adequately 
with abuses and difficulties” (section 1.27). The Working Party’s terms o f reference 
were:
To enquire into self-regulation at Lloyd’s and for the purpose of such 
enquiry review:-
(i) the constitution of Lloyd’s (as provided for in Lloyd’s Acts and Bye­
laws);
(ii) the powers of the Committee and the exercise thereof and;
(iii) such other matters which, in the opinion of the Working Party, are 
relevant to the enquiry.
and, arising from the review, to make recommendations.
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Thus it was from the start an inquiry into self-regulation at Lloyd’s rather than how
best Lloyd’s should be regulated. In the first chapter o f  the Report (section 1.12) the
authors make quite clear their confidence in self-regulation:
There are those that question the whole concept of self-regulation and 
would prefer to see a system of control by government (or by statutory 
bodies set up by government) along the lines followed in some other 
countries. We have no doubt that Lloyd’s will be best served by a properly 
conducted system of self-regulation. Indeed we do not see how it could 
function in anything like its present form under any other system of 
regulation. Since the continued success of Lloyd’s as an international 
market for insurance is important in the national interest, it is of national 
importance that Lloyd’s should have an efficient system of self-regulation.
The Report thus begins with the assumption that self-regulation is the better way for 
Lloyd’s to be regulated rather than by statutory regulation, and then lists 
recommendations for how such a system should work. The Report did not consider 
statutory regulation as a process nor suggest reasons for why self-regulation is to be 
preferred. The purposes o f self-regulation were summarised by the Working Party 
thus:
“The maintenance of the security of the Lloyd’s policy; the maintenance of 
the highest standards of conduct and integrity by all users of the market; the 
preservation of Lloyd’s as a market where conditions of free competition 
can obtain; and the maintenance of standards of fair treatment for those 
members of the Lloyd’s community who can reasonably look to the 
Committee for protection.”
(Letter from H.A.P. Fisher to P.J.F. Green, Chairman of Lloyd’s reprinted 
in the Fisher Working Party Report).
The Fisher Working Party came to the conclusion that the constitution o f Lloyd’s was 
no longer appropriate and that the Committee’s powers were inadequate for self­
regulation. The Working Party recommended that the Committee o f Lloyd’s should 
promote a new private Act o f Parliament so that the constitution o f Lloyd’s could be 
brought up to date and its powers o f  self-regulation enlarged. The principal 
recommendations o f  the Working Party were:
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(1) The creation o f a governing Council composed o f sixteen working members (who 
would also constitute the Committee), six external members and three outsiders who 
would be approved by the Governor o f the Bank o f England. The rule-making and 
disciplinary powers vested in the General Meetings o f  Members should be transferred 
to the Council. The power to make Regulations for the conduct o f insurance business 
in Lloyd’s should be delegated to the Committee.
(2) The Council should be given extensive powers to regulate the admission and 
registration o f Members, Agents and Brokers. The Council should be given the power 
to veto the appointment o f an Active Underwriter and also to inquire into the affairs o f 
any Syndicate, Broker or Agent. The working party recommended that shareholding 
links between brokers and managing agents should cease within five years. This 
reform, divestment by brokers o f their interests in managing agencies was the most 
dramatic reform introduced. The Fisher Report, in paragraph 12.03 said “ ... the eight 
largest “Broker-Controlled” Agencies are controlled by the eight largest Lloyd’s 
brokers who between them account for 58.8 per cent o f the premium income of 
Lloyd’s.” Subsequent to the Fisher Report, the Higgins Inquiry into the Underwriting 
Agency System at Lloyd’s in September 1982 found that 308 out o f 431 syndicates (71 
per cent o f syndicates) would have to change ownership as a result o f  the Act.
(3) The Council should undertake overall responsibility towards Names and should 
exercise a supervisory role over Underwriting Agents. Specific recommendations 
included the mandatory re-registration o f agents, greater disclosure o f information 
about agents and syndicate performance to prospective and existing Names, and the 
introduction o f a standard Agency agreement between agents and Names.
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(4) There should be bye-laws detailing the precise requirements for membership.
(5) The disciplinary functions o f the Council should be delegated to a disciplinary 
committee, with a range o f powers to punish offenders, and an appeal tribunal. The 
Council should have the power to require that any dispute entirely within the Lloyd’s 
community should be decided by arbitration. The Report stressed that the Council 
would strive to maintain the tradition o f not interfering in market and underwriting 
matters, but recommended that the Council be given powers to ensure the maintenance 
o f adequate means and deposits by all Members.
The Working Party Report set out a draft Bill to amend the Lloyd’s Acts 1871-1951 
and this formed the basis for the Lloyd’s Act 1982.
2.7 The Lloyd’s Bill
Following receipt o f the Fisher Report, several groups were formed to work on the 
detailed recommendations o f  the report and to set about preparing for the passage o f a 
private Bill to enact the new constitution. In order for the Committee to be able to 
proceed with the presentation o f a Bill to Parliament, the issue needed to be voted on at 
a meeting o f members. A meeting was duly held on the 4th November 1980 when a 
large majority o f members voted in favour o f the resolution supporting legislation on 
the lines stated in the Fisher Report. A Bill was introduced in late 1980 and received its 
second reading in the House o f Commons in March 1981. The Lloyd’s Act received 
Royal Assent in July 1982.
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2.8 The Scandals of 1982
In late 1982 various scandals in Lloyd’s began to emerge. A serious incident was the 
fraud uncovered at Alexander Howden. When Alexander and Alexander, the US 
broker, purchased Howden Underwriting Agency for $300 million, their auditors 
discovered a multi-million pound fraud. Four o f  Howden’s directors (Grob, Commery, 
Page and Carpenter) had been secretly arranging reinsurances with offshore companies 
owned by Grob, Commery, Page and Carpenter. None o f these transactions had been 
mentioned to  the underwriting members o f Howden. Alexander and Alexander alleged 
that $55 million was missing out o f their $300 million purchase. (Mantle, 1992, p. 99)
Another damaging incident was the so-called “PCW affair”. On 2nd November 1982 
Lloyd’s announced that Mr Peter Dixon, chairman o f PCW Underwriting Agencies 
Limited (a subsidiary o f Minet Holdings pic) and WMD Underwriting Agencies, had 
voluntarily suspended himself from all duties with the agencies. During the Alexander 
and Alexander investigations it was revealed that low risk, high profit reinsurance 
premiums from syndicates run by Peter Cameron-Webb (a past chairman o f PCW who 
retired from this office in 1982) and Peter Dixon had been diverted to companies 
owned by the two men in the Isle o f Man, Guernsey and Gibraltar. (Raphael, 1994, 
page 81)
The sums o f money were huge. Over £40 million had been withheld from PCW 
syndicate members over a number o f years. In addition, the PCW non-marine 
underwriters had written some unprofitable business and the losses were thought to 
exceed the monies diverted to the offshore companies. In 1985 it was announced that
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those members who had been involved with the “Howden” affair and the PCW matter 
had been expelled from the Society.
Against this background o f adverse publicity for the Society and allegations o f 
misconduct and concern expressed in Parliament about the adequacy o f the new 
constitution, the Governor o f the Bank o f England made an important intervention at 
the end o f 1982. He persuaded Lloyd’s to create the post o f Chief Executive (a post 
suggested by the Cromer report thirteen years beforehand). Ian Hay Davison was 
appointed to the new office with the additional title o f  Deputy Chairman and the status 
o f a nominated member o f  the Council (Hay Davison, 1987 p. 6 ) . '  This involved 
increasing the number o f nominated member to four, making the total number o f 
Council members twenty-eight. M r Hay Davison’s main role was to oversee the 
establishment o f  the new self-regulatory regime at Lloyd’s as detailed in the Lloyd’s 
Act 1982.
Another significant development was the establishment o f  the Association o f Lloyd’s 
Members (ALM). The objects o f this association are to improve the understanding o f 
Lloyd’s among members and prospective members, to promote and represent the 
interests o f its members both within and outside Lloyd’s, to publish comparisons o f 
syndicate results and to publish a quarterly newsletter which is distributed to members.
2.9 Developments since 1982.
The events o f  1982 had a significant impact on the regulation o f Lloyd’s and the public 
perception o f the adequacy of self-regulation. It appeared that just after Government
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had passed a Bill giving the terms o f reference for self-regulation, the various scandals 
showed up the inadequacy of that self-regulation.
The findings o f the investigations into the incidents detailed above revealed a number o f 
facts about the inadequacy o f the regulatory arrangements that had existed pre-1982. It 
also showed the standards o f conduct that had existed in the market. Both o f these 
facts had not been available to the Fisher Working Party. Two specific areas o f abuse 
were identified. The first was the use o f “baby” syndicates. An underwriter would 
sometimes have two syndicates - his main, large syndicate and a much smaller, “baby”, 
syndicate which just consisted o f himself and a few others, generally directors o f the 
agency and perhaps a few close friends. When business was presented to the Box the 
underwriter had the opportunity to channel the best business shown to him to the baby 
syndicate rather than to the main syndicate.
The other abuse was the placing o f reinsurance premiums on behalf o f syndicates with 
companies (often offshore) in which the agency or a director o f  the agency had a 
financial interest. Some o f these companies were not reinsurance companies at all, but 
simply a means to divert premiums that were due to Names. Others offered genuine 
reinsurance at terms that were favourable to the company and thereby allowing those 
involved to make profits at the expense o f the Names.
2.10 The Neill Report.
The events o f  1982 revealed regulatory inadequacies which had facilitated a few 
dishonest working members to profit at the expense o f their Names. In 1986 the
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Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry set up a Committee o f Inquiry to consider 
whether the regulatory arrangements established under the Lloyd’s Act 1982 provided 
protection for members o f  Lloyd’s comparable to that proposed for investors under the 
Financial Services Act 1986. Unlike the Cromer and Fisher working parties, the Neill 
Committee o f Inquiry was composed entirely o f outsiders. The Committee was led by 
Sir Patrick Neill QC, Warden o f Hertford College, Oxford.
The Neill enquiry concluded that the regulatory arrangements in place at Lloyd’s did 
not provide protection for Names comparable to that proposed for investors under the 
Financial Services Act 1986 (para 1.5 Neill Report). A central feature o f this Act is the 
creation o f Self Regulatory Organisations (SROs) comprising a number o f independent 
members and an external overseer (The Securities and Investments Board) to set 
standards where required and to monitor performance by the SROs. The Inquiry did 
not feel that Lloyd’s fitted into the framework o f the Financial Services Act 1986 
because any supervisory body at Lloyd’s would not just be concerned merely with 
investor protection; it would have to deal with policyholder protection as well (para 1.8 
Neill Report). The interests o f  these two groups are sometimes in conflict. The 
Inquiry noted that the Lloyd’s Act 1982 had made a provision for nearly one-third o f 
the Council members to be external members and to be directly elected by the investors 
(the Names). In addition there were four nominated members appointed with approval 
o f the Governor o f  the Bank o f England. One o f these nominated members is the 
overseer for the rest o f the City o f London, the Chairman o f the Securities and 
Investment Board.
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The Neill Inquiry concluded that more independent oversight o f the regulation at 
Lloyd’s was required (para 1.9 Neill Report). The solution proposed was to reduce the 
number o f working members on the Council so that they cease to have the majority, 
keeping the same number o f external members, and doubling the number o f nominated 
members. The changes thus proposed were:
COM POSmON OF THE COUNCIL OF LLOYD’S
At the time of the Neill Inquiry
16 working members 
8 external members 
4 nominated members 
(including the Chief Executive)
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As proposed by the Neill Inquiry
12 working members 
8 external members 
8 nominated members 
(including the Chief Executive)
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The Inquiiy felt that such a change would “provide independent oversight no less 
effective than the board members o f any external supervisory authority could be 
expected to provide” (Neill Report para 1.10). The Inquiry made recommendations 
concerning the process o f recruiting Names. The main recommendation was the need 
for Members’ Agents to “produce written statements setting out their policy in relation 
to the advice given to individual Names about the consequences o f membership, and 
setting out the terms o f business, the syndicates to which they have access and their 
approach to allocating Names to syndicates.” (Neill Report para 4.34 and 
Recommendation no 6 page 86). A series o f recommendations were made for the 
contents o f syndicates’ annual reports, and the underwriter’s report in particular. The 
Inquiry recommended that Lloyd’s adopt inception date accounting as soon as it was 
feasible so to do (Neill Report para 5.9). Inception date accounting has been adopted
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for the 1996 year o f account and subsequent years o f account, no doubt somewhat later 
than the Neill Inquiry had intended.
One o f the most important recommendations o f  the Neill Report related to the agency 
agreement between agents and their members. The agency agreement is the document 
signed by a Name and his members’ agent. This is the agreement by which the Name 
delegates full control o f his underwriting business to his members’ agent and 
undertakes to pay all his liabilities associated with each o f his syndicates. At the time 
the Neill Report was written the agency agreement was made between a member and 
his members’ agent. Where a members’ agent was a combined agent and to the extent 
that the member participated on the syndicates managed by that agent (i.e. he was a 
direct Name), no other agreement was necessary. However, where the members’ agent 
was not also the managing agent, or where the combined agent placed a member on a 
syndicate administered by another managing agent, the member became an indirect 
Name and the members’ agent was obliged to enter into a sub-agency agreement with 
the managing agent(s) concerned. The sub-agency agreement delegated to the 
managing agent(s) the power to underwrite on behalf o f the Name. This meant that the 
members’ agent was still contractually responsible to the name for the underwriting 
although having little control over the actions o f the managing agent.
The Neill committee made various recommendations to alter the agency agreements to 
be more favourable to Names. Its major recommendation held that a direct contractual 
relationship be established between a member and the managing agent so as to enable 
members in future to sue their managing agents as well as their members’ agent in
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contract (para 6.27 Neill Report). The Neill Committee also recommended that “the 
agency agreement should distinguish clearly between the functions o f the two types o f 
agent and contain a clear statement as to their respective duties” (paras 6.27 and 6.28 
and recommendation no 22 Neill Report).
The other major recommendations o f the Neill Inquiry were the setting up o f a Lloyd’s 
Ombudsman to investigate complaints by Names against the Corporation, the setting up 
o f a Names’ Interests Committee, encouraging the appointment o f non-executive 
directors to managing and members’ agencies and the mandatory institution o f 
examinations for all those who wish to become active underwriters. The Neill Inquiry 
was in essence trying to create a regulatory regime comparable with that o f  other 
Financial Services which are subject to the Financial Services Act 1986. Some 
recommendations, such as the agency agreements, are refinements o f the Fisher Report.
2.11 Comment on Reports and Acts 1871 to 1986.
The various reports written and Acts passed by Parliament during the period 1871 to 
1986 relate principally to the regulatory regime at Lloyd’s. Indeed reports such as Neill 
were commissioned in response to regulatory failure. The reports do not discuss the 
future o f  Lloyd’s or discuss strategy or planning. None o f the reports discusses the 
business at Lloyd’s or provides an outline o f  any strategy for growth o f the Society. 
The Cromer Report was commissioned in response to a lack o f capital at Lloyd’s. 
However, rather than suggesting how new capital might be attracted, the report 
suggested lowering the means requirements for Names.
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2.12 “Lloyd’s: a route forward” Report of the Task Force
2.12.1 Background
The Task Force report presents a plan for a comprehensive restructuring o f Lloyd’s. 
The report was written in 1991-2 at a time when Lloyd’s was experiencing a serious 
decline in its membership from over 32,000 in 1988 to 22,000 in 1992. Moreover, the 
capital base was decreasing (£11.4 billion in 1991 to £10 billion in 1992) and Lloyd’s 
was facing its first loss-making year, 1989, and with prospects o f further more serious 
loss-making years to follow.
In November 1990, the Chairman o f Lloyd’s, David Coleridge, invited David Rowland,
the Chairman o f Sedgwick pic, to form a Task Force to consider the long-term
development o f the capital base supporting underwriting at Lloyd’s. David Rowland
invited twelve other people to join the Task Force, eight o f whom were working within
Lloyd’s and three o f whom were “outsiders” . The terms o f reference given to the Task
Force by the Council o f Lloyd’s were:
The group’s objective is to look beyond the immediate future and identify 
the framework within which the Society should, ideally, be trading 5-7 
years hence.
The group will have regard particularly for the long-term competitive 
position of the Society.
The group will examine and assess the advantages and disadvantages of the 
present basis on which capital is provided to support underwriting at 
Lloyd’s and consider:
(a) the tension between the one year syndicate and the need to reserve, plan 
and invest for the future of an ongoing business; its effect on Lloyd’s 
competitive position.
(b) the attractions and drawbacks of individual membership and unlimited 
liability to Names and policyholders and the extent to which the Central 
Fund and other vehicles lead to the mutualisation of liability.
(c) the organisation of the capital supporting the underwriting to facilitate 
an effective response to the fluctuations in the insurance cycle.
The group should, taking into account the legal, accounting and taxation 
consequences, recommend a framework for the future and the methods by 
which it might be achieved. (Task Force Report page 5)
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The terms o f reference are similar to those presented to the Cromer Working Party in 
1968 but the Task Force examines the Society in more detail. The Task Force report is 
divided into four sections. Section One gives an overview o f Lloyd’s - its position in 
the world market and its competitive strengths. Section Two, entitled “Strengthening 
Lloyd’s Capital Base”, considers the need for Lloyd’s to grow and suggests various 
reforms to syndicate structure. Section Three concentrates on improving Lloyd’s 
competitiveness and the strengthening o f distribution channels. The fourth section o f 
the report proposes a new structure o f governance for the Society.
2.12.2 Major Recommendations of the Task Force report.
The Task Force suggested solutions for both the short and long term. The report 
categorised their recommendations under Stage 1 (short term) and Stage 2 (5-7 years). 
Stage 1 reforms:
(1) Compulsory high level stop loss. This is to provide more comprehensive 
protection for Names whilst retaining the traditional sole trader status. This scheme 
covers a Name’s loss if over a 4-year period, the accumulated loss exceeds 80% o f the 
Name’s overall premium limit.
(2) Strengthening Names’ rights. This is an attempt to give Names similar rights to 
those enjoyed by shareholders, for example the right to ongoing participation in a 
syndicate, and also the right to request the Council to replace the managing agent.
(3) Additional reserving. The Task Force identified the need to establish equalisation 
reserves at the level o f the individual Name, and the need for a risk premium in the 
reinsurance to close to compensate the receiving Names for the risk o f deterioration on 
closed prior years o f account.
57
(4) Increasing the liquidity of the capital base. Whilst the partly paid nature of 
Lloyd’s capital base is attractive to Names in that it allows them to achieve a second 
return on their assets, this structure, at times o f loss, inevitably comes under stress. 
The Task Force recommended that criteria be developed for ensuring the 
accessibility/liquidity o f Names’ assets for the purpose o f both the means test and for 
the deposit and reserves held at Lloyd’s.
(5) The introduction of Members’ Agents Pooling Arrangements (MAPA). The
Task Force suggested that such arrangements will provide a low-cost method for 
Names to achieve a high level o f  portfolio diversification.
(6) Managing old and open years. The Task Force rejected an idea to mutualise 
specific losses such as asbestos and pollution, but suggested the best solution was to 
trade through the losses. The Task Force suggested that CentreWrite, a Lloyd’s-owned 
run-off company, should produce policies which release individual Names from 
syndicates.
Stage II reforms;
1. The introduction of limited liability capital in the form of Corporate Members.
The Task Force suggested that such Corporate Members would be structured as 
authorised insurance companies and would participate alongside Names on syndicates.
2. The introduction of a system of value for syndicate participations. The Task 
Force suggested that with a system o f value, Names would secure access to syndicates 
through a market mechanism with supply and demand controlled by price. The Task 
Force, however, does not address the issue o f who owns the reputation o f a syndicate.
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One o f the conclusions o f the Task Force (paragraph 4.2) is that to survive in the 
insurance marketplace, Lloyd’s must commit itself to a strategy o f real growth in 
income over a five to seven-year time-frame. In paragraph 4.7 the report states that a 
contraction in the Lloyd’s market would adversely affect the ability o f  Lloyd’s to lead 
and set terms on business. However, the capacity utilisation o f the Society has been 
falling since the mid 1960s (Figure 1.7). In 1967 over 80 per cent o f  capacity was 
utilised; by 1992 this had fallen to just over 60 per cent. This graph suggests that over­
capacity, not insufficient capacity, has been a feature o f Lloyd’s. Indeed, Lloyd’s has 
sufficient capacity to accommodate growth without needing to increase capacity 
further. Over-capacity was probably a factor in the development o f the loss-incurring 
London Market excess o f loss (LMX) spiral.
Chapter 12 o f the Report discussed the need for a reduction in costs over the whole 
market. One o f Lloyd’s historic competitive advantages was the ability to offer lower 
premiums than its company rivals due to lower costs. However, this cost advantage has
been gradually eroded as Figure 2.1 below shows:
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Lloyd’s 29.7 28.8 30.9 33.5 35.2 38.3 36.0 32.4 31.6 32.0 31.8
Top 5 UK Cos 30.2 29.3 29.0 29.5 30.7 31.3 31.6 31.2 30.3 30.4 31.8
U.S. Primary 28.0 27.4 26.8 27.6 27.7 25.9 25.9 26.3 26.2 25.7 25.4
U.S. reinsurance 27.4 26.1 26.9 31.1 31.9 32.6 31.5 30.9 29.6 29.7 31.0
Swiss Re 34.3 34.1 32.4 32.5 32.0 30.2 30.2 30.5 31.3 29.1 30.3
Munich Re 32.1 31.9 30.6 30.1 30.4 31.0 31.0 31.8 31.7 28.6 28.9
7igure 2.1: Percentage expense ratios o f Lloyd’s and various companies. 
(Source: Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s, 1996).
Figure 2.1 shows that the expense ratio o f  Lloyd’s increased from 1985 to 1991 
whereas the expenses o f the Society’s competitors over that period decreased. Since 
1992, expenses are broadly in line with Lloyd’s competitors due to the implementation
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o f the recommendations o f the Task Force Report which recommended that expense 
ratios should be reduced to 5.5% o f capacity compared to 7.2% o f capacity for the 
1990 year o f account (Task Force report para 12.18). These targets were to be met by 
a reduction in agents’ fees.
The Task Force Report includes a section on strengthening distribution channels; in this
chapter the report recognises the need for Lloyd’s to penetrate new markets, such as
Europe, where it has traditionally been under-represented (para 13.1). The Report
states “Achieving these challenging objectives will require meeting clients’ needs by
delivering a competitive product - competitive both in price and service.” The Report
did not consider the need for changes in the products that Lloyd’s offered but
considered how best to deliver the products through cost-effective distribution
channels. The Report reaffirmed “Lloyd’s brokers’ exclusive right o f access on
mainstream London market business” (para 51), and suggested that the market’s need
for profitable growth could be achieved through strengthening the market’s
relationships with its existing brokers, i.e. syndicates should be underwriting more
business from their existing brokers. The report recommended.
....selective and controlled liberalisation of business placed outside the 
Room. The imposition of an intervening Lloyd’s broker should be relaxed 
in two areas: under strictly defined regulatory control, service companies 
should be free to accept business directly from non-Lloyd’s brokers on U.K. 
regional business; Second, where syndicates have established a physical 
presence in European markets, they should be free to accept business from 
‘accredited’ major European broking groups.
Interestingly the Report suggested that Lloyd’s syndicates will need the flexibility to 
develop a range o f distribution approaches in response to the changing needs o f 
customers and that the divestment provisions o f the 1982 Act should be reversed.
60
However, the Report did not discuss whether the introduction o f sophisticated 
information technology such as Electronic Placing Support (EPS) would replace the 
role o f the broker, but it did conclude that in the future brokers would need to rely on 
risk-structuring skills and fee-based advisory services; a low value-added role as simply 
conduits o f commission-generating premiums would not be sustainable (Task Force 
Report para 13.20).
2.13 The Losses at Lloyd’s.
The losses at Lloyd’s have arisen from two principal sources. Firstly, asbestos and 
pollution claims arising in the USA and, secondly, a series o f large natural catastrophes 
affecting Europe and the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The asbestos and 
pollution claims largely arise from liability policies issued to American assureds during 
the period from the end o f the Second World War to the late 1970s. The insurance 
industry has been badly affected by the liberal interpretation applied by American 
Courts to contract wordings (Davies Arnold Cooper, 1992). By late 1991 Lloyd’s had 
paid £lbillion on 60,000 individual asbestos claims under policies dating as far back as 
the 1940s (Chatset Guide to Syndicate Run-Off 1994). The Comprehensive Response 
Compensation Liability Act in the USA forces American industries to clean up polluted 
sites and the cost o f cleaning up all American polluted industrial sites has been 
estimated at between $65 and $750 billion and companies are looking to their general 
liability insurers for reimbursement.
The natural catastrophes that affected the industry over the period 1987 to 1992 were 
unprecedented in their cost. Indeed, the aggregate catastrophe loss ratio for
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underwriting years 1990-1992 was 170 per cent (Guy Carpenter, 1994). These losses 
badly affected the Lloyd’s market because o f the existence o f the London Market 
Excess o f  Loss (LMX) spiral. The LMX spiral was created as a result o f one Lloyd’s 
syndicate reinsuring the portfolio o f  another Lloyd’s syndicate. The reinsuring 
syndicate likewise reinsured its portfolio with another Lloyd’s syndicate. Thus a spiral 
effect was created. The LMX spiral was not just wholly a Lloyd’s phenomenon but 
involved London market reinsurers as well such as Sphere Drake, English and 
American Insurance Company and Kemper Reinsurance Company (UK) Limited. The 
effect o f the LMX spiral was to concentrate Lloyd’s losses on to a few syndicates. For 
instance 66.8% o f the Lloyd’s loss for the 1989 year o f account o f £2.06 billion was 
attributable to thirteen syndicates which underwrote LMX business, one o f which 
(Syndicate 290) produced a loss o f £251 million, equivalent to over ten per cent o f the 
total Lloyd’s loss (Chatset Guide to Syndicate Run-Off, 1994). The losses arising at 
Lloyd’s bankrupted many Names and forced Names into action groups to take legal 
action against underwriting agencies. There has been, and continues to be, much 
media coverage o f these losses. The scale o f the insolvency o f Names is seen in the 
earmarkings o f the Lloyd’s central fund. As part o f Lloyd’s solvency procedures, 
whenever there is a shortfall in comparing a Name’s Lloyd’s assets with his or her 
liabilities at the preceding year end, sufficient central and other assets are identified to 
enable the Name to pass the Solvency Test and to meet the requirements o f the 
Department o f Trade and Industry. As at 31st December 1995 solvency shortfalls 
amounted to £1,001.2 million. This shortfall was covered by the available assets o f the 
Central Fund and by assets o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s. Figure 2.2 shows the 
development o f the solvency shortfalls.
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Y ear Net assets before Earm arkings C entral Fund balance
earm arkings as a t 31st December
1987 254.4 24.0 230.4
1988 303.6 12.9 290.7
1989 384.5 21.8 362.7
1990 376.2 30.3 345.9
1991 438.0 67.9 370.1
1992 1,113.0 354.9 758.1
1993 904.0 661.6 242.4
1994 737.5 1,057.9* (320.4)
1995 540.9 1,001.2* (460.3)
All figures are in £ million.
Figure 2.2: The Lloyd’s C entral Fund.
Source: Lloyd’s annual accounts
* The shortfalls were covered by the available assets of the Central 
Fund, the net assets of the Society and a credit for part of a double 
count in respect of losses which are covered by errors and omissions 
reserves.
The deteriorating position o f the central fund reflects the financial problems that Names 
have experienced. As at 31st December 1994, the earmarkings o f the Central Fund 
exceeded the funds available, so the net assets o f the Society, principally the value o f 
the Lloyd’s building, were used in order for Lloyd’s to pass the solvency test imposed 
annually by the Department o f  Trade and Industry.
2.14 The Lloyd’s Business Plan
The deteriorating financial position o f the Names and the resultant formation o f Names 
Action Groups prompted the Council o f Lloyd’s to publish “Planning for profit: a 
business plan for Lloyd’s of London” in April 1993. This business plan sought to 
give Names, and the insurance industry, a plan for the future o f Lloyd’s. The two most 
important features o f the Business Plan were, firstly, a strategy to manage the claims
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arising from years prior to and including 1985 and, secondly, the introduction o f limited
liability capital. Chapter 3 o f the Business Plan stated:
“The continued losses arising on Lloyd’s policies written many years ago 
are a grave threat to the Society’s future. These losses place a great burden 
on the current membership and make it extremely difficult to attract new 
capital.”
The proposition introduced by the Business Plan was to create a vehicle with sufficient 
capital in order to manage all the 1985 and prior liabilities o f all the syndicates in 
Lloyd’s. The capital for this operation would come from each syndicate reinsuring its 
1985 and prior liabilities into the central vehicle, which has been named Equitas. 
Subsequent to the Business Plan, “Lloyd’s: reconstruction and renewal” was 
published in May 1995. This document proposed an expansion o f the Equitas project 
by reinsuring all Names’ 1992 and prior liabilities into Equitas.
The Business Plan set out a programme of change to restore Lloyd’s to profit. The 
Council o f  Lloyd’s saw that there were two problems facing the Society: the “old 
years” problems and the outstanding legal disputes (Business Plan page 3). The aim o f 
the Business Plan was to build a new Lloyd’s with more independent regulation, higher 
professional standards, lower costs, with a strong and growing capital base and with a 
broader mix o f business from new geographic markets. The main recommendations o f 
the Business were as follows:
(1) Plan for managing the old years problems. This plan involves the a restructuring 
process to reinsure Names in respect o f their individual liabilities for all Lloyd’s policies 
written up to and including 1985 into a separately-capitalised reinsurance company.
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The purpose o f this restructuring was to create a “ring-fence” isolating the problems o f 
the past.
(2) A m ore independent regulatory regime. The Business Plan recommended that 
the regulatory function should operate independently o f  the commercial operation o f 
the market, as would external regulation (Business Plan, page 30). This would be 
achieved by a new tripartite structure o f governance as suggested by a report published 
in June 1992 from working party chaired by Sir Jeremy Morse entitled “A New 
S tructure o f Governance for Lloyd’s”. The structure would consist o f a Market 
Board and a Regulatory Board both o f which are answerable to the Council which is 
the legislative organ o f the Society. The role o f the Regulatory Board would be to put 
in place an appropriate regulatory structure for the market’s business; the Market 
Board would be the driving force in the development o f Lloyd’s and to be responsible 
for business strategy. The Market Board should also act as the parent body for all the 
central services such as premium handling, central accounting, policy issuing and claims 
handling.
(3) Reducing costs. The Business Plan recommended reducing syndicate expenses in 
order to reach a target profitability for the market o f a pre-tax return o f 10 per cent on 
capacity over the underwriting cycle (Business Plan, page 12). This would, in part, be 
achieved by a mandatory cut in managing agents’ fees to Names. The Business Plan 
also recommended that electronic processing be introduced which would improve 
policy preparation o f new business. The Business Plan suggested that this change 
would improve the service to customers and brokers and also reduce costs.
(4) Overall strategy for capital m anagem ent and the introduction of corporate 
capital. The Business Plan recommended that the capacity o f the Society should be
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managed by the Council who would set an upper limit on capacity for each year 
(Business Plan, page 52). In this way the Council would be able to prevent the build­
up o f excess capacity which fuelled the LMX spiral. The most dramatic 
recommendation was that which admitted incorporated capital to Lloyd’s for the 1994 
year o f  account (Business Plan, page 56). The authors o f  the Business Plan set out 
their rationale for the admission of incorporated capital thus:
“....Lloyd’s needs to retain critical mass in order to remain an important 
and influential market, able to lead business and set terms, and it is clear 
that the alternative to growth is serious contraction. Secondly, the certainty 
of growth in demand for commercial insurance, particularly in the areas 
where Lloyd’s has special skills, requires a positive response from Lloyd’s; 
in the absence of growth, alternative outlets for the business will develop 
over time. We believe that some of the necessary growth will come from 
individual Names but it is unrealistic to expects that adequate fresh capital 
could come from that source alone.” (Business Plan, para 14.2, page 56)
Thus the reasoning behind the admission o f incorporated capital was the need for 
Lloyd’s to grow and the supposition that such growth could not be met by the existing 
Names. This raises the interesting question as to what the capacity Lloyd’s should be. 
The authors o f  the Business Plan and those o f the Task Force Report believed that 
Lloyd’s should grow. However there are underwriters in Lloyd’s whom this author 
has interviewed who believe that such growth will lead to intra-market competition and 
that capacity could fall into the hands o f underwriters who are not competent; one 
underwriter interviewed stated that the capacity o f Lloyd’s should be o f the order o f £6 
billion. The Task Force also recommended that Lloyd’s should grow in terms o f 
capacity (Task Force Report, para 4.2, page 54) and further rejected the notion that 
Lloyd’s should be a “niche o f excellence” in which profitability is the sole concern, and 
absolute size is irrelevant (Task Force Report, para 4.5, page 56). This author found 
there were active underwriters in Lloyd’s who believed that the future o f Lloyd’s lay as
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a centre o f excellence and innovation where the size o f  the Society was not as 
important as its profitability.
Whilst the Business Plan recommended that Lloyd’s should grow in terms o f capacity, 
there was little discussion about how premium income should grow. Chapter 15 o f the 
Business Plan discusses “Business development initiatives” and proposes that Lloyd’s 
should build a position in new markets such as the Far East and Continental Europe. 
Whilst the strategy to expand into new areas is sound given that the Business Plan had 
recommended growth in the capital base, there is little discussion about the method o f 
implementing such a strategy. Indeed, since the role o f the Corporation and Council o f 
Lloyd’s is primarily in the regulation o f the market, it could be argued that it is the role 
o f syndicates to develop their strategy rather than the authors o f the Business Plan.
2.15 Lloyd’s Reconstruction and Renewal.
This report, which was written by the Council o f Lloyd’s, was published in May 1995 
and represents an extension o f the recommendation in the Business Plan to reinsure the 
“old years” into a central vehicle. There are four proposals to the Reconstruction and 
Renewal Plan:
(1) Acceleration and expansion of Equitas strategy. In order to resolve the 
problems o f the past, the report recommended that Names be offered the prospect o f 
“finality” i.e. a final reckoning o f all their 1992 and prior liabilities and a chance to 
resign from the Society.
(2) A £2.8 billion settlem ent offer. To assist Names to resign from Lloyd’s, the 
report recommended a £2.8 billion settlement offer which will provide Names with a
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comprehensive settlement o f all litigation and Names’ liabilities up to and including the 
1992 year o f account.
(3) “Triple profit release” in Spring 1996. The report recommended an early release 
o f  1993, 1994 and 1995 profits, to be released simultaneously in Spring 1996. These 
profits would be released to Names in order for them to meet the costs o f  “finality”.
(4) Strengthening central finances. The report recommended that the central 
finances o f  the Society should be strengthened by around £850-900 million. It also 
stated that these funds would be raised as follows: £450 million from Members in the 
form o f a special contribution which could be offset against future Central Fund 
contributions, £200 million from agents and £200-250 million from the future market.
The Reconstruction and Renewal project was a solution to the litigation which faced 
Lloyd’s from the various action groups that had formed following the losses in the 
1988 to 1992 period. The rationale behind Reconstruction and Renewal was to offer 
each Name a final settlement package which would allow them to resign from Lloyd’s. 
In so doing, the 1992 and prior years would be reinsured into a central vehicle, 
Equitas, and the ongoing market would be free from any deterioration from these old 
years.
The Reconstruction and Renewal proposal was written at a time when the Society was
experiencing severe financial strain - “ .......We have concluded that, unless decisive
action is taken, the resources o f the Central Fund may be exhausted before the end of 
1996.” (Reconstruction and Renewal, para 13, page 9). The strain on the Central Fund 
is a consequence o f Names being unable, or unwilling, to finance their underwriting
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debts. Lloyd’s thus faced the prospect that, unless action was taken, the Society could 
fail its solvency test imposed annually be the Department o f Trade and Industry and be 
unable to pay policyholders’ claims.
The Reconstruction and Renewal plan, which was accepted by the members o f  Lloyd’s 
in late 1996, is a fine example o f syndicates and agents cooperating together for the 
benefit o f the whole market. The new Lloyd’s which has evolved from this project has 
a “firebreak” from the old years as well as a new capital structure - a mixture o f 
traditional Names and new incorporated capital.
2.16 Conclusion.
The reports commissioned by Lloyd’s up to and including the Cromer report, dwelt 
specifically on regulatory issues. Cromer ventured furthest as the report’s brief was to 
make recommendations as to what should be done to encourage and maintain an 
efficient and profitable Lloyd’s underwriters’ market o f  competing syndicates. The 
implementation o f Cromer’s recommendation to relax the means requirements created 
an increase in the capacity o f  Lloyd’s. However such capacity was under-utilised and 
as a consequence the LMX spiral was created. The omission from the Cromer report 
was an examination o f methods to encourage more business flow into Lloyd’s. Cromer 
focused on one aspect o f the Lloyd’s market, namely capital provision, and did not 
consider the implications o f his recommendations, i.e. how the premium income into 
Lloyd’s should grow with the expansion in the capital base.
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The Fisher and Neill Reports examined the regulatory aspects o f  Lloyd’s. Fisher 
examined self-regulation in Lloyd’s from the assumption that this was the best method 
to regulate the operations o f the Society. Neill examined whether the regulatory 
arrangements established under the 1982 Lloyd’s Act provided protection for the 
interests o f members o f Lloyd’s comparable to that for investors under the 1986 
Financial Services Act. Both reports made recommendations as to changes in the 
regulatory system. Neither report examined the business development o f Lloyd’s.
A key element in the Lloyd’s Reconstruction and Renewal plan was to reinsure all 
Names’ 1992 and prior years into a central run-off company called Equitas. In 
September 1996 Equitas received its authorisation from the Department o f  Trade and 
Industry. Equitas is regulated by the Department o f Trade and Industry rather than by 
Lloyd’s. The introduction o f incorporated capital into Lloyd’s has resulted in some 
capital providers being regulated by two UK authorities - Lloyd’s and the Department 
o f  Trade and Industry. For instance, the US insurance group CNA has a London 
branch office, CNA International, which is regulated by the Department o f  Trade and 
Industry, and has also provided £25 million o f capacity for the syndicates managed by 
three managing agents (Claremont Underwriting Agency, Tower Managing Agents, 
and Cox Insurance Holdings) which are regulated by Lloyd’s. It therefore seems a 
reasonable proposition that Lloyd’s should be regulated by one body. As the 1992 and 
prior years are being regulated by the Department o f Trade and Industry, this author 
suggests that the Department o f Trade and Industry assume full responsibility for the 
regulation o f Lloyd’s.
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The Task Force Report was written in the knowledge that Lloyd’s was to declare some 
unprofitable years in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The brief o f the Task Force was 
similar to that o f  Cromer although the Task Force examined the future o f  the capital 
base in more detail as the capital providers, the Names, were experiencing financial 
problems as a result o f the loss-making years. Both the Cromer and Task Force reports 
saw the need for Lloyd’s to grow in terms o f premium income and capacity. The Task 
Force recommended the introduction o f limited liability capital and, indeed, this 
recommendation was reinforced by the Lloyd’s Business Plan. The Task Force report, 
as indeed Cromer, was written from the perspective that Lloyd’s needs to commit itself 
to a strategy o f real growth in income. However, there was no discussion as to 
whether such growth was necessary.
Proposition One Lloyd’s should abandon self-regulation and be regulated by
the Department of Trade and Industry.
This proposition was favoured by eighty per cent o f senior executives interviewed by 
this author. One underwriter interviewed suggested that corporate capital providers 
would only wish to be regulated by one authority if, as well as having a Lloyd’s 
syndicate, they owned a UK registered insurance company. This underwriter remarked 
that London would not be an attractive place to transact business if there were a dual 
regulatory system. Another underwriter commented that as the DTI were already 
regulating the 1992 and prior years, it was not too large a leap for the DTI to regulate 
the 1993 and post years. Given the scale o f losses that Lloyd’s has suffered and the 
inability o f self-regulation to prevent the LMX spiral, several underwriters and brokers 
interviewed suggested that regulation by the DTI would give a positive signal to 
investors and to consumers that Lloyd’s had changed.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the nature o f the structure or architecture o f Lloyd’s with special 
emphasis on the capital base o f the Society. An analysis is made o f the change in the 
structure o f Lloyd’s as a result o f the introduction o f incorporated capital.
3.2 Architecture
Architecture is defined by Kay (1995) as “a network o f relational contracts within, or 
around, the firm”. Architecture may be internal, the firm’s own structure, and 
external, its external relationships and networks.
3.2.1 Internal architecture of Lloyd’s
The purpose o f architecture is to create an environment in which employees o f  a 
company can perform to the best o f  their abilities. Successful architecture should lead 
to an environment to which talented people will seek to join. The Lloyd’s market is not 
a homogeneous unit, and not all syndicates and agencies have common interests. The 
single feature is, however, that they all trade in the Lloyd’s marketplace.
A syndicate consists o f the active underwriter, a deputy to the active underwriter and 
possibly class underwriters each o f whom will underwrite a particular class o f business. 
The active underwriter has ultimate responsibility for the operation o f the syndicate. 
Syndicates are small operating units and even those syndicates that have several class 
underwriters will often have meetings o f the underwriters to discuss the progress o f
Chapter three: The architecture of Lloyd’s and the capital base
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their respective accounts. This is different from a company structure where there are 
individual underwriting departments and perhaps little liaison between each department. 
The dynamic o f a Lloyd’s syndicate is that o f a small business - a small number of 
people working together towards a common goal. Such a structure encourages the 
individuals involved to be innovative and to respond quickly to brokers’ enquiries. An 
outstanding example o f a Lloyd’s underwriter is Cuthbert Heath, who in 1887 
underwrote the first burglary insurance in response to an enquiry from a broker (Gibb, 
1957). Such innovation is still a characteristic o f Lloyd’s today.
The internal architecture o f the Society o f Lloyd’s is its structure o f governance. This 
was discussed by the Task Force and Morse Reports (1992). The structure o f Lloyd’s 
in 1991 at the time o f the Task Force is shown in Figure 3.1
At the time o f the Task Force, the head o f the governance structure was the Council o f 
Lloyd’s whose role was the advancement and protection o f the interests o f Members o f 
the Society in connection with business carried on by them as Members o f the Society. 
The Council o f Lloyd’s consisted o f twelve working members (the Committee o f 
Lloyd’s), eight external members and eight nominated members and the roles o f the 
Council covered both regulatory and business issues. Sitting beneath the Council of 
Lloyd’s was the Corporation o f Lloyd’s which consisted o f three major divisions:
(i) Market Services Group: This carried the responsibility for the central claims 
office, the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office and the marketing o f Lloyd’s.
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(ii) Systems and Communications: This department was responsible for the 
development o f information technology at Lloyd’s and also had responsibility for the 
infrastructure o f the Lloyd’s building.
(iii) Regulatory Services: This department had the responsibility o f regulation o f the 
marketplace - underwriters, brokers and agents.
GOVERNANCE
Council
Committees
CORPORATION OF LLOYD’S
REGULATION 
Regulatory Services
MARKET SERVICES 
Market Services 
Systems & Communications
RAISING OF CAPITAL UNDERWRITING PRODUCTION AND
& SERVICING OF PLACEMENT OF
CAPITAL BASE 26,539 Names 
354 Syndicates
BUSINESS
111 Members' Agents 138 Managing Agents 219 Lloyd's Brokers
Figure 3.1: The structure  of Lloyd’s pre Task Force R eport (1991) 
Source: Task Force R eport 1992
The dual functionality o f the Council o f Lloyd’s was criticised by the Task Force 
Report as it concluded there was not sufficient independence between the policy­
making role o f the Council and the execution o f regulatory policy. The Report 
suggested splitting the Council into a Market Board, responsible for all business issues, 
and a Regulatory Board. The governance o f the Society was further discussed by a 
working party chaired by Sir Jeremy Morse, a nominated member o f the Council and 
Chairman o f Lloyds Bank. The Morse working party reported in June 1992 and 
concluded that the current structure o f governance did not accord the right status to
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either business development or regulation with a perceived tendency for business 
leadership to be “squeezed out” (Para 2.5 Morse Report, 1992). However, the Morse 
Report did not suggest what the nature o f such leadership should be. The business o f 
Lloyd’s is underwriting and thus the business leadership should be held by underwriters 
and brokers rather than by the Council o f  Lloyd’s which holds no underwriting or 
broking role. However, the Task Force Report and the Morse Report were written at a 
time when Lloyd’s was experiencing a period o f loss-making years and, as a result had 
been criticised by Names for regulatory failure. Whilst the Walker Report on the LMX 
spiral did not attribute the development o f such business to the constitutional 
arrangements under which Lloyd’s was regulated, the Report did suggest there was a 
need for a more pro-active stance in the monitoring o f compliance o f standards set for 
managing and members’ agents (Paragraph 1.12(a) Walker Report, June 1992).
The Morse Report recommended a new tripartite structure o f governance. Two limbs 
o f the structure would be concerned with the business and regulatory functions, the 
Market Board and Regulatory Board respectively. This reflected the recommendations 
o f the Task Force Report. The Morse Report recommended that the Council o f 
Lloyd’s should remain as the legislative organ as envisaged by the Lloyd’s Act 1982. 
Figure 3.2 shows the structure recommended by the Morse Working Party. The Morse 
Report envisaged that the Regulatory Board would be an informed monitor and 
facilitator, putting in place an appropriate regulatory structure for the market’s 
business; and that the Market Board would concentrate itself on the development o f 
Lloyd’s, with its own responsibility for compliance and for making sure that the 
Regulatory Board is well informed o f developments in the insurance market generally
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COUNCIL OF LLOYD’S (141 (g)
6
W ORKING (a)
4
NOMINATED
4
EXTERNAL
CEO AND HEAD OF REGULATION 
IN ATTENDANCE
M A R K E T  BO A RD  (15 or 16) (c) (g)
6 WORKING (COMMUTEE) (aXg)
2 WORKING (UNDERW RITING 
ASSOCIATIONS) (b)
1 W ORKING (LUAA) (b)
1 W ORKING (LIB C )(b)
2 or 3 NON-EXECUTIVE (d) 
CEO (e)
2 OTHER EXECUTIVES (i)
R EG U LA TO R Y  BO A RD  (14) (h)
4 NOMINATED 
4 EXTERNAL 
4 W ORKING (f)
HEAD OF REGULATION (e) 
SOLICITOR TO 
CORPORATION (e)
N O TES
(a) To include the Chairman of Lloyd's and two elected deputies.
(b) To be nominated by associations in accordance with their own procedures.
(c) Preferably not more than three broker representatives in all on Market Board.
(d) Appointed by Council; could be external Names.
(e) Ex-officio appointments.
(f) Appointed by Council but not members of Council or Market Board.
(g) To be Chaired by the Chairman of Lloyd's.
(h) To be chaired by nominated member of Council who should have courtesy title of Deputy Chairman
(i) To be appointed by the Chairman of the Market Board, after discussion with the CEO, 
from amongst senior Corporation personnel.
Figure 3.2: Recommended structure of the Council of Lloyd's and the Market and Regulatory Boards 
as proposed by the Morse Report
Source: A new Structure of Governance for Lloyd's. Report of the Working Party Chaired by Sir Jeremy Morse. June 1992
and in Lloyd’s in particular. The Morse recommendations thus envisaged a more 
independent regulatory overview o f Lloyd’s than hitherto had been in place. However, 
with four market practitioners on the Board there would be some input into the 
regulatory process from persons with a knowledge o f Lloyd’s. The Morse Report 
recommendations go further towards an independent regulatory body than suggested 
by the Neill Enquiry but do not suggest a totally independent body as is the case with 
Self Regulatory Organisations formed under the Financial Services Act 1986.
The Morse Report stated that the Market Board “should be the driving force in the
development o f the Society” (para 6.1). The Task Force Report stated that the
Market Board should “lead the market and promote its interests in all matters affecting
the business o f Lloyd’s” and furthermore “be responsible for those aspects o f  business
strategy that need to be decided centrally, and the changes necessary to maintain
Lloyd’s competitive position” (para 14.11). These terms are far more specific than the
powers o f the Council as detailed in the Lloyd’s Act, 1992, namely:
“The Council shall have the management and superintendence of the 
affairs of the Society and the power to regulate and direct the business of 
insurance at Lloyd’s....” (para 6, Lloyd’s Act, 1982).
The nature o f the business strategy to be decided by the Market Board is not specified 
in either the Task Force Report or the Morse Report. The Lloyd’s market is 
fragmented and the business strategy adopted by a U.K. household or motor syndicate 
may be totally impractical for a syndicate that underwrites worldwide excess o f loss 
reinsurance. This author suggests that the role o f the Market Board should not be to 
decide upon a strategy for Lloyd’s but to ensure that Lloyd’s is an environment where 
syndicates can adopt differing strategies depending upon their business requirements.
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In essence the Market Board should ensure that Lloyd’s is a freely competitive 
environment. The nature o f the Market Board could therefore impede the competitive 
position o f Lloyd’s if it is too interventionist. The Market Board should allow 
syndicates to decide upon their own business strategies.
Proposition one recommended that Lloyd’s be regulated by the Department o f Trade 
and Industry. I f  this were effected then there would be implications for the Regulatory 
Board whose primary function o f regulation would be administered by the DTI. 
Therefore this author suggests:
Proposition two: The current Market Board and Regulatory Board should be
replaced by a single Business Development Board.
Such a proposition was widely welcomed by underwriters and brokers, indeed fifteen o f 
the twenty senior executives who were interviewed agreed with this author’s 
suggestion. There was concern voiced by seven underwriters that, given the recent loss 
history o f the Society, there may be the tendency for the Regulatory Board to interfere 
with the business o f the syndicates to the extent o f dictating what classes o f business 
could each syndicate underwrite. This could stifle innovation as underwriters may be 
prevented from underwriting certain classes o f business that do not appear in their 
Business Plans which are submitted to the Lloyd’s regulatory department. This author 
suggests that a Business Development Board should consist o f underwriters, brokers, 
corporate capital providers and Names’ representatives and should focus on new 
business initiatives and helping syndicates and brokers to achieve their business 
objectives. An example o f the operation o f the proposed new Board is the
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development o f  Lloyd’s Japan Inc. This company was set up jointly by Lloyd’s 
underwriters and the Corporation’s Marketing Directorate. The proposition is that 
this company will be a locally incorporated Japanese subsidiary o f the Society owned 
directly 100 per cent by the Corporation o f Lloyd’s for a ten year franchise period. 
Underwriters will participate by virtue o f a co-investment agreement which provides 
rights over profit sharing, governance in a similar way to that o f shareholding. 
Underwriters will only be able to underwrite Japanese direct business by being 
nominated by a participating managing agent in Lloyd’s Japan Inc. The company will 
underwrite business via various consortium arrangements and each participating 
managing agent in the company will have access to these consortia.
3.2.2 Externa] architecture of Lloyd’s.
External architecture is the ability o f  an organisation to foster relationships between 
other organisations for mutual benefit. Clearly in Lloyd’s the relationship between the 
syndicates and the brokers is important; indeed, business can only be transacted 
through Lloyd’s brokers (Lloyd’s Act, 1982 Section 8(3)). The relationship between 
brokers and Lloyd’s underwriters was seen by the Task Force Report to be a source o f 
competitive advantage (Para 3.31, Task Force Report, 1992). This is echoed by 
Melgard (1978) who states that the success o f the Lloyd’s and London market “lies in 
the interrelationship between and close ties between broker and underwriter” .
The provisions o f Sections 10 and 11 o f the Lloyd’s Act, 1982 do not allow a Lloyd’s 
broker to own a managing agent and vice versa. Paragraph 12.12 o f the Fisher Report
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referred to three ways in which abuses might arise from a broker’s interest in a 
managing agent:
(i) action contrary to the interests o f Names - by the broker applying pressure on an 
active underwriter o f a controlled syndicate to underwrite business contrary to his 
better judgment; or to write business at premium rates below those he would offer to 
other brokers, or to give commissions higher than those he would give to other 
brokers; or to settle claims on terms he would not otherwise agree;
(ii) action contrary to the interests o f  policyholders - by the broker giving business to a 
controlled syndicate although better terms were available from other syndicates; and
(iii) action contrary to the interests o f  the Lloyd’s market as a whole - by the broker 
undermining the principle o f competition and, especially if he makes use o f his 
knowledge o f other brokers’ business in so doing, by undermining the basis o f  trust on 
which the market operates.
As it is unlikely that a broker would wish to see his own insurance entity fail, it seems 
logical that broker ownership o f managing agents would encourage better priced 
business to be shown to the managed syndicate. This would not, o f course, be in the 
interests o f policyholders, as suggested by the Higgins Report. However, a freely 
competitive environment would ensure that the customer achieves a fair price for his 
risk.
In London in 1995 there were 141 Lloyd’s syndicates, 65 companies in the Institute o f 
London Underwriters and 87 members o f LIRMA (London Insurance and Reinsurance 
Market Association). The geographical proximity o f the underwriters creates a huge
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coinsurance market that operates very efficiently. For a risk whose size or unusual 
features requires several insurers to agree on rates and policy terms, the London market 
can obtain such coverage in a matter o f days. It could take several weeks to transact a 
similar insurance in the USA with underwriters in several cities and often in different 
time zones (Frinquelli etal, 1994).
Underwriters in London will often know each other’s skills and if one underwriter is 
unable to rate a particular risk, then he is likely to know o f an underwriter in London 
who will be able to progress the broker’s enquiry: Talented underwriters build up 
knowledge that enables them to “lead” the rating and assessment o f the risk. Other 
underwriters with less experience, or perhaps with less risk-bearing capacity, can 
“follow” the leading underwriter by taking a smaller share o f the risk. The result o f the 
architecture o f the London market is a risk-transfer system that takes advantage o f the 
best underwriters in the market and spreads that risk among underwriters and 
companies according to their capacity and appetite for particular types o f risk.
One disadvantage o f this structure is the geographical distance between underwriters 
and the risks they are assessing. Whereas international reinsurers will have a series o f 
branch offices and therefore easy access to local knowledge, London underwriters have 
to rely on professional surveyors to visit and report on risks. Such local knowledge is 
more crucial in insurance than in reinsurance. During 1994 Lloyd’s premium income 
from the United States Excess and Surplus Lines market was $1,550 million, 
representing 17% o f the market (A.M. Best Company, 1995). Lloyd’s has accessed 
this segment o f the US insurance market by granting binding authorities to Managing
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General Agents. Essentially Lloyd’s underwriters are relying on the knowledge of local 
underwriters to produce profitable business. Whilst the conditions o f the binding 
authority will restrict the Managing General Agent in terms o f the type and scale o f risk 
accepted, it is an arrangement built on trust between the Lloyd’s underwriters and the 
Managing General Agent. Such binding authorities overcome the lack o f a branch 
network, although there is the danger o f a “rogue” agent abusing the underwriting 
authority given to him.
3.3 The concept of capital
There are various meanings that can be attributed to the word capital depending on the 
context and the purpose o f its use. Dickinson and Roberts (1984) suggest three such 
uses. Firstly, there is real capital which encompasses the physical assets o f the firm. 
Secondly, capital may be used as a concept in financial theory to describe the value o f 
the firm to the holders o f its security. The value o f this type o f capital is determined 
within the capital market and its value is determined by profit forecasts, cash flow 
estimates and political and economic forces. The term “market capital” may be better 
used to describe this meaning o f capital. Lastly, there is the capital which is surplus to 
an assessment o f the current liabilities o f the firm; this form o f capital may be termed 
financial capital; Dickinson and Roberts (1984) call such capital “corporate capital” but 
as this has a particular meaning in Lloyd’s, the term “financial capital” is used here. 
Financial capital may be measured as the difference between total assets and liabilities 
at any one time. These funds will be used by the management o f the firm in pursuing 
their corporate objectives. Financial capital is equivalent to the policyholders’ surplus 
o f an U.S. insurance company. The concept o f financial capital is, however, static in
81
that it does not reflect any particular growth paths that the company may wish to 
follow in the future (Benjamin, 1980). A calculation o f financial capital relies on the 
assessment o f assets and a valuation o f liabilities. Assets should be valued as closely as 
possible to their market value and technical reserves should be assessed on a realistic 
set o f assumptions. For an insurance or reinsurance company, the level o f assets will be 
identifiable such as premium funds, investments and property. The total assets will be 
valued at a certain figure. This contrasts with the position o f a Lloyd’s syndicate where 
the assets o f  the syndicate are the premium trust funds and the members’ funds at 
Lloyd’s. The members’ funds constitute the members’ deposits held at Lloyd’s 
together with special reserves and personal reserves also held at Lloyd’s. The member 
has other assets which are not held by Lloyd’s in trust for the member but are declared 
to Lloyd’s via the means test, a valuation o f the wealth o f the member. A Name’s 
means test is a valuation o f the member’s wealth which supports his chosen level o f 
Overall Premium Limit (i.e. the amount o f premium a Name can underwrite in any one 
year o f  account). Thus a Name may well have wealth in excess o f that declared in the 
means test.
An insurance or reinsurance company will have a certain level o f assets over and above 
its liabilities, i.e. it will have a certain financial capital that may be calculated. By 
contrast, a Lloyd’s syndicate will be able to assess its liabilities but will not be able to 
calculate its financial capital as the assets o f the syndicate are not readily quantifiable. 
These assets comprise the members’ total resources and the assets held by each 
member in excess o f their declared means.
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The financial capital o f an insurance or reinsurance company may be used by the 
management either to accept more premium income (i.e. more liabilities) or to expand 
the company such as by purchasing a competitor. Such a transaction may increase the 
share value o f the company. By contrast the financial capital o f  a Lloyd’s syndicate 
may only be utilised for accepting premium income. Any activity beyond this, such as 
the purchase o f a competitor syndicate would have to be a financial transaction 
undertaken by the managing agent o f the syndicate which are, almost exclusively, 
limited liability companies. The managing agent’s only sources o f revenue are profit 
commissions payable by Names on the managed syndicate and fees charged by the 
managing agent to the syndicate Names.
There is a growing body o f literature about a fourth type o f capital - reputational 
capital i.e. the assessment o f  the value o f a company’s brands - its brand equity. A 
good reputation enhances profitability because it attracts customers to the company’s 
products, investors to its securities, and employees to its jobs. In turn, esteem inflates 
the price at which a public company’s securities trade. The economic value o f a 
corporate reputation can therefore be gauged by the excess market value o f its 
securities (Fombrun, 1996 page 81). There are various methods for assessing the 
value o f a company’s brands although none has universal appeal. A method for 
estimating a brand’s value is to make an assessment o f the royalty on sales a third party 
would have to pay to obtain the right to use the name. An alternative approach is to 
make the assumption that stock market prices incorporate all known information about 
a brand and fully reflect a company’s future prospects. Given this assumption, the 
value o f a brand is its market value over and above the liquidation value o f the net
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assets involved in producing and selling the brand. Given that a company’s assets are 
valued at book value, the excess market value therefore incorporates not only the value 
o f the company’s reputation but also the market’s best guess about the current market 
value o f those historic assets (Fombrun, 1996 page 91). The market value o f a public 
company reflects its value as an operating enterprise. The excess market value 
therefore corresponds to the overall regard that the company is held by investors, i.e. a 
gauge o f its reputational capital. The reputational capital o f Lloyd’s syndicates is 
discussed in Chapter 6.
3.4 The chain of security at Lloyd’s
One o f the central issues discussed by the Task Force report was the future nature o f 
Lloyd’s capital base, indeed Section II o f  the report is devoted to strengthening the 
capital base. The main focus o f the Task Force’s work was to assess the advantages 
and disadvantages o f the basis on which capital is provided to support underwriting at 
Lloyd’s (Task Force Report page 53).
A peculiar feature o f  insurance is that capital is not needed since premiums are 
collected first and claims are paid later. The business should enjoy positive cash flow 
unless claims exceed premiums in which case capital will be called upon. In insurance, 
capital serves principally to provide reserves for the protection o f the policyholders in 
the event o f loss.
In the case o f Lloyd’s, underwriters will not call for Names to contribute until there is a 
loss on any particular year o f account and capital is needed to fund the loss; then
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underwriters may call for as much capital as is required. Names at Lloyd’s have 
unlimited liability as a result o f their status in English law a sole traders, but only in 
respect o f their own share o f a syndicate’s loss - a Name’s liability is several and not 
joint. The security o f  a Lloyd’s policy is dependent upon the ability o f  a Name to meet 
his or her obligation under insurance policies underwritten by the syndicate.
In accordance with the Insurance Companies Act 1982 all premiums must be paid into 
a premiums trust fund, on behalf o f all policy holders (Section 83 (2)). This fund must 
only be used for the payment o f claims and be held in short-term investments. Lloyd’s 
has three premium trust funds - the U.S. dollar trust fund, the Canadian dollar trust 
fund and the sterling trust fund. Three years after the inception o f a year o f account, the 
active underwriter calculates a closing reserve. Most o f the balance in the premiums 
trust fund will be used to buy a reinsurance policy, known as the reinsurance to close 
(RITC). The reinsurance to close indemnifies the fund against future claims. The 
other party with which the reinsurance to close policy is taken out is usually the same 
syndicate but for the next year o f account. If  after the calculation o f the reinsurance to 
close there is a surplus in the premiums trust fund, this is distributed to the Names as 
profit.
If  the premiums trust fund proves inadequate to meet the claims on a year o f account 
then the capital in a Name’s deposit and personal reserves are called upon. Each Name 
at Lloyd’s is required to place a deposit with the Corporation o f Lloyd’s pro-rata to his 
premium income. This percentage ranges from 20% to 50% depending on the level o f
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means shown and the category o f the Name (i.e. whether a working Name, one who is 
employed within Lloyd’s, or an external, non-working Name).
A Name’s members’ agent will normally require the Name to have Personal Reserves, 
accumulated out o f past profits. In addition there are Special Reserves which allow a 
Name to set aside a small tax-exempt part o f his underwriting profits. These reserves 
and deposits are there to meet losses. If  the Lloyd’s deposit is used to fund losses then 
a Name will be required to reduce his Overall Premium Limit (OPL) or cease 
underwriting until the deposit is made good. If  the Name’s deposit and reserves prove 
insufficient to meet his liabilities then Lloyd’s will require the loss to be funded from 
the Name’s means.
The Name’s underwriting obligations are unlimited. If  a Name’s means are not enough 
to meet claims then Lloyd’s must turn to the fourth and last line o f  defence: the Central 
Fund. The Lloyd’s Central Fund was established by a trust deed in 1927 out o f  a small 
levy paid by every Name in proportion to his premium income (Hay Davison, 1987). 
It exists for the purpose o f protecting policyholders, so that claims can be met when 
Names lack means. Essentially the Central Fund mutualises the losses o f  an individual 
member onto the whole membership. The Central Fund also provides security for two 
bonds. One o f the bonds is in favour o f Lioncover Insurance Company Limited. This 
insurance company was set up by Lloyd’s in connection with the PCW settlement (a 
compromise settlement between the Corporation o f Lloyd’s and Names on the PCW 
syndicates who had been defrauded). The second bond is in respect o f  CentreWrite 
Limited which was set up to provide reinsurance for run-off years o f account. The
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bonds may be called upon in the event that each company’s liabilities exceeds its assets. 
As at the 31st December 1993, £30 million o f the Central Fund was earmarked in 
respect o f Lioncover’s accounts (Global Accounts).
There are thus four parts to the security behind a Lloyd’s policy: the premiums trust 
funds, deposits and reserves, certified means and the Central Fund. These provide the 
financial resources to back up a Lloyd’s policy. Figure 3.3 shows the financial 
resources o f Lloyd’s at the 31st December each year from 1982 to 1995. The US and 
Canadian Trust Funds have been converted to sterling at the rates o f exchange ruling at 
the 31st December for each year.
These four “lines o f  defence” are subject to two checks: premium income monitoring 
and the annual solvency check. Gross premium income (i.e. net o f brokerage and 
commission and return premiums but gross o f outwards reinsurance costs) is monitored 
by the Lloyd’s Regulatory Department for each o f the three open years o f  account. 
Premium income is monitored to ensure that the Syndicate’s assets i.e. the assets o f the 
Names should cover the risks they undertake. If  a Syndicate’s premium income exceeds 
its stamp capacity then, under the provisions o f the Syndicate Premium Income Bylaw 
(Number 6 o f 1984), the regulatory authorities o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s will stop 
the syndicate from underwriting any further business. Premium income is used by 
Lloyd’s as a measure o f risk. However no differential is made between the classes o f 
premium income as the same asset requirements are required by Lloyd’s irrespective o f 
the type o f premium income (and therefore risk) which a Name is assuming. This
87
Year
Premiums trust funds Members' funds at Lloyd' s
U/writers Joint 
advences asset
Sterling American Canadian in Illinois trust fond
Total
technical
reserves
(B) (C) 
(A) Personal Special 
Deposit reserves reserves
Total
A+B+C
Other
assets
Total
members'
1982 1,505 2,593 151 - - 4,249 773 119 180 1,072 1,750 2,822
1983 1,839 3,034 178 - - 5,051 983 170 205 1,358 1,931 3,289
1984 2,272 4,179 273 - - 6,724 1,212 212 231 1,655 2,268 3,923
1985 2,700 3,921 217 - - 6,838 1,582 242 254 2,078 2,591 4,669
1986 3,224 4,707 268 - - 8,199 2,092 273 240 2,605 3,300 5,905
1987 3,322 4,503 271 - - 8,096 2,621 330 215 3,166 3,256 6,422
1988 3,128 5,174 353 - - 8,655 2,831 465 226 3,522 3,492 7,014
1989 4,531 5,206 422 229 - 10,388 3,333 626 298 4,257 3,700 7,957
1990 4,632 4,154 355 177 - 9,318 3,504 621 293 4,418 3,036 7,454
1991 6,229 4,995 343 198 - 11,765 3,744 600 308 4,652 2,643 7,295
1992 9,418 5,774 396 246 - 15,834 3,718 601 178 4,497 1,880 6,377
,1993 11,746 6,482 419 244 141 19,032 3,760 841 117 4,718 1,749 6,467
1994 12,307 6,987 401 229 135 20,059 4,227 778 73 5,078 1,487 6,565
1995 10,732 8,124 454 237 139 19,686 4,696 748 55 5,499 1,259 6,758
FIGURE 3.3: SECURITY OF A LLOYD’S POLICY
All figures in £m as at 31st December
(Source: Statistics Relating to Lloyd's, 1996 edn.)
weakness was recognised by the Lloyd’s Business plan which recommended the 
introduction o f risk weighted capital (Section 12.1 page 51).
A second check is the annual solvency test, formerly called the Lloyd’s audit. This 
originated in 1908 when, in response to a scandal in which an underwriter bankrupted 
several Names, a proposal was issued by underwriters, led by Cuthbert Heath, to the 
Committee o f Lloyd’s suggesting that underwriters should produce a certificate signed 
by an approved accountant that a syndicate’s Names were in the possession o f assets 
sufficient to cover their liabilities (Gibb, 1957). Each year Lloyd’s issues minimum 
reserves for each class o f business in its first, second, third and subsequent years o f 
development. Underwriters are required to calculate their reserves for both the open 
and closed years o f account with reference to these minima. However, Names must 
provide more reserves if the pattern o f claims warrants it. The calculation o f the 
reserve must be agreed and signed by an approved auditor to certify that a Name has 
sufficient assets in his premiums trust fund, deposits or personal reserves to cover his 
liabilities. Any deficiency must be made good before the certificate is signed. Names 
who cannot provide certificates o f solvency are declared to be in default and Central 
Fund assets are earmarked to cover the deficiency.
Underwriting is the most significant characteristic that defines the Lloyd’s market. 
Underwriting at times leads to intramarket support and at other times to intramarket 
competition, but its main objective is to make underwriting profit by collecting more in 
premiums than is paid out in claims. Many o f the more arcane and distinctive 
structural characteristics o f Lloyd’s were built around the pre-eminence o f the art o f
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underwriting and the role o f  the underwriter. Lloyd’s capital structures, the 
administrative support organisations, accounting conventions and distribution systems, 
all support and evolved out o f the pre-eminence o f underwriting.
Lloyd’s is a marketplace, not an insurance company, within which approximately 150 
entities (syndicates) underwrite all classes o f insurance and reinsurance business. This 
structure has developed over a period o f some 300 years and is a model that has been 
remarkably successful, notwithstanding the 1988 to 1992 loss period. Despite the 
longevity o f the market, this model has not been successfully copied elsewhere in the 
world.
At the very core o f Lloyd’s has been the concept o f a capital base constructed entirely 
from individual sole traders, known as Names. Names were the exclusive source o f 
capital at Lloyd’s until 1994, when institutional capital (Corporate Capital) was 
permitted to invest in Lloyd’s. Under English law, this sole trader status confers on the 
individual unlimited liability for any losses incurred, but also provides for considerable 
tax advantages, leading to high returns in times o f profitability. Becoming a Name is 
open to anyone who has the required means. However, a potential Name has to be 
sponsored by existing Names. Names are “underwriters” by virtue o f their sole trader 
status.
A unique feature o f the Lloyd’s capital structure is the annual venture. Before the 
commencement o f each underwriting and calendar year, the constitution o f the 
syndicate - a list o f capital providers who wish to support the syndicate - is established
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for that year although the final result o f the year will not be declared until three years 
after the start o f  the underwriting year. For example the underwriting year 1996, which 
relates to all policies underwritten during the twelve months beginning 1st January 
1996, will not be “closed” until 31st December 1998. Once the year is “closed” then all 
the profit is distributed to the Names, or any underwriting loss on the year o f account is 
collected from the Names. With agreement o f the managing agency, Names select how 
much premium income or “capacity” they wish to receive from each syndicate, and the 
aggregate total pledged by all the capital providers gives the total premium income, the 
capacity, for the syndicate for the forthcoming year o f account.
At the end of each calendar year, there is, in effect, a liquidation o f the capital base and 
a recapitalisation o f all the syndicates. New capital may wish to join for the following 
year o f account thereby increasing the capacity o f the syndicate. Alternatively, capital 
may wish to withdraw in which case the capacity o f the syndicate will fall. At the end 
o f the three year period, an underwriting year o f account is “closed”. The underwriter 
makes an assessment o f the liabilities o f the account to run-off to extinction and this is 
charged to the Names on that particular year o f account. This reserve is known as the 
“Reinsurance to Close” (RITC). The RITC is transferred to the oldest open year o f 
account and the transferring year will then be closed. Any surplus profits are 
distributed to Names and likewise any loss on the year o f account is collected from 
Names. There is thus no retained surplus within any Lloyd’s syndicate, as total profit 
and loss to capital is declared annually and either distributed to or called from its capital 
providers, the Names. “Surplus” is in the deposits and assets o f the capital providers.
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The main disadvantage o f an annual venture is that managing agents are unable to plan 
ahead as the capital base could, in theory, decide to leave the Lloyd’s market. This 
poses a problem when policyholders are seeking multi-year contracts. In reality, a 
profitable well-run syndicate will not have a problem in maintaining its capital base 
from year to year; an unprofitable syndicate, however, will lose its Names. A 
disadvantage in the annual venture is in investment strategy and asset/liability matching 
which require multiple-year planning - a difficulty for syndicates to achieve. The 
advantage o f the annual venture is that syndicates have to justify themselves to the 
capital base each year - poorly performing syndicates will not be able to retain their 
capital base. The annual venture means that the capital base is very fluid and can thus 
respond to opportunities in the market. The annual venture allows syndicates to 
expand their capacity when rates in the market are high, and thus profits are able to be 
made, and conversely to contract their capacity when rates are depressed . 
Consequently, the annual venture allows syndicates to be counter-cyclical to the 
insurance market outside Lloyd’s. The introduction o f “permanent” capital could lessen 
the pressure to maintain quality results.
The capital base, representing the sum o f the assets o f  the underwriting Names, is 
dedicated to the Lloyd’s market, although it may move between syndicates within the 
Lloyd’s market. Lloyd’s syndicates only compete with capital with each other; they do 
not compete with the capital markets at large. This situation could change with the 
introduction o f corporate capital.
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There is a certain kudos in being a member o f Lloyd’s, like that associated with being a 
member o f  an exclusive club. This apart, however, there are sound financial reasons 
for wishing to be a member:
(1) Partly  paid capital base: A major attraction o f membership at Lloyd’s is that 
individuals may participate in the market on a partly-paid basis. Rather than buying 
shares in an insurance company, individuals must show wealth o f  at least £250,000; 
however only 30% o f these funds need to be held at Lloyd’s (i.e. to constitute the 
member’s deposit). Each prospective candidate for membership has to undergo a 
Means Test. Assets, which currently qualify for Means Test Purposes are divided into 
two main groups:
(A) Assets which m ust constitute not less than  60%  of M eans Test
(i) Stock Exchange Quoted Securities.
(ii) Cash at Bank or Building Society.
(iii) Surrender Value o f Life Policies.
(iv) Absolute reversionary interest in Trusts at market value, calculated on an actuarial 
basis.
(v) Bank Guarantees, Insurance Company Guarantees, Letters o f Credit.
(vi) Gold at 70% o f its market value, subject to certain conditions.
(B) Assets which m ust not exceed 40%  of the M eans Test
(i) Homes other than the Candidate’s principal residence, are permitted at market 
value, less any outstanding mortgage or loan.
(ii) All commercial property at its market value, less any outstanding mortgage or loan.
(iii) Farmland at its market value (excluding the value o f the house, if the house is the 
principal residence), less any outstanding mortgage or loan.
(iv) Leasehold property, subject to certain conditions.
(2) Highly leveraged returns. In addition to allowing capital to be partly paid, 
Names also benefit from having their assets “work twice”. For example if some o f the 
Name’s assets are in land or in commercial property, these could be earning an income
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whilst backing a Name’s underwriting at Lloyd’s. Similarly, assets that are deposited at 
Lloyd’s such as securities or cash will earn a return in addition to supporting a Name’s 
underwriting.
(3) Gearing or leverage. Names are required to deposit 30% o f their overall 
premium limit as funds at Lloyd’s. This means that if a Name achieves 10% return on 
capacity, this equates to a 33.3% return on the funds at Lloyd’s in addition to the 
investment return earned on the deposit.
(4) Tax advantages. As Names have sole trader status, they may pool gains or losses 
from underwriting against other income to reduce tax liability. However, whilst sole 
trader status accords the Name favourable taxation status, the Name also has unlimited 
liability for any losses on underwriting.
3.5 The Introduction of corporate capital at Lloyd’s.
The total losses declared by Lloyd’s for the years o f account 1988 to 1992 were £8.7 
billion. Lloyd’s declared a profit o f £1 billion for the 1993 year o f account and similar 
profits are expected for the 1994 and 1995 years o f account (pers comm a Members’ 
Agent). This loss-making period has been compared with the years 1964, 1965 and 
1966 which all produced losses as a result o f Hurricane Betsy which hit the Eastern 
Seaboard o f the USA in 1965. However, by the 1969 year o f account Lloyd’s had 
recouped these losses. Lloyd’s does not possess statistics relating to its capacity at the 
time o f Betsy, but if an estimate o f £450 million is made then the 1964 loss equated to 
0.22% o f capacity, the 1964 loss 7.7% of capacity and the 1966 loss 3.6% o f capacity. 
Such losses are containable and indeed the capacity o f Lloyd’s grew steadily after this 
period. By contrast the 1988 year o f account loss equated to a 4.63% loss on capacity,
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the 1989 result a 18.83% loss on capacity, the 1990 result a 26.33% loss on capacity 
and the 1991 result a 17.99% loss on capacity. These losses forced some Names into 
bankruptcy and led to the formation o f Names’ action groups in order to pursue legal 
remedies for their pecuniary losses against managing and members’ agents e g. the 
Gooda Walker action group, the Devonshire Names’ action group.
The losses were the impetus for the formation o f the Task Force and its subsequent 
report and the follow-up documents, the Business Plan and the Reconstruction and 
Renewal Plan. The losses gave Lloyd’s a great deal o f  adverse publicity as some 
Names became bankrupt and others, faced with the prospect o f mounting losses, 
committed suicide. There were 31,945 Names as at the 1st January 1993 o f which 
19,537 were active (Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s). The remaining 12,408 Names had 
open years (i.e. run-off years o f  account) and could not leave Lloyd’s until such times 
as the open years were closed. As at the 1st January 1988 Lloyd’s had 32,433 active 
Names (Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s). Thus in five years the number o f active Names 
had almost reduced by one-third. With the decline in the number o f Names came a drop 
in capacity from a maximum o f £11,382 million in 1991 to £8,878 million in 1993, a 
drop o f 22 per cent. As the Task Force report proposed that Lloyd’s should grow, it 
was necessary to  find a new source o f capital. The Task Force report stated (page 64 
para 5.18) that it would be optimistic to assume that the current Names could provide 
all the required growth, especially given that one quarter o f  Names were over 62 years 
old. A central part o f the Business Plan was the proposal to introduce incorporated, 
limited liability, capital in additional to the existing unlimited liability capital base.
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3.6 Lloyd’s New Capital Structure.
As a result o f the reduction in Lloyd’s capacity from £11.382 billion for the 1991 year 
o f account to £8.878 billion for the 1993 year o f account, the Task Force Report 
concluded that:
“.... the Society should commit itself now to a strategy of real growth in 
income over the next 5-7 years. This will necessitate stable real growth in 
capacity..... ” (Section 4.1 page 54).
The Report concluded that the retraction in Lloyd’s capital base could not be allowed 
to continue and that further shrinkage would increase concerns surrounding the 
continued security o f  a Lloyd’s policy, impair its ability to set terms and lead business, 
increase the relative burden o f the old year claims arising from asbestos and pollution, 
limit the Society’s resolve to achieve cost control and, finally, adversely affect the 
dynamism of the market (Section 4.7 page 56).
This author suggests that the concerns voiced in the Task Force Report are not all 
material. A decrease in the capital base o f Lloyd’s does not give a positive message to 
the worldwide insurance and reinsurance market especially in the USA where growth 
and expansion is a part o f business philosophy. However, this viewpoint depends on 
viewing Lloyd’s as a single entity. Purchasers o f Lloyd’s policies have, recently, 
become more interested in the composition, in terms o f individual syndicates, o f the 
security supporting their policy especially as the rating agency Standard and Poor has 
devised a rating system for Lloyd’s syndicates. The ability o f Lloyd’s to set terms and 
lead business is not dependent on its size but rather the skill o f its underwriters and the 
added value it gives to the risk transfer process as opposed to its competitors. The 
Task Force states that Lloyd’s has to be able to grow if it is to trade through the
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overhang o f old years’ claims arising from asbestos and pollution. The Reinsurance to 
Close mechanism offers Names the ability to exit a syndicate but it does result in the 
oldest open year o f account assuming all the liability from all the closed years hence 
Names pay for losses on years o f account on which they had no participation. This is 
o f no concern to Names if the Reinsurance to Close is an adequate assessment o f the 
liabilities, but under-reserving results in current Names incurring losses on years o f 
account in which they had no original participation. The Task Force assumed that the 
way to deal with this problem was for Lloyd’s to grow and in effect to ‘dilute’ the 
problems o f the old years. The Lloyd’s Business Plan and the subsequent 
Reconstruction and Renewal Plan suggested that the old years (1992 and prior) should 
be closed into a single run-off company, Equitas. This has the benefit o f closing any 
syndicates that have open years prior to and/or including 1992 into a central fund - 
essentially Equitas mutualises the liabilities o f Lloyd’s. Thus the Business Plan has 
effected the solution to this problem independent o f the need for Lloyd’s capacity to 
grow. Section 4.7 o f the Task Force Report suggests that a decline in capacity would 
“adversely affect the dynamism o f the market, and its attractiveness to entrepreneurs.” 
If  Lloyd’s is viewed as a market where insurance expertise thrives and profits are made, 
then the size o f the Society should not matter in order to attract the best underwriting 
talent. Indeed, it could be argued that if Lloyd’s decreased in size the available capacity 
would fall to the most competent underwriters. Interestingly, the Task Force Report 
dismissed the suggestion that Lloyd’s should become a “ ...small niche o f excellence in 
which profitability is the sole concern, and absolute size is irrelevant” (Section 4.5, 
page 56). This author found that o f those underwriters who were interviewed five 
believed that the capacity o f Lloyd’s should fall to a level o f about £6 billion. This
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would prevent some intra-Lloyd’s competition and result in the capacity being in the 
hands o f competent underwriters. In this way Lloyd’s would become a niche o f 
excellence.
The Business Plan set a target figure for capital o f £10-12 billion by 1997 (Section 12.3 
page 52). The authors o f the Business Plan were aware o f the effect that the 
implementation o f the proposals o f the Cromer Report had had on capital, and the need 
to  ensure that capital was not increased so as to lead to the over-capacity problems o f 
the mid to late 1980s. The Lloyd’s Business Plan recommended the introduction o f 
limited liability capital as had been discussed some twenty years earlier by the Cromer 
Report. From the 1994 year o f  account onwards there was to be a new capital 
structure at Lloyd’s consisting o f the existing unlimited liability Names and limited 
liability incorporated Names as shown in Figure 3.4 below.
Figure 3.4: Lloyd’s capital structure from 1994 onwards.
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From the 1994 year o f account onwards, Names fall into five categories:
(a) High liquidity Names. These are Names with liquid assets o f at least £500,000. 
Names in this class will be allowed to participate in the market on a 20% ratio o f funds 
at Lloyd’s to overall premium limit, subject to a minimum deposit o f  £200,000 and 
requirements that they show means o f at least 50% o f premium limit and reconfirm 
annually.
(b) Names with means o f at least £250,000 but less than £500,000. These Names are 
required to lodge 30% o f their premium limit at Lloyd’s.
(c) External Names with means between £100,000 and £250,000 or vocational Names 
(i.e. Names working at Lloyd’s) have to deposit 40% o f their overall premium limit at 
Lloyd’s subject to a minimum o f £25,000. Overall premium limits range from £50,000 
to £600,000.
(d) Members with means less than £100,000 or vocational Names with nominal means 
are required to deposit 50% o f their overall premium limit at Lloyd’s. The overall 
premium limit for these Names must not exceed £190,000 and for vocational Names 
the overall premium limit must not exceed £100,000.
(e) For working members only there is a special category o f membership which 
obviates the need to show any level o f  personal wealth. However, such Names must 
put 50% of the premium limit into funds at Lloyd’s. This category o f Name cannot 
underwrite more than £100,000 in premium income in any one year o f account.
To assist members with limit premium levels in achieving some diversity o f risk across 
syndicates, the Business Plan provides for the establishment o f Members’ Agents 
Pooling Agreements (MAPAs). Baillie-Hamiliton (1988) has demonstrated that the
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probability o f a severe loss declines as the number o f Syndicates in a Name’s portfolio 
increases. A MAPA involves a members’ agent combining all syndicate participations 
in a single pool. Names have a share in the pool rather than in an individually 
constructed (bespoke) portfolio. For the 1995 year o f account approximately 40% of 
Lloyd’s capacity is from MAPA names (pers comm a Members’ Agent). Each MAPA 
must contain at least thirty syndicates and within that MAPA no one syndicate can 
constitute more than 7.5% of the MAPA’s capacity. As Lloyd’s is a subscription 
market if a Name underwrites through a MAPA he could well be on the same risk 
several times. In the event o f a claim on that risk a Name could be in a worse loss 
position through a MAPA than through a bespoke portfolio. It is essential therefore 
that the MAPA offers a Name a portfolio o f types o f syndicate (marine, non-marine, 
motor, aviation and life) so that the Name achieves a diversification o f risk. As a 
MAPA contains a number o f syndicates, the profitability MAPA will tend to “mirror” 
the results o f  the overall market. It will only be possible to achieve higher than 
average returns if the Name’s portfolio is bespoke. However such a bespoke collection 
o f syndicates could achieve results worse than the market average.
In order to meet the Council’s target o f £10-12 billion o f capacity, the formation o f 
limited liability corporate capital was considered necessary. The reasoning behind this 
strategy was because o f past losses the number o f  names was decreasing and those that 
remained were ageing. However the resilience o f the names to remain trading in 
Lloyd’s has been remarkable (Figure 3.5). Indeed for the 1994 year o f account Names’ 
capacity increased over the previous year and with over £1.5 billion from corporate 
investors, Lloyd’s capacity increased by 24% to £10.9 billion. Whilst the number o f
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members has more than halved since 1990, the average underwriting capacity o f the 
names has increased by over 40% from £373,000 in 1990 to £525,000 in 1996. 
Corporate capital is providing an increasing proportion o f the capacity at Lloyd’s - 
from 15% in 1994 to 31% in 1996. Thus the enthusiasm o f professional investors for 
Lloyd’s is keen but the traditional capital base is proving more resilient than some 
commentators have forecast. The traditional base is likely to fall away once Equitas is 
operational and Names are presented with the finality quotes. However, given that 
many Names are still trading after the loss making period would suggest that they may 
continue for some time. However, this author proposes:
Proposition three Over a ten year period all natural Names will incorporate and 
the capital base of Lloyd’s will consist of entirely incorporated, 
limited liability capital.
All the senior executives interviewed agrees with this proposition, although one 
underwriter suggested that Lloyd’s would have a two tier capital structure with 
corporate capital and high limit ‘natural’ Names i.e. Names o f considerable personal 
wealth who underwrite at least £1,000,000 each. Given that unlimited liability has 
caused so much financial loss to Names, the option to participate on a limited basis in 
Lloyd’s would seem attractive. The corollary to the expected decline in the number o f 
natural Names is that there will be fewer Members’ Agents in the future. Indeed one 
Members’ Agent, Ashley Palmer and Hathaway Ltd has closed and transferred its 
Names to Stewart Members’ Agency which in turn has amalgamated with Kiln 
Cotesworth Members’ Agency.
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Year o f account 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Names (£m)
Corporate capacity (£m)
10,743 11,063 9,833 8,784 9,303
1,595
7,838
2,360
6,950
3,044
Total Capacity (£m) 
Change %
10,743 
+ 1.1
11,063
+3.0
9,833
-11.1
8,784
-10.7
10,898
+24.1
10,198
-6.4
9,994
-2.0
No. o f Names 28,770 26,539 22,259 19,537 18,117 14,800 12,800
Av. capacity o f Name 
(£000)
373 417 442 450 513 530 525
Figure 3.5: Lloyd’s allocated capacity 1990-96. 
Source: Lloyd’s quarterly business report
The initial requirements, developed in 1993 for corporate members, restricted 
corporate members to supporting syndicates on a passive basis in the same way as 
individual members.
The principal requirements enforcing this were:
- the control requirement: a prohibition on the control o f a managing agent by a 
corporate member, insurance carrier or Lloyd’s broking group;
- the diversification requirement: no more than 20% o f a corporate member’s overall 
premium limit (OPL) could be allocated by a corporate member to a single syndicate; 
and - the concentration requirement: no more than 25% o f a syndicate’s capacity could 
be provided by any one corporate member group and no more than 50% o f a 
syndicate’s capacity could be provided by corporate members in total.
These requirements forced corporate members to participate through a spread o f 
syndicates. For the 1994 year o f account some £900 million o f capital was raised by 25 
corporate member groups to support £1,594 million o f capacity. These spread vehicles
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were investment trusts that raised capital by issuing shares on the London Stock 
Exchange. A major attraction o f investing in the Lloyd’s market was the creation o f 
Equitas which, at that time, was to provide a “ring fence” to shield providers o f capital 
trading in years o f account 1994 and following from claims on policies from prior to 
1992. The maximum OPL for corporate members in Lloyd’s was limited to twice the 
corporate member’s funds at Lloyd’s.
In 1994, some dispensations to the diversification requirements were granted by 
Lloyd’s in response to commercial demands o f corporate members who sought to focus 
their participation on a narrower range o f syndicates managed by a single managing 
agent. This facilitated the evolution o f dedicated vehicles and, in a few cases, the 
segregation o f the corporate member’s participation into its own syndicate set up in 
parallel to the existing syndicate, for instance Syndicate 322, J.D.P. Barnes and others 
has a parallel corporate syndicate, Number 2322 for which the capital backing is wholly 
from Frankona Reinsurance Company.
For 1995, Lloyd’s maintained the rule that the corporate member was not permitted to 
gain control o f the managing agent, and shareholdings in the managing agent held by 
companies related to the corporate member were restricted to less than 25%. The total 
corporate participation in Lloyd’s for the 1995 year o f account was £2,364 million, 
23% of the total capacity o f Lloyd’s.
In the summer o f 1995, the Council o f Lloyd’s revoked the majority o f the 
concentration and diversification requirements for 1996. Also, the control
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requirements were relaxed allowing common ownership o f corporate members and 
managing agents. Thus corporate capital providers could have direct control o f the 
management structure o f a managing agent rather than just being a capital provider.
A leading example o f an integrated vehicle, incorporating both capital provision and 
managing agency in a single structure is the marriage between Brockbank Underwriting 
Agencies and Mid Ocean Re, a leading reinsurer based in Bermuda. £50 million in new 
capital has been raised to support two new corporate parallel syndicates writing 
alongside existing Brockbank syndicates. In addition, Mid Ocean Re will hold a 
controlling 51% share in the new expanded Brockbank group, the remaining 49% will 
be held by Brockbank. (Howard, 1996).
USF&G Corp o f Baltimore, USA has established a syndicate in Lloyd’s for the 1996 
year o f  account. Through a new wholly-owned subsidiary, known as F&G UK 
Underwriters Ltd, the American insurer is the sole corporate member o f Lloyd’s 
syndicate 1211. At the same time, USF&G has formed a new managing agency, to 
manage the operations o f the corporate syndicate (National Underwriter, 1996b).
These moves by insurers into the Lloyd’s market have been matched by one Lloyd’s 
dedicated corporate member to acquire a DTI insurer operating outside the Lloyd’s 
market. Hiscox Dedicated Capital is to pay £30.1 million for the Economic Insurance 
Company, funded by an issue o f ordinary shares. This will allow the Hiscox syndicates 
a cost-effective method to underwrite provincial personal lines business (Collison, 
1996). A corporate member o f Lloyd’s has to deposit 50% of its OPL as funds at
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Lloyd’s (Corporate Participation at Lloyd’s, May 1996). This will give the corporate 
member a minimum 50% solvency margin before reinsurance, assuming that the 
capacity is fully utilised. By contrast a DTI registered insurer only has to have a 
solvency margin o f 40% net o f reinsurance. Hence the Hiscox Group will underwrite 
personal lines through Economic Insurance Company and international reinsurance 
business through its Lloyd’s syndicates.
An important feature o f Lloyd’s for new corporate capital, and indeed all investors in 
Lloyd’s, is the separation o f old liabilities into a run-off company, Equitas Reinsurance 
Limited. The formation o f this run-off company effectively mutualises all 1992 and 
prior liabilities. Equitas “ring fences” corporate capital and Names from any 
deterioration on policies written prior to 1993. By pooling all the old year liabilities 
Lloyd’s can strive for a level o f provision that is consistent across all syndicates. This 
author suggests that, if  at some future point, Equitas was under financial strain then 
other world-wide reinsurers and insurers would be under a similar strain and thus an 
industry-wide solution to such a problem would have to be found. By pooling all its 
old liabilities, Lloyd’s will be able to effect block commutations with any one reinsurer 
for the whole market and will have much more influence in agreeing the quantum of 
any claim rather than this being negotiated piecemeal by each syndicate. The separation 
o f the old liabilities from the continuing market will give Lloyd’s a competitive 
advantage over its competitors. Investors and policyholders will not be concerned with 
any deterioration on old years which might affect the financial position o f a syndicate. 
The US company Cigna Corporation has copied the Equitas model by proposing a 
“good bank / bad bank” scenario. Cigna sought permission from the regulatory
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authorities in Pennsylvania during early 1996 to restructure itself into two main 
subsidiaries - one inactive to run off costly claims, the other active to manage Cigna’s 
healthier continuing operations. The Pennsylvania Insurance Department has given its 
approval for this restructuring (Snyder, 1996).
3.7 Recent structural changes in Lloyd’s.
The following is a list, in no particular order, o f some o f the structural changes that 
have occurred in Lloyd’s since the introduction o f corporate capital in 1994:
(i) Terra Nova Holdings Ltd o f Bermuda has acquired the ongoing business o f 
Octavian Syndicate Management Ltd which manages five syndicates. The transaction 
involves creating a new managing agency for 1996 and beyond. It also allows for the 
provision o f additional corporate capacity to each o f the five syndicates. The five 
syndicates are: Non-marine syndicate 702, Aviation syndicate 959, Marine syndicate 
1009, Marine syndicate 329 and Abbey motor syndicate 554. (National Underwriter, 
1996a)
(ii) The most recent shift in capital structures comes from the largest limited liability 
spread vehicle, LIMIT pic, which is proposing to purchase majority shareholdings in 
two substantial managing agencies. LIMIT will acquire a majority stake in Bankside 
Syndicates Ltd., which manages eight syndicates with a combined capacity o f £403 
million. The investment trust will also take a controlling interest in Janson Green Ltd., 
which manages three syndicates with a total capacity o f £345 million. (Moore and 
Morton, 1996).
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(iii) In order to form a Lloyd’s integrated vehicle, the Murray Lawrence Group have 
agreed to merge their business with Masthead Insurance Underwriting pic.
(iv) Aon Corporation are in the process o f  acquiring 49% o f the shareholding o f Jago 
Managing Agency.
(v) . St Paul Companies Inc have acquired a 100% economic interest in the Gravett and 
Tilling Group and Cassidy Davis Group.
(vi) Murray Lawrence and Partners are to merge all their syndicates to merge into one 
umbrella syndicate number 2001 for the 1997 year o f  account.
(vii) The board o f Methuen Underwriting Limited have agreed in principle to 
amalgamate some, or all, o f their syndicates into one umbrella for the 1998 year o f 
account. Bermuda based excess liability insurer ACE Ltd has acquired a 51% stake in 
Methuen Group Ltd with an option to purchase the remaining 49%. Methuen Group is 
the holding company for Methuen (Lloyd’s Underwriting Agents) Ltd. As part o f the 
agreement, ACE has agreed to provide an additional £50 million to help support 
underwriting by Methuen syndicates in 1997 and subsequent years.
(viii) Spreckley Villiers Bumhope and Co Ltd have signed a letter o f intent with Aon 
Corporation to acquire a shareholding in the company.
(ix) Mid Ocean Ltd has purchased a £50 million stake in the Brockbank Group. Under 
the terms o f the arrangement, Mid Ocean will provide £50 million o f capital for two 
new dedicated corporate vehicles, which will operate in parallel with the Brockbank 
Group’s three existing syndicates. One dedicated vehicle will write personal lines,
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while the second dedicated vehicle will concentrate on all other classes written by the 
Brockbank syndicates.
(x) Instead o f buying an interest in an agency, CNA Corporate Capital Ltd, a 
subsidiary o f CNA International, is providing £25 million o f capacity for three 
managing agencies: Claremont Underwriting Agency; Tower Managing Agents, part o f 
the Archer Group pic; and Cox Energy and Marine, part o f Cox Insurance Holdings 
pic. Under the arrangement four dedicated corporate capital syndicates are to be set up 
to run in parallel with the existing syndicates o f these agencies.
3.8 Corporate capital and its influence on the structure of Lloyd’s.
The report published by Lloyd’s in May 1994 entitled “Value at Lloyd’s” linked the 
value o f syndicate participations with the replacement o f the current “annual venture” 
with a system o f permanent capital. One theme o f the report was that syndicate 
members could assign their future participations in a syndicate to a corporate member 
in exchange for shares, other securities or cash (Value at Lloyd’s page 35 para 10). 
The corporate member would either support a spread o f syndicates or would be a one 
member “corporate” syndicate. The report argues that a one member “corporate” 
syndicate would no longer be required to perform a reinsurance to close and would be 
able to undertake annual accounting (Value at Lloyd’s page 35 para 10). Furthermore 
such a scheme would, the report states, resolve some o f the competitive disadvantages 
o f the annual venture system; in particular, a “corporate” syndicate would retain its 
earnings at syndicate level and offer the possibility o f merging the business o f the 
managing agent with the business o f the syndicate (Value at Lloyd’s page 35 para 
10.1). The report goes on to say that the disadvantages associated with an annual
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venture, namely the costs o f raising and servicing the Lloyd’s capital base, which the 
report estimates to be £100 million (Value at Lloyd’s page 38), and the difficulty o f 
managing a business where the underwriter does not know his capital for the next year, 
would be solved. However, the structures o f a corporate syndicate - essentially an 
insurance company - and a Name are different. A Name’s underwriting is supported by 
the Lloyd’s deposit and this deposit is “locked” until the year o f account is closed. If a 
Name were offered shares in a corporate syndicate then he could either resign and wait 
until his deposit is released in order to buy the shares, or alternatively, commit more 
funds to Lloyd’s. The report argues that a corporate syndicate would not have to 
calculate a RITC as all the liabilities would remain within the same syndicate. Whilst 
the calculation o f the reinsurance to close is a major aspect o f an underwriter’s job, it is 
difficult to see how this is any different from the calculation o f a year-end balance sheet 
for a limited liability insurer.
The introduction o f corporate capital has altered the nature o f the capital base o f 
Lloyd’s. It is no longer the case that Lloyd’s needs individuals to provide capital but 
institutional investors may now enter the market. There are both spread vehicles and 
dedicated corporate vehicles. A spread corporate provider needs to have access to 
many syndicates but with the advent o f dedicated capital the choice o f  syndicates 
available to a spread vehicle may, in time, become restricted.
The introduction o f corporate capital opens up the Lloyd’s market for new investment 
opportunities and allows the skills o f Lloyd’s underwriters to be utilised by new capital 
providers. For instance building societies request that the mortgagee insures the
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mortgaged property. The building society will arrange this insurance through its panel 
o f insurers. The building society receives a commission from the insurer but the insurer 
retains the underwriting profit. A building society could invest capital into an existing 
Lloyd’s syndicate or could form its own dedicated syndicate. The building society 
would then insure its mortgages’ properties with the syndicate. The building society 
would the retain both the commission and the underwriting profit. There are syndicates 
in Lloyd’s that are purely insurers o f UK household business such as Syndicate 1191 
(Boardman, Cunningham and Poland), thus the expertise exists in Lloyd’s for such a 
proposal to occur.
Corporate members o f Lloyd’s provide £3.04 billion o f capacity for the 1996 year o f 
account, almost 30% o f the total capacity. It seems, at first, perplexing that a market 
that has declared some £7.9 billion (pre-tax) o f  losses between 1988 and 1992 should 
be attracting investment. The Lloyd’s guide “Corporate Participation in Lloyd’s” states 
that some o f the attractions o f participating in the Lloyd’s market are:
access to underwriters who set the rates and terms on two-thirds of the 
business written in the London market;
- ability to write direct insurance business in over 60 foreign states and 
territories;
- an unrivaled brand name, despite recent losses, based on a reputation for 
always paying valid claims;
- a market which has returned to profit (profits of over £2.5 billion are 
projected on the 1993, 1994 and 1995 years of account).”
These are no doubt powerful reasons to be investing in the Lloyd’s market, however 
this author does not believe any o f these reasons as being the primary influence in 
attracting investment into Lloyd’s. London is, primarily, the world’s centre for 
international reinsurance business. Before the introduction o f corporate capital into 
Lloyd’s, an insurer or reinsurer that wished to underwrite London market business had
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to set up an office in London. This required DTI registration and approval. A 
corporate syndicate need only have a minimum funds at Lloyd’s o f £500,000 (or £1.5 
million if a US corporate member). The funds at Lloyd’s must be 50% o f the corporate 
member’s overall premium limit. Lloyd’s allows funds at Lloyd’s to be provided in a 
number o f forms such as cash, gilts letters o f credit and bank guarantees.
Thus for a modest investment o f just £500,000 a capital provider will have access to 
London market business. The capital provider will also be able to use the Lloyd’s 
Policy Signing Office for processing premiums and the Lloyd’s Claims Office for 
agreeing claims on behalf o f the syndicate, the basic infrastructure o f the Lloyd’s 
market. The corporate syndicate will also be situated in the underwriting room in 
Lloyd’s so that brokers will be able to have very easy access to the syndicate. This is in 
contrast to a new company that will have to market itself to the broking community. 
Setting up a corporate Lloyd’s syndicate, or investing in an existing syndicate, is a cost 
effective way to access London market business.
One of the greatest advantages o f  Lloyd’s is the worldwide licenses to trade. For three 
hundred years Lloyd’s has been at the heart o f  the marine insurance industry. Informal 
business arrangements were gradually turned into centralised formal licences, so that 
individual syndicates did not have to negotiate independently with local regulators. 
This has the advantage o f deriving considerable economies o f scale. By having a 
common formula for security across all Names and corporate capital providers, Lloyd’s 
is able to be licensed as a single entity. Furthermore the security o f all policies issued 
by Lloyd’s is backed up by the mechanism of the central fund to which all Names and
110
corporate capital providers subscribe. The foil list o f the territories in which Lloyd’s 
has either foil or conditional licenses to trade is shown below in Figure 3.6.
Aldeney France Jamaica Senegal
Anguilla Gabon Jersey Singapore
Antigua Gambia Kentucky, USA Solomon Islands
Australia Germany Luxembourg South Africa (Republic)
Austria Gibraltar Malawi Spain
Bahamas Greece Malta Sweden
Barbados Grenada Mauritius Switzerland
Belgium Guernsey Monaco Togo
Belize Hong Kong Namibia Trinidad
Bermuda Illinois, USA Netherlands Turks & Caicos
Cameroon Iceland New Zealand United Kingdom
Canada Republic o f  Ireland Papua New Guinea United States *
Cayman Islands Isle o f Man Portugal - Vanuatu
Cyprus Israel St. Kitts Virgin Islands (UK)
Denmark Italy St. Lucia Virgin Islands (US)
Dominica
Finland
Ivory Coast St. Vincent Zimbabwe
Notes:
* Lloyd’s is licensed only to underwrite Excess and Surplus Lines insurance business in the USA other 
than in Kentucky, Illinois and the US Virgin Islands where the Society is an admitted insurer.
Note that underwriters are not necessarily precluded from accepting insurance from countries not 
mentioned in this list, because in some cases no restrictive legislation may be in existence.
Source: Corporate Participation at Lloyd’s, Lloyd’s o f London, May 1996.
Figure 3.6: Lloyd’s Licenses.
3.9 Lloyd’s Brokers
One o f the features o f the Lloyd’s market is the special position o f the Lloyd’s broker 
as the sole intermediary with right o f access to the market. This privileged position was 
originally codified by the Lloyd’s Act o f 1871. Under the Lloyd’s Brokers Byelaw 
(No. 5 o f 1988), Lloyd’s has the power to “grant permission to broke insurance 
business at Lloyd’s by virtue o f the registration o f the body corporate or partnership as 
a Lloyd’s broker and for the review, renewal and withdrawal o f such registration.”
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Subject to certain conditions, the byelaw prohibits the broking o f insurance business at 
Lloyd’s by any person not registered under the byelaw.
The Council o f Lloyd’s must be satisfied that applicants are “fit and proper” and, to this 
end, all directors and compliance officers are subject to character and suitability tests. 
The purpose o f these tests is to identify any involvement in illegal or fraudulent 
activities and to assess their levels o f relevant experience in their chosen fields. Other 
requirements imposed by the byelaw include:
- Capitalisation o f not less than £250,000.
- An office (not necessarily the head office) located within close proximity o f the 
Lloyd’s building.
- Having completed a probationary period as an “umbrella” broker, effectively being 
sponsored by an existing Lloyd’s broker for a period that should not exceed three years 
before making their own full application for approval.
- Maintain professional indemnity insurance protecting third parties against errors or 
omissions by the broker.
- Maintain professionally audited accounting records.
- Maintain “insurance broker accounts” (IBAs) with approved banks, through which all 
insurance business transactions must pass. The banks are unable to place any lien or 
charge on the accounts, and the accounts must bear the name o f the broker together 
with the “IBA” designation.
- Make annual reports to Lloyd’s, including details o f any umbrella arrangements, latest 
audited accounts and details o f current professional indemnity insurance.
The Lloyd’s broker’s role is considerably wider than that o f  the insurance agent or even 
an ordinary “High Street” broker. It includes the preparation o f policy and signing 
documents (except for UK motor) as well as all marketing and considerable 
involvement in the handling o f claims. The Lloyd’s broker provides the Lloyd’s 
underwriter with a large marketing effort, whose cost is directly proportional to the 
amount o f premium written. If the underwriter does not write the risk, he has no 
marketing expense. The role o f the insurance broker is essentially simple: the matching
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o f carriers (insurance and reinsurance companies), seeking to earn a return on risk 
capital, with others, who wish to protect their capital by transferring or sharing their 
non-trading risks, thus protecting their balance sheet. Mahoney (1993) defines this 
matching exercise as seeking a risk-return corridor within which the two principals are 
willing to trade. Leaving aside the brokers’ negotiating skills, the two key components 
are risk capital and a distribution system. Mahoney (1993) states that it is these two 
components that will be significant drivers o f  change from the brokers’ perspective.
The Lloyd’s broker plays a major role in market innovation by developing new types o f 
insurance and special schemes. As a result, the broker has a large technical 
involvement in insurance, especially in developing new wordings, new methods o f 
rating and new systems o f arranging cover.
For many brokers, the Lloyd’s market is one o f many markets, as many risks are placed 
globally. The larger brokers have built up a substantial network o f offices, regionally in 
the UK and in many countries overseas. Thus whilst Lloyd’s syndicates are dependent 
on Lloyd’s brokers for premium income, Lloyd’s brokers are not necessarily dependent 
on syndicates in that Lloyd’s brokers are free to place business outside the Lloyd’s 
market. The “ownership” o f the insurance business written in Lloyd’s is thus with the 
brokers and not the syndicates, as the brokers can easily remove business from Lloyd’s 
and place it in another market.
Whilst under the provision o f the Lloyd’s Act 1982 brokers are not permitted to have 
an interest in managing agencies, the Aon Corporation, the largest broker in the world,
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has recently invested in various managing agencies (e.g. Jago and Spreckley Villiers 
and Bumhope). Furthermore with the introduction o f incorporated capital into 
Lloyd’s, this has given managing agents access to new sources o f capital and the equity 
markets. This author suggests that a future development could be the purchase o f a 
broking house by a Managing Agent in order to access a constant flow o f business to 
the managed syndicates. The broker would effectively become the marketing arm of 
the Managing Agent, although this would require a change to the Lloyd’s Act, 1982 as 
under Sections 10 and 11 o f the Act Lloyd’s brokers and Lloyd’s managing Agents are 
not permitted to own each other.
Due to the nature o f the subscription market, marketing initiatives have not been easily 
implemented within Lloyd’s. Individual syndicates and managing agencies are reluctant 
to market products lest that gives a competitor an advantage. However there have 
been some initiatives that have been implemented by syndicates that have met with 
success:
INITIATIVES UNDER THE LLOYD’S UMBRELLA
-Binding authorities: Binding authorities give approved coverholders the ability to 
accept business on behalf o f underwriting members o f  one or more syndicates, within 
strictly controlled guidelines. The creation o f binding authorities is governed by 
Lloyd’s. Coverholders bind risks directly from insureds or from brokers or 
intermediaries. The binding authority schemes benefit Lloyd’s in that syndicates get 
access to business that would not otherwise reach Lloyd’s such as excess and surplus 
lines insurance from the USA. Coverholders are remunerated more on the profitability 
o f the binding authority rather than the volume o f business produced.
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-Access to Provincial Brokers: Ever since they were first established, Lloyd’s motor 
syndicates have operated almost entirely without the involvement o f Lloyd’s brokers. 
These syndicates have marketed their products through networks o f hundreds o f small, 
local insurance agents and brokers. The only role o f  the Lloyd’s broker is to guarantee 
the premium o f the small provincial brokers so that the syndicates avoid the credit 
exposure o f the smaller agents. Recently, the principal o f accessing business through 
provincial outlets has been applied to other types o f insurance. Syndicates in the 
market now offer employers’ liability, household and accident and health insurance 
through such networks.
INITIATIVES NOT UNDER THE LLOYD’S BROKERAGE UMBRELLA 
-Service Companies: A further recent and potentially far-reaching development 
amongst motor syndicates has been the establishment o f service companies, which 
effectively take the place o f the broker altogether. The syndicate markets and 
advertises itself directly to the public or motor trade and carries out all policy issuing, 
premium collection and claims settlement in-house.
-W ider Service Com pany Applications: Keen to reduce the dependence on brokers 
and their cost, and access to difficult-to-reach business usually controlled by local 
insurance companies, non-motor syndicates have began to experiment with the concept 
o f the service company. Such a concept appeals to syndicates that deal in relatively 
low-premium, high-volume business. For example, non-marine Syndicate 990 founded 
“Denham Direct Underwriters Limited”. The Syndicate realised that the costs involved 
in underwriting small premium errors and omission business was becoming increasingly 
prohibitive within the Lloyd’s system. The Syndicate felt that the intermediaries were
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not earning enough brokerage to warrant coming to Lloyd’s as opposed to placing 
business with the major UK insurance Companies. Denham Direct Underwriters 
Limited seeks business from various provincial UK intermediaries and brokers. The 
Syndicate administers and processes most o f the work with the broker earning similar 
commission placing the business with Denham Direct as he would get from a UK 
composite insurer. The success o f this service company is largely on its ability to get 
quotes to the insured within twenty-four hours o f receiving the proposal from the 
intermediary.
The Managing Agent Roberts and Hiscox Limited has started Hiscox Insurance 
Agencies as a non-profit making service company to underwrite outside the Lloyd’s 
building for the Syndicates managed by Roberts and Hiscox. Hiscox insurance 
Agencies is concentrating on high-value household business.
Hiscox (1989) foresees business being written at Lloyd’s on a two-tier system. The 
most complicated catastrophe, innovative or creative insurance will be written at 
Lloyd’s with the more simple insurance business being written in Managing Agents’ 
offices outside Lloyd’s, exactly as is done by insurance companies country-wide or 
even worldwide making extensive use o f computer networks.
The large London brokerages are now international in a form that is distinct from that 
o f 15 to 20 years ago. They are now part o f worldwide broking organisations, some o f 
them led by large brokers in the United States (for instance Bowring is owned by 
Marsh McLellan; Nicolson Leslie and Bain Hogg are owned by Aon). The
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implications are that they can more easily place insurance anywhere in the world. They 
are no longer dedicated to placing business in the London market. One implication o f 
the globalisation o f London brokers may be more flexibility on commission structures. 
Brokers in Lloyd’s are remunerated by a percentage o f the premium, however larger 
brokers should be able to take advantage o f modem information technology and 
achieve economies o f scale that have enabled them to convert many accounts to a fee 
basis in the United States.
Whilst there are broking houses in the London market that are part o f  global 
brokerages, there are some small independent broking houses that are purely focused 
on the London market and often particular niche areas. For instance, Bell and 
Clements Limited broke United States Excess and Surplus Lines insurance to Lloyd’s 
syndicates and London companies. This author believes that such small independent 
brokers may well be the target for purchase by corporate capital providers who wish to 
secure business for their managed syndicates.
The number o f Lloyd’s brokers has been declining in recent years because o f mergers, 
although the contraction has not been as sharp as with syndicates. The peak year for 
Lloyd’s brokers was in 1983 when there were 272 firms. By April 1995 this number 
had dropped to 207 accredited Lloyd’s brokers. However, the market is relatively easy 
to enter and new firms continue to be authorised; forty new firms were registered as 
Lloyd’s brokers between 1990 and 1994. The insurance broking scene is fairly 
concentrated as is shown is Figure 3.7 below with the ten brokers placing over half o f 
all the business in Lloyd’s during 1993. The largest broking group controlled 10.6% of
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Lloyd’s total premiums in 1993, compared with 9.9% in 1992. The aviation market is 
dominated by a few large broking groups, where in 1993 the top company placed 
17.1% o f all Lloyd’s premiums in this class. The top five broking groups’ combined 
share o f  Lloyd’s aviation premiums has ranged since 1976 from 46.0% to 63.7%.
Class of 
Business
Percentage of total premiums
Largest
broker
Ten leading 
brokers
Marine 11.6 64.4
Aviation 17.1 76.2
Non-MAT 9.2 49.6
All business 10.6 51.8
Figure 3.7: Shares o f Lloyd’s total premiums placed by the largest broker groups, 
1993. Source: Statistics Relating to L loyd’s.
As Lloyd’s syndicates do not have branch offices like their competitors such as Munich 
Re and Swiss Re, this author suggests that the broking system in Lloyd’s will continue, 
although more use will be made o f service company arrangements to access low- 
premium high-volume business in a cost-effective manner. An important question is to 
what extent the relationship between the brokers and the syndicates might change with 
the introduction o f sophisticated information technology systems.
Chiplin (1986) defines information technology as “the integrated use o f computing, 
microelectronics and telecommunications technologies” . It offers those engaged in the 
production and distribution o f insurance services cost-effective facilities for:
(i) the rapid storage, processing and retrieval o f policy records, accounting and other 
data;
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(ii) the automation o f not only routine functions such as settlement o f balances, but also 
o f tasks involving decision-making previously undertaken by trained underwriting staff;
(iii) the rapid transfer o f data between intermediaries, their customers, processing 
bureaux, loss adjusters and others;
(iv) speedy access by insurers to external databases, such as credit-checking agencies, 
anti-fraud registers, and Lloyd’s Register o f  Shipping.
The main function o f information technology is to improve efficiency by enabling tasks 
to be performed more quickly and at lower cost. It also may be used as a tool for 
management control and for new mechanisms o f distributing products.
Much has been written by various authors concerning the developments in information 
technology in the London insurance and reinsurance market (Burton, 1996; Carter and 
Falush, 1995; and Chelmsford, 1992 provide useful summaries). It is not the purpose 
o f this author’s work to describe the current developments in information technology 
but rather to evaluate the effects o f such technology on the broker-underwriter 
relationship.
Information technology has already been an agent o f change in financial services. For 
instance in the personal insurance sector, with direct dealing operations such as Direct 
Line and also in personal banking, with the introduction o f automated till machines and 
telephone banking. The Stock Exchange after “Big Bang” changed rapidly from a face- 
to-face market to electronic dealing between trading rooms, which do not necessarily
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have to be in the same city or indeed on the same continent. Thus global 24-hour 
electronic trading has become a feature o f the stockmarkets.
Computer networks are developing within the London and international insurance 
markets. Whilst business conducted across these networks is principally claims 
settlement, there is some electronic placement o f risks. The development o f Electronic 
Placing Support (EPS) within the London market will allow brokers to place business 
with London market companies and Lloyd’s syndicates across a computer network - 
information on the risk is sent to underwriters who register their acceptance or 
declinature o f the risk electronically. Whilst the EPS initiative is taking some time to be 
accepted by companies and syndicates, many underwriters interviewed acknowledged 
that electronic placing o f risks will be a major feature o f  the London market in the 
future.
The implication o f electronic placing means that the actual location o f the risk-bearing 
capital and where business is conducted becomes less relevant. Computer networks not 
only lower the cost o f  transacting business, they also provide an electronically level 
playing field as all underwriters and brokers theoretically have equal access to all the 
markets. This will ensure that there is a competitive environment, but will increasingly 
challenge the broker to demonstrate how he is adding value to his clients.
It seems reasonable to assume that clients will ask their brokers what services they get 
for their fees and commissions. If the broker only provides access to the subscription 
market and undertakes various administrative functions (such as issuing cover notes,
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policy wordings and premium accounting), then the broker may be supplanted by 
technology as computer networks can provide all these functions.
The success o f the Bank o f Scotland’s insurance subsidiary, Direct Line, shows that 
such personal lines business can be underwritten successfully by the use o f technology 
without the need o f an intermediary. Given the competitive pressures from the direct 
writers, this author believes that the added value associated with placing such 
commodity business will become small as to render this activity an extremely low- 
margin business. Such business may still be placed in the brokered market but will have 
to be performed in a more innovative manner than it is today.
This development is similar to that which occurred in the institutional equity secondary 
trading business following the end o f fixed commissions. Commissions for this activity 
have been drastically cut and if investment banks had remained heavily dependent on 
their secondary equity market trading activities, their profit margins would have 
collapsed. Consequently, this industry was compelled to develop higher margin 
businesses, e.g. mutual funds, new forms o f complex securities and entering the 
emerging securities markets.
This author suggests that the large international brokerage firms will be compelled to 
expand their business into higher-margin activities. A noteworthy example o f such 
diversification has been the move by major insurance intermediaries to act as sponsors 
for some o f the Bermuda based reinsurance companies (e g. Marsh McLennan and Mid 
Ocean Re; AON and IPC Re; AON and LaSalle Re). Similarly, AON have invested in
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various managing agencies at Lloyd’s e g. Jago Managing Agency Ltd and Spreckley 
Villiers Bumhope and Co Ltd.
The added value that brokers have brought to the London market has been a cost- 
effective global distribution system to underwriters, without their having to sustain the 
fixed costs o f operating offices world-wide. However, with computer networks and 
the possibility o f a global network (WIN - the Worldwide Insurance Network), brokers 
must add more value to the risk transfer equation than merely accessing markets, a 
function that is that achieved by the computer network. In order to “add value” 
brokers will need to seek to operate with increasing sophistication in the compilation, 
analysis and distribution o f risk-related data. Rosenthal (1994) states that those 
insurance intermediaries with the most sophisticated capabilities for accessing, 
analysing, and distributing such information will possess a potent competitive weapon 
for the capture and retention o f high-margin risk-management business. The expansion 
o f direct writers o f  property catastrophe business in Bermuda, such as Partner Re, 
shows that the managers o f  these companies believe they have better analytical 
capabilities that the reinsurance intermediary.
Insurance is only a subset o f a broad range o f risk management techniques for 
controlling loss exposures. There are capital market devices including debenture 
financing, surplus notes, Act o f God bonds, standby lines o f credit, and derivatives tied 
to catastrophe futures that are all alternatives to traditional reinsurance. Piccione 
(1996) suggests that for reinsurance brokers to succeed in the future, they will need to 
become experts in the use o f these risk management techniques, in addition to finite and
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traditional catastrophe protection, in order to prescribe the optimum asset protection 
package to their clients. This author suggests that insurance brokers will increasingly 
resemble consulting practices, employing a diverse range o f skills outside the traditional 
insurance sector.
3.10 Conclusion - the future role of the broker
Lloyd’s brokers are unique amongst brokers as only they are able to place business in
Lloyd’s. Section 8 (3) o f the Lloyd’s Act, 1982 states:
“An underwriting member of shall in the course of his underwriting 
business at Lloyd’s accept or place business only from or through a Lloyd’s 
broker or such other person as the Council may from time to time by 
byelaw permit.”
The Act does not rule out the possibility o f syndicates accessing business through 
intermediaries other than Lloyd’s brokers, such as service companies, although the 
wording o f the Act does not permit syndicates to trade direct. In addition, given that 
syndicates do not have a branch office network similar to that o f the Munich Re or the 
Swiss Re, the role o f the broker as the provider o f business to syndicates would seem 
to be assured. However, with the introduction o f corporate capital and the acquisition 
o f managing agencies by overseas insurers (e g. Ace and Methuen Underwriting 
Agencies Limited; USF&G and Ashley Palmer Limited), syndicates are effectively 
becoming the London branch offices, or London subsidiaries, o f worldwide insurers. 
As reinsurance business is often placed globally because o f the large limits required by 
the reinsured, the new owners o f syndicates may well find it more cost effective to 
underwrite certain business, direct through, for instance, their Bermudan subsidiary 
rather than writing it through a broker in the London market. However, there is
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reinsurance business which is entirely placed in London to which companies outside 
London do not have access.
The Lloyd’s Act, 1982 heavily protects the role o f the Lloyd’s broker. However, the 
use o f service companies to write commodity-type business cost-effectively is likely to 
grow, especially as much o f this business may be underwritten entirely by one syndicate 
owing to the small sums insured. Complex or large risks which require worldwide 
capacity are likely to need the broker for placement. More formally, this author 
proposes:
Proposition four The role of brokers will be focused into complex placements 
with simple business being handled outside the Lloyd’s system.
There was agreement amongst all the underwriters and capital providers interviewed 
with this proposition, although the brokers interviewed were less enthusiastic about this 
proposition. However, all acknowledged that the development o f computer networks 
would mean that simple business could be underwritten without the intervention o f the 
broker.
The growth o f computer networks in London to place business is in its infancy and this 
author found that there was opposition from underwriters and brokers about the 
introduction o f Electronic Placing System (EPS). The EPS system, which went live in 
March 1992, enables brokers to place risks with insurers in both the Lloyd’s and the 
company markets and was developed by LIMNET (The London Insurance Market 
Network). LIMNET was formed in 1987 by the ILU, LIRMA, Lloyd’s and Lloyd’s
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Insurance Brokers Committee to promote and facilitate the exploitation o f IT on a 
market-wide basis. EPS enables a broker to send the slip and information about a risk 
electronically to the underwriter. The underwriter is then able to download this 
information into his own system without the need to re-key the information.
EPS does not replace the broker as it is he who sends the information to the 
underwriter. The EPS system does not link underwriters to each other; it is effectively 
a broker-controlled system. For the vast majority o f  insurance and reinsurance 
placements in the London market, EPS does not supplant the traditional system of 
brokers placing business with underwriters through a process o f face-to-face 
negotiation, nor is it likely in the foreseeable future. It is however likely that simple 
business will be placed entirely through the EPS system. For large accounts which 
have voluminous quantities o f information and require explanation, the face-to-face 
process is likely to continue.
In 1992, LIMNET, the Brussels based Reinsurance and Insurance Network (RINET), 
the American based Brokers and Reinsurance Market Association (BRMA) and the 
Reinsurance Association o f America (RAA), whose members collectively handle much 
o f the reinsurance business placed internationally, agreed to establish a joint venture, 
with RINET as the contractor. The aim is to develop common electronic data 
interchange standards for use by reinsurers and brokers worldwide. The ultimate 
objective is to facilitate international electronic communications networking for 
insurers, reinsurers and intermediaries globally; It is therefore feasible that there will be 
a truly international market for the placing o f facultative and treaty reinsurance with
125
participants located in London and other parts o f the world. Such a system could, in 
theory, replace the necessity for brokers. However, the development o f the network is 
receiving input from brokers, so it is unlikely that a system will be developed that 
supplants the need for brokers.
3.11 Should Lloyd’s be established in other countries?
Three o f the competitors o f Lloyd’s, Munich Re, Swiss Re and General Re have offices 
in many countries o f the world. All these three companies have either opened offices in 
new countries or have purchased locally-domiciled companies. Munich Re, for 
instance, operates on a world-wide basis maintaining branch offices and subsidiary 
insurance companies. Facilities are provided for all forms o f treaty and facultative 
reinsurance from Munich and in forty-eight cities world-wide by more than sixty offices 
abroad. Munich Re operates in more than 150 countries on five continents (Best’s 
Insurance Reports - International, 1995). In 1991 Munich Re established a liaison 
office in Moscow, becoming the first foreign reinsurer to obtain authorisation to 
conduct business in all the former Soviet republics.
Lloyd’s is not established overseas, in the same way as Munich Re, because Lloyd’s is a 
brokered market whereas Munich Re will underwrite through brokers or direct. The 
traditional Lloyd’s syndicate will wait for business to be brought by brokers whereas 
Munich Re will actively search for business as is evidenced by the company’s strategy 
o f acquiring insurance and reinsurance companies and opening new branch offices. 
Apart from relying on brokers, syndicates overcome their lack o f overseas 
establishment by granting binding authorities to agents to underwrite local business on
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their behalf. Before the introduction o f corporate capital, managing agents did not 
have the necessary capital raising structures to set up and finance an overseas office.
Overseas establishment is important in order to access local insurance business which is 
normally underwritten by local companies. This author suggests that Lloyd’s 
syndicates could achieve overseas establishment in one o f three ways. Firstly, a 
managing agent could open up a branch office; secondly, a consortium o f syndicates 
could open up a branch office, and; thirdly, the Corporation o f Lloyd’s could open up a 
contact office. A recent initiative has been the opening o f Lloyd’s Japan Inc which is 
a joint venture between various Managing Agencies and the Corporation o f Lloyd’s to 
access Japanese insurance business. Lloyd’s Japan Inc involves various Managing 
Agents pooling their expertise, resources and sharing expenses. Such joint ventures 
could be followed by similar initiatives in other parts o f the world such as China, 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
An alternative to opening up an overseas office is a joint venture between a broker and 
a syndicate to develop business from a certain territory. Such a structure is a logical 
extension o f the current subscription system, although a joint venture o f this sort would 
probably only involve one syndicate. With the introduction o f corporate capital, 
syndicates now have access to the capital investment that would be required for such a 
venture. This author suggests that as overseas establishment is an alien culture for 
syndicates as they have always operated from the Lloyd’s building in Lime Street, such 
broker-underwriter ventures may become commonplace in the future.
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This author interviewed a senior US regulator who stated that one o f the problems 
facing Lloyd’s was that there was little understanding in the US about how Lloyd’s 
operated; he felt that the Society was far too remote. The regulator recommended that 
Lloyd’s should open a US contact office, essentially a marketing office. This contact 
office would not have an underwriting function but would act as a liaison between the 
USA and London. The office would answer questions from the US regarding Lloyd’s 
and could be staffed by members o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s. Such an office, it was 
suggested, would give Lloyd’s much needed positive publicity after the loss making 
years o f 1988 to 1992.
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Chapter four: Two Structural Models: The Porter Model and the Market-
Hierarchy-Network Model
4.1 Introduction
Chapter three explored Kay’s concept o f architecture and Lloyd’s was examined within 
this framework This chapter examines Lloyd’s within two other structural frameworks. 
The first is a model o f an industry developed by Michael Porter. This model is 
developed from industrial economics and stresses the competitive nature o f the firms 
within an industry. By contrast, the second model - the Market-Hierarchy-Network 
Model - accommodates the concept o f cooperation and collaboration between firms. 
Lloyd’s is examined within both these frameworks.
4.1.1 The Porter Model
A financial model o f an insurance company was developed by Harrison (1972) “to 
assist the Corporate Planning Department o f the Insurance Company o f North America 
(INA) to improve its long-range planning capabilities” . This study dealt with the cash 
flows through INA and aimed to evaluate future strategies through forecasting INA’s 
income statements and balance sheets for future years. Harrison (1972) designed a 
computerised financial model o f the insurance and investment operations o f  INA. This 
model was designed to calculate the evolution o f INA’s financial position over a five to 
ten year period, given a set o f assumptions about the way in which premium volume, 
loss and expense ratios and investment income will change over that period. The 
purpose o f the Harrison model is to convert forecasts o f  premium volume, operating 
ratios, stock market behaviour and federal tax regulations into forecasts o f the balance 
sheets and profit statements o f the company. The model can be used to predict the
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financial effect on the company o f ceasing to underwrite one particular line o f 
insurance. This model is o f use to a single insurance company but does not describe 
the insurance industry and cannot evaluate the effect o f competitor behaviour.
A mathematical model o f an insurance company has been developed by Bohman 
(1979). This model looks at the cash flows within the company and produces various 
mathematical formulae to describe them. The model describes an insurance company 
rather than the industry and is purely based on accounting principals.
Neither o f the models describes the insurance industry as a whole. A better framework 
for the analysis o f an industry is provided by Porter (1980). Porter’s model is o f an 
industry consisting o f several competing companies. Porter suggests five competitive 
forces within the industry - the threat o f entry, the threat o f substitution, bargaining 
power o f suppliers, bargaining power o f buyers and rivalry amongst existing 
competitors. All five competitive forces jointly determine the intensity o f industry 
competition and profitability. Figure 4.1 shows the Porter model. The collective 
strength o f these five forces determines the profit potential in the industry, where profit 
potential is measured in terms o f return on investment.
4.2 The Porter model and the direct insurance market.
4.2.1 The need for insurance
The single most compelling reason why commercial enterprises purchase insurance 
products is to provide financial stability. In theory, insureds willingly suffer a known 
predetermined loss (premium payments) to prevent against the potentially severe
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Figure 4.1: The Porter Model (Source: "Competitive Strategy": Porter. 1980)
financial impact o f the occurrence or aggregation o f random losses. Most risk 
managers recognise that insurance is simply a financing mechanism to spread their cost 
o f risk over time. Corporate entities use insurance as a tool to stabilise cash flow and 
quarterly earnings (Beer, 1991). This author has applied the Porter model to the direct 
insurance market in figure 4.2. In the USA, the writers o f direct insurance vary from 
small one-state mutual companies such as Germania in Texas to nationwide carriers 
such as Allstate Insurance Company and State Farm Insurance Company. The potential 
entrants are insurance companies who perceive that the market is profitable and wish to 
enter. Such companies may be foreign or domestic carriers who wish to write 
commercial business.
4.2.2 Regulation and consumer pressure
To apply the Porter model to insurance it is necessary to adapt the framework to add in 
the role o f regulation. The regulatory regime is very pervasive in the insurance industry 
especially in the USA where consumer protection is a political issue. The regulatory 
authorities will require each new entrant to be licensed and may further require certain 
minimum capital requirements. Under the provisions o f the Glass Stegal Act, banks are 
prevented from entering the insurance industry in the USA. Furthermore, USA admitted 
carriers in each State are requested to file their rates with the State Insurance 
Commissioner. After Hurricane Andrew hit Florida in 1992, regulators restricted 
insurers’ ability to implement large rate increases, to not renew policies, to cancel 
policies, to cease writing certain lines, or to withdraw from the state entirely (Snyder, 
1993). Florida’s insurance commissioner was concerned about the availability o f 
insurance and imposed a 90-day moratorium on non-renewals, and the state legislature
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Figure 4.2: Applying the Porter model to the direct insurance market
Figure 4.3: Applying the Porter model to the reinsurance market
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extended the prohibition by another 90 days (Satterfield, 1993; Hagstrom, 1993). As 
the moratorium was about to expire, Florida’s legislature approved a Bill that limited 
individual insurers to canceling no more than ten per cent o f their homeowners policies 
in any one county in one year and no more than five per cent o f  their property owners 
policies state-wide for each o f the following three years (1993 -1995) (Silva, 1993).
4.2.3 Substitutes for insurance
The main substitute for insurance is for the company to self-insure. This can take the 
form o f higher retentions, possibly in response to a programme o f risk management or 
self-insurance via a captive company. Large corporations often have their own 
insurance subsidiaries, e.g. Tate and Lyle pic own Athel Insurance Company and The 
Virgin Group own The Scarlet Lady Insurance Company. One o f the reasons for the 
formation o f captive insurance companies has been the reluctance o f direct insurers to 
provide large buyers o f insurance with the insurance arrangements they require (Carter, 
1981). During the period from 1985 to 1987 there was a scarcity o f insurance capacity. 
A rise in pricing followed and, as a result, there was a greater retention o f risk by some 
commercial insureds (Beer, 1991). It was this environment that spurred the growth of 
captives, risk retention groups, trusts, pools and other formalised risk-financing 
programmes.
4.2.4 The role of suppliers of capital
The suppliers in Porter’s model equate to those entities that provide capital, namely 
reinsurers and investors. Reinsurance functions as a source o f capital because when an 
insurer purchases excess o f loss reinsurance, he is borrowing the capital o f a reinsurer
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to absorb fluctuations in his own results due to unexpected and unpredictable variations 
in the frequency and severity o f large losses (Hutter, 1991). If  the ceding company 
increased its capital, it could retain more o f its own business. Alternatively, the insurer 
could write lower policy limits fully supported by his own capital and purchase no 
reinsurance. Historically, quota-share reinsurance has been the most common method 
by which reinsurers have provided capital to insurers. If, for example, an insurer has a 
50% quota share contract the company is using the reinsurer’s capital to write larger 
lines on risks - in this case double the line that the company could if the reinsurer were 
not present. The reinsurer will pay a ceding commission to the cedant which helps to 
fund the ceding company’s acquisition costs. This permits companies to finance growth 
without consuming statutory capital.
Porter’s model emphasises that the intensity o f  competition in the industry is a function 
o f the bargaining power o f the suppliers capital. Porter (1980) states:
“Suppliers can exert bargaining power over participants in an industry by 
threatening to raise prices or reduce the quality of purchased goods and 
services. Powerful suppliers can thereby squeeze profitability out of an 
industry unable to recover cost increases in its own prices.”
An ample supply o f reinsurance is likely to intensify the competition within the 
insurance industry. Insurers may be able to undercut the pricing o f their competitors if 
their reinsurance arrangements are such that a large proportion o f the liability is passed 
on to reinsurers. In this scenario an insurer can underwrite to increase its market share. 
Alternatively, low-cost reinsurance may mean that the insurer can achieve higher profits 
than the market average.
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Conversely, an increase in the price o f reinsurance may cause an insurer to re-think his 
reinsurance purchasing strategy especially if the insurer is unwilling to pass the 
additional costs to the consumer. Such a scenario may cause the insurer to increase his 
net retention, or reduce his participation in a particular segment o f the insurance 
market. Expensive reinsurance generally has the effect o f producing a disciplined 
insurance marketplace. A study by the American broker, Guy Carpenter (1994), 
estimates that the average cost o f a US insurer’s catastrophe excess o f loss protection 
has increased 220% since 1982. This rise in cost has caused the retention levels o f 
primary insurers to rise sharply to more than 4% o f policyholder surplus in 1994, from 
2% in 1989. Another way at looking at this is from the perspective o f the level o f 
industry loss that it is required to create a claim on the reinsurance programme. Guy 
Carpenter (1994) estimate this to be $3 billion loss for a typical reinsurance programme 
in 1994 compared to an industry loss o f only $500,000 in 1982.
The catastrophes affecting the USA during 1992 such as Hurricane Andrew ($15 billion 
loss) and Hurricane Iniki ($1.6 billion loss) pushed the combined ratios for the 54 
reinsurers reporting data to the Reinsurance Association o f America (RAA) from 106.5 
to 117.4. (A combined ratio is a formula used by insurance companies to relate 
income to claims, administration and dividend expenses. The formula is Combined 
Ratio = Loss Ratio + Expense Ratio + Dividend Ratio). This rise in reinsurers’ 
combined ratios affected primary insurers. Having absorbed huge losses, reinsurers 
reduced their exposures in these overly concentrated areas - areas where reinsurance 
was in most demand. This further tightened the property insurance market. For 
instance, earthquake insurance capacity in California dropped by twenty per cent.
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Problems in obtaining catastrophe reinsurance were a major factor in limiting new 
earthquake writings (Schachner and Harty, 1993).
According to a report commissioned by the California Department o f Insurance 
(1991/2), earthquake insurance could not be sold by primary insurers in California 
without the participation o f the reinsurance market, especially for commercial 
earthquake insurance. Due to the unpredictable nature o f  the hazard, great reliance is 
placed on per risk and catastrophe reinsurance, for instance the PML (Probable 
Maximum Loss) ceded by primary insurers writing in San Francisco was 69.4% for 
1990; for carriers writing in the Los Angeles area the PML ceded was 74% for 1990.
The effect o f the supply o f capital to the insurance industry may take the form of 
increasing the size o f  an existing company, such as the recent increase by £7 million in 
the paid up capital o f  Copenhagen Re UK (Ladbury, 1996).
Alternatively, new capital will enter the market as new entrants. In this scenario there is 
little difference between suppliers o f  capital and new entrants. The intensity o f the 
competition in the insurance industry is a largely a result o f new entrants to the market. 
Direct Line Insurance, owned by Royal Bank o f Scotland, managed to undercut the 
pricing o f UK motor insurance by using quick and simple computer systems linked to 
powerful underwriting systems for analysing and managing risk. This model allowed 
the company to bypass the traditional broker channel and to take a 12% market share 
(Newing, 1996). Direct Line’s approach was based on information technology, and
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using the telephone as the sole distribution channel allowed the company to centralise 
and base all its operations on IT systems.
4.2.5 The buyers of insurance
The buyers in the Porter model equate to individual persons or companies who require 
insurance. Such protection can be bought direct i.e. between the company or individual 
and the insurer, or through a broker. The broker may be a small “High Street” 
operation or a large multi-national concern such as the US “alphabet” houses (e g. 
Alexander and Alexander, Marsh McLennan). The individual consumer is unlikely to 
be able to discern the difference between one insurer’s product and another. The role 
o f  reputation, advertising and branding is important in influencing consumer choice.
Buyers compete with the industry by forcing down prices, bargaining for higher quality 
or more services, and playing competitors against each other - all at the expense o f 
industry profitability (Porter, 1980). The bargaining power o f an individual consumer is 
minimal in the personal lines market, however groups o f individual can be an effective 
force. For instance, the UK charity Age Concern offers household insurance to people 
aged over fifty years. This portfolio o f business has an annual premium income o f £50 
million and was, until 1996, administered by Bain Hogg Insurance Brokers and 
underwritten by various Lloyd’s syndicates. This business was transferred to 
Commercial Union in January 1996. Commercial Union paid a fee to Age Concern and 
are returning all profits on the business other than a small margin. It seems logical 
that the broker will in time be no longer required as Commercial Union are capable o f 
administering the business in-house (pers comm a Lloyd’s UK underwriter).
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In the commercial insurance market the buyers are more sophisticated than in the 
personal insurance market. Buyers o f commercial insurance sometimes employ risk 
managers to structure a suitable insurance programme. Large purchasers o f insurance 
are likely to be able to negotiate their insurance costs especially if the market has an 
excess o f capacity, i.e. capital.
4.3 The Porter Model and the Reinsurance Market.
This author has applied the Porter model to the reinsurance market in Figure 4.3. 
There are many similarities between the insurance model in Figure 4.2 and the 
reinsurance model in figure 4.3. Regulation is also a feature o f  the reinsurance market 
but reinsurance is subject to less regulation than direct insurance (Carter and Dickinson, 
1992). Carter and Dickinson suggest three reasons for this. Firstly, governments that 
wish to exercise control over the national insurance market recognise that this can be 
achieved without prejudicing their ability to gain access to the capital and technical 
expertise o f reinsurers. Secondly, as reinsurance transactions are between one insurer 
and another, the regulatory authorities feel that insurers are better informed consumers 
than the general public so there is less need to be protective to the insurer. Thirdly, a 
more extensive use o f reinsurance is considered, particularly in developing countries, to 
afford the balance o f payments savings over trade in direct insurances.
4.3.1 The reinsurance market and the threat of entry.
Entering the insurance or reinsurance market in the U.K. is a matter o f satisfying the 
requirements o f the Department o f Trade and Industry as regards capital and the 
suitability o f the officers o f the proposed company. Similarly, for an individual to
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become a member o f Lloyd’s requires a certain level o f liquid assets. Leaving the 
market is however more difficult as capital will be tied up to cover future liabilities. It 
is only after those liabilities have expired can the capital be released. A member o f 
Lloyd’s can only leave when all his open years o f  account have closed. If  a member has 
open years then he will be called upon to pay any cash calls that may be asked for by 
the syndicate in order to pay claims. New entrants to the reinsurance industry bring 
new capacity, the desire to gain market share and often substantial resources. The 
premiums written during 1993 in the reinsurance industry were approximately $65 
billion (Shapiro, 1994). The largest twenty companies write $46 billion, some 70% o f 
the total worldwide reinsurance premiums. A list o f  the largest twenty reinsurers is 
shown below in figure 4.4.
Rank Reinsurer
Net reinsurance 
premiums written 1993 (US$)
1 Munich Reinsurance Co $9,212,873
2 Swiss Re Group 7,577,726
3 Employers Re Group 3,336,857
4 Assicurazioni Generali 2,876,063
5 Hannover Re/Eisen & Stahl Re 2,804,520
6 Cologne Re 2,655,848
7 General Re Corp 2,524,000
8 Frankona Group 1,825,087
9 Gerling Global Re Group 1,756,479
10 SCOR S.A. 1,742,315
11 Mercantile & General Re 1,647,844
12 American Re-Insurance Co 1,371,000
13 AXARe 999,162
14 Tokio Marine & Fire Ins Co 985,818
15 Toa Fire & Marine Reinsurance Co 985,818
16 Prudential Reinsurance Co 892,310
17 Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co 879,423
18 Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co 688,113
19 Aachen Re Group 645,578
20 Transatlantic Holdings 631,693
TOTAL $ 46,040,234
FIGURE 4.4. THE TWENTY LARGEST REINSURERS IN THE WORLD
Source: Shapiro (19941
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Lloyd’s is missing from the above table because it is a market and not a company. 
Lloyd’s net reinsurance premium during income during calendar year 1993 was $6.1 
billion. Therefore Lloyd’s is the third largest reinsurer in the world after Munich Re 
and Swiss Re. These three reinsurers underwrite over one-third o f the world’s 
reinsurance premiums. Thus the reinsurance market is dominated by a small number o f 
large reinsurers. This contrasts with the insurance market which is localised. The 
reinsurance market is global and this has undoubtedly been enhanced by the reinsurance 
broker whose role is to locate capacity for his client’s reinsurance programme. For 
instance, a reinsurance programme o f a Lloyd’s syndicate may have as security other 
Lloyd’s syndicates, London companies, European companies, US companies and 
Australian companies.
The growth in the reinsurance market is currently in Bermuda where capacity during 
1994 was estimated to be $4.5 billion (Covaleski, 1994). The growth o f this capacity 
was fueled by the decline in capacity o f the London Market for property catastrophe 
excess o f loss business due to adverse loss experience and the consequent high rates 
being achieved by the remaining writers o f property catastrophe business. A study by 
the American reinsurance broker Guy Carpenter estimated that the level o f available 
capacity for property catastrophe business in the London market dropped from $125 
million per reinsurance programme in 1990 to $60 million per reinsurance programme 
in 1994. In contrast Bermudan capacity per programme for such business rose from nil 
in 1990 to $95 million in 1994. Covaleski (1994) suggests the reasons for setting up a 
reinsurance company in Bermuda are: the regulatory and political climates are stable 
which is a major attraction to reinsurers; its good business infrastructure; accessibility
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to the Americas and Europe; the lack o f taxation o f retained earnings; the costs o f 
doing business in Bermuda are from 10% to 35% cheaper than conducting the same 
operations in the USA. Whilst there was a shortage o f capacity for catastrophe 
business in 1993 (Macleod, 1994) which allowed London companies and Lloyd’s to 
raise rates, with the extra Bermudan capacity entering the reinsurance market, rates 
became static during 1994 (Ladbury, 1994).
Access to the Bermudan capacity is through brokers although some companies are 
offering capacity direct to buyers. Partner Reinsurance Company for instance offered 
about 70% o f its capacity through brokers and 30% direct (Souter, 1993). The 
investment in new Bermudan reinsurance companies has come from both banks and 
established insurance companies. Marsh McLennan, the US broker, and J.P. Morgan 
raised funds o f $359 million to capitalise Mid Ocean Re. Partner Re had investment 
from Swiss Re and Centre Cat Ltd has a capital o f $300 million funded by Centre Re 
Group which is controlled by Zurich Reinsurance Company.
4.3.2 The purchasers of reinsurance.
In the London market all business is transacted through brokers and access to Lloyd’s 
is solely through Lloyd’s brokers. The purchasers o f reinsurance are insurance 
companies and, as the buyers are in the same industry as the reinsurers, it is reasonable 
to assume they are sophisticated purchasers. The Porter model needs to be modified to 
take account o f the role o f brokers as there is not always a direct link between the 
insurer and reinsurer. An insurer’s need for reinsurance will largely depend on how 
risk-averse the insurer is. Reinsurance is essentially a means to protect an insurer’s
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balance sheet from a single major loss or an abnormal number o f smaller (attritional) 
losses. Reinsurance is either proportional or non-proportional and can be effected to 
cover a particular risk or an entire account. The reinsurance market is global and the 
insurer can access the worldwide reinsurance capacity either by going direct to the 
reinsurer or by using a reinsurance broker. The bargaining power o f the insurer, i.e. the 
ability o f the insurer to obtain a competitive quote, depends on the availability of 
capacity wishing to reinsure the risk. It has already been seen that the influx of 
capacity into Bermuda has had the effect o f stabilising rates and the author foresees that 
prices will decrease if there are two or three years o f no major natural peril losses.
The bargaining power o f the buyers o f reinsurance will be a factor in determining the 
intensity o f the competition within the reinsurance market. The bargaining power o f 
buyers will depend on the availability o f  alternative products to reinsurance and the 
availability o f capacity. The greater the available capacity, the more the insurer can 
bargain on price and/or broadened coverage. The bargaining power o f  the buyer is 
likely be enhanced if a broker is used, as the broker will have detailed knowledge o f the 
marketplace.
4.3.3 The suppliers of capital.
In the reinsurance market the suppliers are the providers o f capital, e.g. equity capital 
(shareholders), and also reinsurance cover provided by the retrocession market. In the 
context o f  Lloyd’s, the suppliers o f capital are the Names i.e. individuals which provide 
the capital for a syndicate in order for it to underwrite insurance. The retrocession
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market provides a mechanism for reinsurers to increase their capacity analogous to the 
way an insurer uses a reinsurer’s capacity (Browne, 1991).
The bargaining power o f capital providers will influence the competitive pressures 
within the industry such as the availability o f reinsurance (or retrocessional) protection. 
However, the major factor influencing competition in the reinsurance market is new 
entrants to the market which provide capacity to underwrite risks.
During the period 1984 to 1989 there was a plentiful supply o f affordable retrocessional 
reinsurance which encouraged reinsurers to underwrite property catastrophe excess o f 
loss business in the USA where rates (i.e. pricing) were high. The retrocessional 
coverages underwritten in London formed the London Market Excess o f  Loss (LMX) 
network with London underwriters reinsuring each other’s liabilities. With this 
coverage in place the capacity o f the reinsurance market for US property catastrophe 
programmes approached $300 million per company in 1986. In addition, primary 
companies augmented their excess o f loss catastrophe programmes by purchasing pro­
rata treaties, most o f which did not contain a limitation on the maximum payable by the 
treaty in the event o f a major single loss such as a hurricane or earthquake (Powers and 
Hearn, 1993).
Over a four year period, beginning in 1988, a series o f major catastrophes (the Piper 
Alpha oil rig explosion, Hurricane Hugo, European windstorms, Typhoon Mireille in 
Japan, the Oakland, California fires and Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki) battered the 
worldwide property catastrophe market. As a consequence o f these losses, primary
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companies claimed on their reinsurance protections and, in turn, reinsurers claimed 
from their retrocessional protections. The continuing calls for large cash payments, due 
to the recurrent catastrophe losses, and the incestuous nature o f  the London 
retrocessional network triggered the “LMX spiral effect” . This cascading o f loss from 
one reinsurer to another produced the disastrous results in the Lloyd’s and London 
market in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The LMX market began to collapse and the 
ability o f reinsurers to arbitrage the catastrophe product (i.e. reinsure the liabilities at a 
cheaper price than they were originally written at) began to erode and reinsurers faced 
the prospect o f larger net retentions. Large losses and the prospect o f unreinsured 
aggregate exposures led them to withdraw from the property catastrophe market. As a 
consequence, by January 1993 the maximum available limit per company for worldwide 
property catastrophe excess o f  loss was $175 million (Powers and Hearn, 1993). As 
property catastrophe capacity decreased, catastrophe reinsurance prices increased by 
about 50 to 60 per cent. Instead o f purchasing retrocessional protection some insurers 
boosted their financial strength. For instance, after Hurricane Andrew, Allstate 
Insurance Company, a subsidiary o f Sears, Roebuck and Co, raised $2.3 billion through 
an initial public offering.
4.3.4 Substitutes for reinsurance.
An alternative to buying reinsurance is for insurers to retain more o f the risk net and 
unreinsured, for instance by purchasing reinsurance at a higher attachment point. With 
the decline in traditional reinsurance capacity for property catastrophe risks in the early 
1990s, non-traditional products were developed to enable insurers and reinsurers to 
achieve a “spread” o f risk. One alternative is “financial reinsurance” . This is a
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mechanism to finance the future payment o f a ceding insurer’s losses by circumventing 
statutory accounting principles. This artificially improves the underwriting results and 
generally creates statutory surplus for the ceding insurer (Laurenzano, 1991). In 
contrast to traditional reinsurance, financial reinsurance does not protect against loss or 
compensate for losses suffered by ceding insurers under their policies o f insurance, i.e. 
there is no risk transfer. A common form of financial reinsurance involves the transfer 
o f funds from a ceding company in the form o f premium, with the return o f these funds 
plus interest over time from the reinsurer in the form o f losses, profit commission or 
return premiums. The premium charged to the ceding company represents the present 
value o f the assuming reinsurer’s exposure under the contract. In effect, such an 
arrangement is little more than an investment contract with a guaranteed return. In the 
USA, statutory accounting principles generally prohibit the discounting o f loss 
reserves. A financial reinsurance contract provides companies with a method whereby 
they can present value or discount reserves whilst reporting that discount as reinsurance 
recoverable and, in turn, as underwriting income.
4.4 The position of Lloyd’s in the Porter model.
Lloyd’s operates as both an insurer and reinsurer. Indeed, a single syndicate may 
operate in both the insurance and reinsurance markets. For example non-marine 
syndicate 183 (D.F. Bradstock and others) has both a reinsurance underwriter and an 
insurance underwriter. That syndicate competes with international reinsurance 
companies on catastrophe excess o f loss business and competes with UK insurers on 
household comprehensive business. There are syndicates that specialise in insurance 
e.g. non-marine syndicate 1191 (Boardman, Cunningham and Poland) which only
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underwrites UK household comprehensive business. Lloyd’s syndicates also provide 
retrocession cover to other Lloyd’s syndicates and to London and foreign companies.
The “suppliers” o f the Porter model are those entities that supply capital. The capital o f 
the Lloyd’s market comes from individuals called Names, from corporate vehicles and 
from the assets o f Lloyd’s central fund and the assets o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s. A 
syndicate may consist o f individuals (Names) each with unlimited liability. There are 
also syndicates that consist solely o f one capital provider, e.g. Syndicate 1211 which is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary o f the American domiciled reinsurer F&G Re. Such 
syndicates have a capital base that has limited liability.
The funds in the Lloyd’s Central Fund are there to pay claims in the event o f Names 
being unable to pay their losses. The funds o f the Central Fund are raised by a levy on 
each member’s overall premium income limit (OPL). If  the Central Fund becomes 
exhausted then the assets o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s will be used to pay claims. 
This is the chain o f security which exists behind the Lloyd’s policy. Some members o f 
Lloyd’s buy personal stop loss reinsurance which will cover all the member’s losses for 
a particular year o f account excess o f  a certain aggregate sum up to a certain limit o f 
indemnity. Whilst a member’s stop loss policy does not directly increase the capital he 
has available to commit to underwriting, it does allow the member to increase his 
overall premium limit because assets which the member may have to withhold in order 
to pay for future losses can be utilised for underwriting.
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Porter provides a useful structure in which to analyse industries. This author has 
applied the framework to both the direct insurance market and the reinsurance market. 
Whilst the main features may be described using Porter, the model has to be extended 
to include the influence o f regulation which is an important factor in insurance and 
reinsurance.
The Lloyd’s market is both an insurance and reinsurance market. Lloyd’s is a supplier 
o f  capital to the insurance market because there are syndicates that underwrite 
reinsurance business, i.e. are providers o f  reinsurance. The Society is also a competitor 
within the insurance market. Indeed, syndicates do not only compete with companies 
but compete for business with each other. Lloyd’s syndicates are also purchasers o f 
reinsurance. In the reinsurance market, Lloyd’s is a competitor and is also a supplier o f 
capital by being a provider o f  retrocessional reinsurance. In the reinsurance market 
there are Lloyd’s syndicates that are buyers o f reinsurance.
As Lloyd’s syndicates are members o f the insurance and reinsurance industry, the 
market cannot be said to be highly focused into one particular market. Lloyd’s is, for 
instance, the world’s third largest reinsurer and the second largest insurer o f  UK direct 
insurance business. This position is different from its competitors who are often 
focused into either reinsurance (Munich Re, Swiss Re) or insurance (Sun Alliance, 
Commercial Union). An attempt by this author to map the Porter model on to Lloyd’s 
is given in Figure 4.5. Because Lloyd’s syndicates operate in the insurance and 
reinsurance market, it is necessary to superimpose two Porter models upon each other. 
Suppliers to the insurance market may be syndicates who underwrite reinsurance
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Notes: (1) Syndicates may be suppliers to the Lloyd's reinsurance market by providing 
retrocession protection and to the Lloyd's insurance market by providing 
reinsurance protection.
(2) Syndicates may be buyers of reinsurance from other Lloyd's syndicates.
(3) New Syndicates will be entrants to the Lloyd's insurance and reinsurance markets.
Figure 4.5: Applying the Porter model to Lloyd's.
business. There are other syndicates who reinsure syndicates that underwrite 
reinsurance business. The buyers from the reinsurance market may be Lloyd’s 
syndicates who wish to reinsure their portfolio o f risks. The Porter model concept thus 
may be applied to Lloyd’s but the model is arguably being over-stretched.
4.5 The Market-Hierarchy-Network Model
The Porter Model views a firm as being in competition with all other firms in the same 
industry. Whilst this is a useful perspective, the model is not broad enough to 
encompass the concept o f cooperation between firms in the industry. The author’s 
research has revealed that cooperation is a feature o f Lloyd’s (see Chapter five), thus a 
new model which develops the concept o f inter-firm cooperation would be useful 
when examining Lloyd’s. Such a model is the Market-Hierarchy-Network Model.
In economic life there are a myriad o f organisational forms that firms or a group o f 
firms may take. Lorange and Roos (1992) suggest that all organisational forms lie on 
a continuum which measures the degree o f vertical integration on a scale running from 
“free markets” to “internalised hierarchy”, a framework shown in Figure 4.6. The left- 
hand side o f the continuum represents a situation where all the activities are integrated 
within an organisation. Moving along towards the right-hand side, there are ever 
decreasing degrees o f vertical integration to an extreme where all the transactions are 
conducted within an open market context.
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Mergers and Joint Joint co-operative co-operative
HIERARCHY acquisitions ownership venture venture venture MARKET
Large ^ ---------------------—----—— ---------------------------------------------- ^  None
Degree of vertical integration
Figure 4.6: Organisational forms (Source: Lorange and Roos, 1992)
The term “market” may seem obvious enough, but there are many forms o f market. 
The crucial feature o f the market is that it is a coordination device involving the 
voluntary exchange o f goods and services between two parties at a known price. 
Economists understand the term “market” not to mean any particular place but a 
region in which buyers and sellers are free to trade with each other so that the prices o f 
the same goods tends towards equality. The characteristic feature o f the neo-classical 
theory o f the market, as expounded by Marshall (1936), is the concept o f  equilibrium - 
a position where supply and demand are the same and so there is perfect coordination 
between the desires and wishes o f purchasers and suppliers. A perfectly competitive 
market is a structure in which there are so many buyers and suppliers that not one o f 
them can individually affect the price. In contrast to the neo-classical theory the 
Austrian school o f thought, such as Kirzner (1973) sees the market as a process o f 
selection, turmoil and change where disequilibrium processes prevail. This is a 
dynamic theory o f the market. Whilst the neo-classical theory emphasises the 
importance o f the price o f good in the market, Kirzner (1973) emphasises the effects 
o f the competitive process that markets encourage.
At the other extreme of the continuum is the hierarchy and one o f the most influential 
writers on this subject has been Williamson (1975,1985). Williamson’s work develops
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that o f Coase (1937) who argued that firms and markets were alternative means for 
organising similar kinds o f transaction and that transactions will be governed by the 
institutional arrangement that is most efficient. Williamson has developed Coase’s 
ideas into what has become known as the “transactions cost economics approach”. 
Williamson argues that transactions that involve uncertainty about their outcome, that 
recur frequently and require substantial “transaction-specific investments” - o f time, 
money or energy that cannot easily be transferred - are more likely to occur within a 
hierarchically organised firm. By contrast, exchanges that are straightforward, non- 
repetitive and do not require transaction-specific investment will take place across 
market boundaries. Transactions will be moved out o f  markets into hierarchies as 
transaction costs increase. Transaction costs arise from the following four factors: our 
inability to analyse everything in advance (man’s bounded rationality); the fact that the 
future is uncertain; the presence o f few suppliers and buyers o f the product in question; 
and, the tendency o f individuals to act in a self-interested manner and to do so with 
guile. The basic premise o f Williamson’s transaction-based theory is that firms will 
tend to absorb uncertainty by integrating its source inside their own boundaries and 
within their control rather than expose themselves to the marketplace.
Williamson’s view o f markets and hierarchies see firms as having definite boundaries. 
Outside the boundaries are competitors and within the boundaries, managers exercise 
authority. However, the boundaries o f firms are changing and they are engaging in 
forms o f collaboration that resemble neither arm’s length market contracting nor 
vertical integration.
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This blurring o f boundaries is giving rise to a variety o f inter-firm structures, that the
literature describes generically as “networks” or “strategic alliances”. Jarillo (1993)
describes networks in terms of inter-company cooperation. He states:
“Between the two basic ways to organize economic activities (market and 
firms), a vast intermediate area does exist, which has of late received the 
denomination of ‘network’. This is a widely used term, and certainly lacks
specificity.......(It is) a third kind of organization, between ‘market’ and
‘firm’, because economic activity therein is not coordinated (primarily) 
either by the price or by the hierarchical mechanisms.” (Jarillo, 1990)
The transaction costs theoiy explains why some transactions are organised within the 
market mechanism while others occur within hierarchies; the reason is one o f efficiency 
in that transactions are organised along that system which produces the lower cost. 
If  the transaction cost for an activity is high, then the activity will be carried out within 
the firm, i.e. vertical integration. If  the transaction cost is low, the activity will occur 
within the market. This reasoning does not explain, however, the emergence o f the 
intermediate organisational form, the network. Jarillo (1988) contends that if a 
company finds a way to lower those transaction costs - by the intervention o f an 
entrepreneur - then it would pay that company to sub-contract. As a result, the 
company would be less integrated than its competitors, and more efficient as it has 
lowered its transaction costs compared to its competitors’. The essence o f a network 
is that a company finds a way to lower transaction costs which, until then, were forcing 
competitors to integrate. By so doing, it gains efficiency over its competitors, and sets 
up an organisational form that consists o f independent units that are cooperating with 
each other. The question is, o f course, why are the transaction costs lowered?
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Jarillo (1990) agues that the ‘glue’ that holds the network together is neither the pure 
price signal, nor command from above, but rather it is trust, which Thorelli (1986) 
defines as:
“...... an assumption or reliance on the part of A that if either A or B
encounters a problem in the fulfillment of his implicit or explicit 
transactional obligations, B may be counted on to do what A would do if 
B’s resources were at A’s disposal.”
Whilst Jarillo explains networks in terms o f transaction costs, he pays scant attention 
as to how alliances actually work in order to bind the firms into a network o f 
relationships.
Between the two extremes o f organisational form, markets and hierarchies, there lie 
various organisational structures. Any merger or acquisition represents a lower degree 
o f vertical integration than that found in the subsidiary organisation. Joint ownership 
arrangements exhibit even lower degrees o f vertical integration and various types o f 
formal and informal cooperative ventures lower still.
Many definitional problems are associated with networks, but they describe, in broad 
terms, inter- rather than /'wfra-organisational forms (Egan, 1995). Networks provide 
an intermediate organisational mode to markets and hierarchies. They offset the 
uncertainties involved with market-based transactions and they avoid the complexities 
o f integration.
Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) point out that strategic alliances and inter-firm 
networks have been gaining in popularity with many firms for their lower overhead
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costs, increased responsiveness and flexibility, and greater efficiency of operations. 
Network forms o f organisation have attracted much study; for instance, Miles and 
Snow (1986) have talked o f “Network Forms”, Handy (1989) has described 
“Shamrock Organisations”; Johnston and Lawrence (1988) have discussed “Value 
Added Partnerships” and Jarillo (1993) describes networks as “Borderless 
Organisations”. Deriving a satisfactory definition o f a network is difficult given that 
they occur in various forms. It is tempting to define a network as being a form that is 
neither a market, where there are arm’s length relationships and price is the co­
ordinating mechanism, nor a hierarchy, where there are vertical relationships and 
administrative “fiat” is the co-ordinating mechanism. However, defining something by 
what it is not, is hardly an intellectual approach to a problem.
The term “network” has become the vogue in attempting to describe organisations. 
However, there is little agreement in what organisational form constitutes a network. 
Baker (1992) argues that all organisations are networks - patterns o f roles and 
relationships. For example, a network that is characterised by a rigid hierarchy of 
tasks and roles, vertical relationships and administrative apparatus separated from 
production is commonly called a bureaucracy. In contrast, a network characterised by 
flexibility, decentralised planning and control, lateral ties is closer to Baker’s definition 
o f the network type o f organisational form. Some scholars such as Lorange and Roos 
(1992) argue that economic changes can be shown on a continuum with Market at one 
end and Hierarchy at the other. Other authors (e.g. Powell, 1991) see that networks 
are distinct forms o f organisation, i.e. a network is a distinct form o f strategic alliance. 
The problem o f defining a network is arguably, semantic. At what point, for instance,
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does a joint venture between two hierarchical firms develop from being a strategic 
alliance into a network? This author suggests that whilst a market and a hierarchy 
may be defined in economic terms and are thus identifiable, networks are described in 
terms o f their qualities; thus the definition o f what a network is will differ from author 
to author. For instance, Jarillo (1988) defines networks as “long-term, purposeful 
arrangements among distinct but related for-profit organizations that allow those firms 
in them to gain or sustain competitive advantage vis-à-vis their competitors outside the 
network”. Kaneko and Imai (1987) see networks as a particular form o f multi-faceted, 
inter-organisational relationships through which new information is generated. 
Johanson and Mattsson (1991) regard networks as a method o f dividing labour such 
that firms are highly dependent upon each other. The co-ordination o f activities is not 
achieved through a hierarchy or a market, but through the interaction and mutual 
obligation o f the firms in the network. These three definitions see networks as being a 
pattern o f  relationships between firms, but as Powell (1991) points out networks may 
also occur between individuals, independent production teams or very small business 
units. A network is often thought as a flat organisational form in contrast to the 
vertically organised hierarchy forms. The key feature o f networks is that they are 
based on trust and cooperation. In contrast to either market or hierarchy, networks 
co-ordinate through less formal, more egalitarian and cooperative means (Thompson, 
1991). A broad approach to the definition o f a network is offered by Baker (1992) 
who states that the chief structural characteristic o f a network organisation is the high 
degree o f integration across formal boundaries.
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Figure 4.7 represents Powell’s attempt to summarise the key differences between 
markets, hierarchies and networks. In the market transaction there is no need for trust 
to exist between the actors and agreements are reinforced by legal sanction. Each 
party knows the benefit o f the exchange. In the network form there is cooperation 
between the actors and extensive communication o f information between the parties. 
In the hierarchy, communication occurs in the form o f the employment contract. 
There is a clear chain o f authority between the actors.
Forms
Key features M arket H ierarchy Network
Normative basis Contract - 
property rights
Routines Relational
Means o f communication Prices Routines Relational
Methods o f conflict 
resolution
Haggling - resort 
to courts for 
enforcement
Administrative 
fiat - supervision
Norm of 
reciprocity - 
reputational 
concerns
Degree o f flexibility High Low Medium
Amount o f commitment 
among the parties
Low Medium to high Medium to high
Tone or climate Precision and/or 
suspicion
Formal,
bureaucratic
Open-ended, 
mutual benefits
Actor preferences or 
choices
Independent Dependent Interdependent
Mixing o f forms Repeat 
transactions 
Contracts as 
hierarchical 
documents
Informal 
organisation. 
Market-like 
features: profit 
centres, transfer 
. pricing
Multiple 
partners. 
Formal rules.
Figure 4.7: Stylized comparison of forms of economic organisation.
(Source: Powell, 1991)__________________________________________
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The network form o f organisation was neglected by business writers for many years as 
they did not find it a useful concept. This neglect was probably due to the pre­
eminence o f the “competitive advantage” school o f business thought, which is best 
represented by the work o f Michael Porter. Porter states that the profits a company 
can achieve in an industry are determined, first by the profit potential o f the industry, 
and second, by the position o f the firm within the industry. The profit potential o f an 
industry is determined by the interaction o f five forces: how easy it is for a firm to 
enter, the intensity o f  rivalry between the existing competitors, the bargaining power o f 
both suppliers and customers, and finally, the availability o f  substitute products. Thus 
in order to prosper, a company has to compete not only with its current competitors, 
but with potential competitors, as well as with its suppliers and its customers. This is 
an “atomistic” view of the economic activity, in which each company is alone against 
the world. This view is challenged by a network perspective, as network theory 
emphasises the pattern o f relationships between among the firms in the industry, an 
issue that receives little attention in the Porter framework.
4.6 Towards a classification of the structure of Lloyd’s
The above has given a very brief overview o f the three types o f organisational form - 
markets, networks and hierarchies. An interesting question is which o f these models o f 
coordination is applicable to Lloyd’s? This question may be answered on two levels - 
firstly, on the level o f the business transaction i.e. positioning the business process, and 
secondly, at the level o f the governance o f Lloyd’s. It has been stated earlier in this 
chapter that there are syndicates in Lloyd’s that underwrite insurance and others that 
underwrite reinsurance. Those syndicates that underwrite personal lines insurance
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such as motor and household form a market where the customer is able to choose 
between the coverage offered by one syndicate compared to another. Furthermore, 
these syndicates operate in the UK personal lines market and compete directly with 
other insurance companies for business. Sums insured are small and each personal 
lines syndicate underwrites 100 per cent o f the risk. There is no cooperation between 
syndicates as they are in competition for the same business. We may therefore say that 
with respect to personal lines business, Lloyd’s is a market.
The subscription system o f risk placement is generally used for large risks where the 
capacity required exceeds that which may be supplied by one insurer, consequently it is 
generally used for reinsurance placements rather than insurance business. This author 
further suggests that the subscription system is also used for new insurance products 
where the legal implications o f  coverage have not yet been tested. In this situation, 
any one syndicate may wish to participate in only a small percentage o f the liability. 
There are no agreements between firms in the subscription system - it is a method o f 
trading rather than a formalised agreement. Such a system o f risk placement may be 
likened to an informal cooperative venture where there is cooperation but in a loose 
and uncodified form. Thus the subscription market lies on the far right-hand side o f the 
structural continuum given in Figure 4.6. In the subscription system, a risk may be 
underwritten by say twenty syndicates all participating with various percentage lines. 
Any one syndicate may not know the other syndicates participating in the risk, 
although they will be told by the broker which syndicate is the lead. At renewal o f  the 
risk, any syndicate is free to decline to write the risk and often new syndicates will
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participate and sometimes syndicates will increase or decrease their percentage lines on 
the risk. Thus the subscription market for any one risk may change from year to year.
A consortium arrangement involves the prior agreement between syndicates on the 
types o f  business to be underwritten by the consortium and the proportion o f business 
ceded to each o f the consortium members. It is a joint venture and the cooperation is 
formalised between the syndicates. Consortium arrangements are to the left o f the 
subscription system o f risk placement when superimposed on the structural continuum 
o f Figure 4.6.
Consortium arrangements and the subscription system o f risk placement are examples 
o f strategic alliances, which some scholars would terms as networks; they fall between 
the two extremes o f market and hierarchy - nearing towards a market - on the 
structural continuum o f Figure 4.6. The subscription system exists primarily as a 
mechanism for placing risks that require a capacity greater than that provided by any 
one insurer. There is no formalised cooperation agreement between the syndicates; 
however, it is business practice that the following syndicates on the slip will agree with 
the judgments o f the leading underwriter, especially in terms o f claims handling and 
any changes in the coverage.
In a consortium arrangement, the composition o f the consortium, in terms o f the 
participating syndicates, is determined before any risk is underwritten. There is a 
consortium slip to which all participating underwriters subscribe and this details how 
the consortium will operate in terms of risk selection, claims handling and the payment
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o f fees to the lead syndicate o f the consortium. In both consortia and the subscription 
system, the transaction costs for any one syndicate are reduced because a syndicate can 
underwrite a risk which it otherwise would have to underwrite in total and then 
arrange facultative reinsurance protection.
It has been stated earlier in this thesis, that this author has found that Lloyd’s 
underwriters are entrepreneurial in their underwriting. The suggested reason for this 
was the existence o f the subscription system which allows underwriters to experiment 
but not expose too much o f their capital base to liability. Additionally, the subscription 
system allows risk information to pass freely from underwriter to underwriter. Jarillo 
(1988) argues that a network exists when the transaction costs are lowered and that 
this is the result o f the action o f the entrepreneur. Jarillo’s reasoning would suggest 
that the subscription system exists as a result o f  the entrepreneurial nature o f  the 
Lloyd’s underwriter. This author’s contention earlier in this thesis, is that the 
subscription system encourages entrepreneurism, thus throwing into question Jarillo’s 
argument. However, it may be that Jarillo’s argument could be reversed in that the 
intrinsic ability for a firm to enter into a network arrangement with other firms 
encourages the entrepreneur to act and to seize the opportunity.
The subscription system performs two functions: firstly, a pooling a syndicate’s capital 
in order to assume the risk, and secondly a pooling o f underwriting expertise to review 
and assess the risk. There has been, and continues to be, a gradual growth in the size 
o f syndicates, for instance ACE London Underwriting Limited announced in early 
April 1997 a merger o f Syndicates 47 and 322 and o f Syndicates 219 and 204.
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Furthermore, with Managing Agents being owned by large corporate capital providers 
who can supply capital to syndicates, this author suggests that syndicates may continue 
to grow in size. With such mergers and acquisitions and organic growth in size, 
syndicates are able to underwrite bigger lines on risks because they have a larger 
capital base to support the liability. In the future, whether a risk is placed via the 
subscription system may thus depend not so much on the need for syndicates to pool 
their capital, but on the need for syndicates to pool their expertise.
Jarillo (1990) argues that a network is held together through trust and he illustrates 
this reasoning by describing the operations o f the Italian textile manufacturer Benetton. 
Whilst there is trust within the subscription system in that all the syndicates are reliant 
on the judgment o f the leading underwriter, this author suggests that trust is not the 
primary reason for the network. The subscription system exists because it is a 
mechanism whereby insurers can underwrite large risks. They could not underwrite 
such risks without either increasing their capital base or arranging reinsurance for the 
risk. This author suggests that the primary reason why the network exists is to 
compensate for the lack o f capital o f the constituents o f the subscription system. 
Furthermore, the subscription system ensures that all underwriters pool their 
knowledge in risk assessment. The transaction costs o f a syndicate participating in the 
subscription system are lower than those associated with raising extra capital or by 
employing extra underwriters. Trust is therefore not the primary reason that the 
network occurs.
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We may view a consortium arrangement as being a pre-arranged subscription system. 
Unlike the subscription system, trust is more the essence o f this alliance. A group o f 
syndicates come together and pool their capital to form a consortium for underwriting 
certain types o f business, e.g. the Marchant Space consortium and the Small Business 
Consortium. One o f the members is the consortium leader and he will underwrite 
business for the consortium members in accordance with the rules o f the consortium. 
The broker is the intermediary between the customer and the underwriter. The 
relationship is one o f agent and principal and the law o f agency applies. Some 
Managing Agencies are receiving investment. from broking houses, e.g. Aon’s 
investment in the Jago Managing Agency, thus we might expect to see some alliances 
between syndicates and brokers in the future. If  we take a broad perspective on the 
role o f the broker, then brokers may be regarded as the marketing arm o f syndicates 
and, in this sense, there is an alliance between brokers and syndicates. Furthermore, in 
recent years brokers have worked closely with underwriters to develop products. 
These alliances are not formalised but are rather an agreement to work together for 
mutual benefit.
A syndicate may be viewed as a hierarchy, indeed the traditional view o f a syndicate is 
a single underwriter in charge o f a small number o f staff. With the growth of 
syndicates, this structure has developed into one where there are line underwriters, 
essentially underwriting departments, e.g. property excess o f loss, direct property, 
casualty, medical expenses. Each line underwriter will have to produce a business plan 
and negotiate capacity with the Board o f Directors. Each underwriting department is
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viewed as a profit centre. This is the structure o f syndicates that have a capacity in 
excess o f  £100 million, e.g. Brotherton, Charman, Harvey Bowring.
One o f the features o f Lloyd’s is that syndicates outsource various functions, 
principally premium processing (to the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office), policy issuance 
(to the broker) and claims handling and negotiation (to the Lloyd’s Claims Office). 
Syndicates “buy into” each of these services. Such a structure is a network form.
If  the structure o f Lloyd’s is viewed from the viewpoint o f its governance, then the 
Society resembles a hierarchy. The Council o f Lloyd’s may be likened to a board of 
directors which oversees various operating divisions (M-form organisation). 
However, the Council’s role is primarily that o f regulator and monitor and cannot 
direct the business underwritten by each syndicate nor direct each syndicate’s strategy 
as can the centre in an M-form organisation. However, the Council o f  Lloyd’s does 
have extensive powers over syndicates as the implementation o f Equitas demonstrates.
The above discussion suggests that it is difficult to classify Lloyd’s as being one 
particular organisational type. This author suggests that it is not useful to regard 
Lloyd’s as an organisation but rather to view it as an industry, a microcosm o f the 
insurance industry consisting o f insurers and reinsurers. There are certain 
commonalties between the syndicates such as the unique capital base, close 
communication between the underwriters and shared central services. Lloyd’s is, in 
essence, a collection o f insurance entities that are gathered in a particular geographical 
space, the Lloyd’s building. Comparison may be made between Lloyd’s and the 
entire UK insurance industry. The DTI regulates the insurance industry in a way
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similar to how Lloyd’s is regulated by the Council o f Lloyd’s. Contributions to the 
Central Fund are analogous to contributions that UK insurers make to the 
Policyholders’ Protection Board, although this Board responds solely to claims from 
individuals whereas the Central Fund will pay all claims, both insurance and 
reinsurance. There are mergers and takeovers in the UK insurance industry similar to 
the mergers that have occurred between syndicates. The subscription system o f risk 
placement occurs with companies as well as in Lloyd’s.
There are thus various organisational forms that are present within Lloyd’s and it is not 
possible to say that Lloyd’s belongs to one particular structural type. We may view 
Lloyd’s as being a sector o f the insurance industry. However, because it is small and 
tightly controlled by the Council o f Lloyd’s and all the syndicates trade in the same 
building, it has a unique identity, that o f being “Lloyd’s”. By contrast the UK 
insurance industry does not have a similar unique identity, due to the disparate nature 
o f its participants. Figure 4.8 summarises the structures present within Lloyd’s.
Structure Generic type of organisational form
Subscription system (syndicate- 
syndicate relationship)
Network: Informal cooperative venture
Consortium arrangement Network: Joint venture
Individual syndicate Hierarchy - internal structure. 
Network structure - relationship with 
LPSO, LCO and broker
Governance structure o f the 
Society o f Lloyd’s.
Hierarchy - resembles an M-form 
organisation
Broker-underwriter relationship Network: Informal cooperative 
arrangement
Personal lines (insurance) 
syndicates
Market
Figure 4.8: Structures present within Lloyd’s. 
(Source: This author’s analysis)
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4.7 Current structural changes in the insurance industry
It is interesting to speculate on the future structure o f Lloyd’s, but it is informative to 
first look at the changing structure o f the insurance industry. Bebear (1990) comments 
that the future insurance industry will consist o f niche insurers and large insurers. This 
scenario is reinforced by Schulte-Noelle (1994) and, in particular, Famy (1990) who 
states:
“At the one extreme will be the (veiy) large insurers who operate in a fairly 
general way on a Europe-wide or worldwide basis.
“At the other extreme will be the small or medium-sized insurers that operate 
nationally, perhaps even only locally, and will continue to do so. 
Specialisation in a limited area of operation is often followed by specialisation 
in specific business segments, for example in individual classes of insurance 
or -and this is becoming increasingly important- in individual groups of 
customers.”
In the U.K personal lines industry, there is a drive for insurers to contain costs in order 
to compete effectively against the direct writers such as Direct Line. One way to 
ensure that expenses are handled efficiently is to seek economies o f scale through 
merger with another company, such as that between Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance. 
In the reinsurance industry, there is consolidation between reinsurers, e.g. the merger 
o f  General Re and Cologne Re, the acquisition o f Société Anonyme Française de 
Réassurances (SAFR) by Partner Re o f Bermuda.
This consolidation within the insurance and reinsurance industries is being mirrored 
within Lloyd’s with a gradual decrease in the number o f syndicates but a growth in the 
average size o f syndicate. Furthermore, the availability o f new external corporate 
capital gives the potential for syndicates to grow in size. This author suggests that 
Lloyd’s could develop into an insurance bourse with about 100 syndicates each with a
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capacity o f about £100 million. This author further suggests that this will lead to a less 
flexible and less innovative Lloyd’s than has previously been the case. There will also 
be a gradual decrease in the number o f risks placed within the subscription market as 
the increase in the size o f syndicates will result in more syndicates underwriting 
business fully rather than coinsuring with other syndicates. This is not the traditional 
picture o f Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s has always been an institution where individual 
underwriters have been able to start up their own syndicates. This has ensured the 
regeneration o f the Lloyd’s ‘market’ and has encouraged the entrepreneur to flourish. 
Given this culture, it is interesting to speculate whether the large syndicates will spawn 
smaller break-away syndicates headed by underwriters who wish to have their own 
syndicate. We may therefore yet see a growth o f new small syndicates. This, 
however, will only occur if the Central Fund is kept as the foundation o f the security 
o f  Lloyd’s. This is a subject discussed below.
Some scholars, such as Bamatt (1997) state that the future organisational form will be 
the network structure. Whilst this author concurs that the network form will be o f 
increasing importance, the experience o f the insurance industry with the current merger 
o f companies suggests that this industry will be dominated by large hierarchical firms. 
The structure o f the insurance industry would provide fertile ground for some further 
academic study.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the role o f cooperation within Lloyd’s. From this analysis a 
descriptive model o f Lloyd’s is proposed. The chapter concludes with a description o f 
the Illinois Insurance Exchange and a comparison between this Exchange and Lloyd’s.
5.2 The subscription system
A dictionary definition o f cooperation is “working together to the same end”. This 
definition captures the essence o f cooperation in that it identifies that cooperation 
requires two independent parties working together. The most pronounced example o f 
cooperation in Lloyd’s and in the London market is the subscription system o f placing 
risks. This involves a broker placing each risk with several syndicates, each syndicate 
taking a percentage o f the liability in return for the same percentage o f premium. The 
broker will continue to place the risk with underwriters until the percentage placed on 
the slip is one hundred per cent. For some risks the broker is able to place over one 
hundred per cent o f the risk, in which case the written line o f each syndicate or 
company will be reduced proportionately until the total sums to 100 per cent. The 
subscription market operates due to the nature o f the London market as a brokered 
market; there is no direct placement o f business between the insured or reinsured and 
the syndicate or insurance company. This is not the case for other markets such as in 
Bermuda where direct placement o f reinsurance business is common.
Chapter five: The Nature of Cooperation within Lloyd’s
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Carter and Diacon (1990) provide a very comprehensive summary o f the operation o f 
the subscription system which they describe as a system “essentially to canvas the 
opinion o f underwriters on what should be the appropriate loss probability.” Carter 
and Diacon (1990) see the subscription system as a method whereby the London 
market is able to handle the “more unusual and high risks insurances where, by 
definition, loss probabilities are not known or agreed by insurers.” Thus the rate for 
the risk is achieved through consensus between underwriters. However, this view of 
the subscription market does not encompass its other function which is to achieve a 
consensus on policy wording and coverage.
Syndicates also cooperate in various administration functions such as LPSO and the 
Lloyd’s Claims Office. Syndicates are required to use these shared services which are 
charged to the syndicate based on usage. By cooperating in this way, Syndicates can 
achieve economies o f scale. Underwriting decisions are left to the underwriters o f 
each syndicate, the Corporation o f Lloyd’s does not direct the underwriting.
The structure o f Lloyd’s may be likened to Chandler’s M-Form organisation (Chandler, 
1962). However, whereas in an M-form organisation the centre can direct the business 
decisions made by each business unit, this is not the case with Lloyd’s. The centre (the 
Corporation and Council) assists the underwriter, but does not direct underwriting 
decisions. The profitable nature o f Lloyd’s comes from the broker-underwriter 
relationship not the centre-underwriter or centre-broker relationship. The Corporation 
o f Lloyd’s does not direct what type o f business is written by each syndicate or direct
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the strategy o f each syndicate - the centre can just monitor, regulate and assist in 
various functions such as accounting.
The subscription market relies on there being a large number o f syndicates willing to 
cooperate. In recent years consortium arrangements have developed which offer 
brokers a predetermined subscription market. Essentially the subscription market is 
condensed into one “stamp”. This arrangement allows brokers to place business with 
one underwriter who represents the whole consortium arrangement. A binding 
authority and lineslip are also methods to “condense” the subscription market.
The Porter model needs to be altered to take into account the cooperative nature o f the 
Lloyd’s market. This author suggests that Lloyd’s is unique because o f the nature of 
cooperation within the Society. Each risk is too large for any one syndicate to 
underwrite in totality, therefore cooperation enables each risk to be written across 
several syndicates. The advantage o f such a method of underwriting business to the 
syndicate is that the underwriter can attain a better spread o f business for a given 
premium income, i.e. a balanced book of business, both in terms o f class diversification 
and in terms o f geographical spread. As for the customer, he is not reliant on any one 
insurer or reinsurer, so gaining the advantage o f risk spread. In addition the risk has 
been scrutinised by various underwriters, not just by one underwriter. This allows for a 
greater evaluation o f the assessment o f the risk for the customer and a sharing o f 
information between underwriters. Indeed, this author suggests that the sharing of 
information between underwriters via the subscription system is an important aspect o f 
the operation o f Lloyd’s.
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Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) define added value as:
“Added value measures what each player brings to the game. Take the size of 
the pie when you and everyone else are in the game; then see how big a pie 
the others can create without you” (Page 46.)
Given this definition, the added value o f each syndicate is the maximum line it can 
underwrite for any particular line o f business. This is true if the total capacity o f the 
market equals the capacity o f any one risk. But if  the market capacity is greater than 
any one risk, the added value o f each syndicate is zero, i.e. a “buyer’s market”. 
However, if  the capacity o f the market is less than the capacity o f any one risk then the 
added value o f each syndicate is greater than its maximum line, i.e. a “seller’s market” 
and therefore the underwriters’ prices will increase. There is asymmetry between 
shortages and surpluses in capacity - a small shortage will increase added value greatly 
but a small surplus will reduce added value to nil. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) 
suggest that this asymmetry explains the recurring cycles in insurance. Whilst each 
syndicate may have zero added value in times o f surplus capacity, the whole London 
market does have added value within the worldwide reinsurance market.
The subscription system of risk placement ensures that each syndicate is reliant on each 
other. If  a risk has a capacity o f say $100,000,000 and a syndicate has a maximum line 
o f $10,000,000 on this risk, then the broker must find nine other syndicates with similar 
maximum lines for the risk to be fully placed. Given this degree o f interdependency 
between syndicates, it is not unreasonable to assume that the strategy o f one syndicate 
will affect the strategy o f the others. For the subscription market to operate a large 
number o f participants are required. However, the crucial feature is that no one 
company or syndicate is able, or willing, to underwrite each risk fully; each entity will
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take a fraction o f the risk. With the introduction o f corporate capital into Lloyd’s and 
the purchase o f managing agents by large reinsurers and investment trusts, there is the 
possibility o f the growth of large syndicates which will have sufficient capacity to 
underwrite risks one hundred per cent. In this scenario, the subscription market will 
collapse for all but the largest reinsurance placements.
5.3 Developing a structural model of Lloyd’s.
Porter provides a useful framework within which to analyse an industry, however whilst 
a Porter-type model may be developed for Lloyd’s - see Chapter Four - such a model 
overstretches Porter’s work. Furthermore, Porter’s model does not take into account 
the role o f cooperation which is a feature o f Lloyd’s. A more useful framework is that 
developed by Kay (1995). Whilst Kay’s work is primarily directed at evaluating the 
core competencies o f the firm, his concept o f architecture may be used as a framework 
for analysing the structure o f Lloyd’s. However, like Porter, the work by Kay does not 
include an evaluation o f cooperation or culture within a firm or industry both o f which 
are elements strongly present in Lloyd’s. This author’s work on cooperation expands 
some o f the ideas o f Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995) and Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger (1996) on coopetition.
All organisations consist o f various activities, such as task, allocation, supervision and 
coordination. Such activities constitute the mechanics o f the organisation and the fact 
that such activities can be arranged in various ways means that organisations can have a 
variety o f structures.
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Superficially, Lloyd’s resembles a large diversified firm in which responsibility is pushed 
down to the business unit and to profit centre managers (Chandler, 1962). Goold and 
Campbell (1987) have investigated large diversified companies and have identified two 
extremes o f company structure:
“At one extreme we found companies such as BTR, GEC, Hanson Trust and 
Tarmac, who believe in:
- limiting the activities of the centre to a few essentials, such as approving or 
rejecting proposals and appointing managers;
- giving as much responsibility as possible to the managers in charge of the 
business units: the centre does not interfere in the thinking of these managers, 
other than to replace those who fail;
- setting tough targets for profit and insisting that managers meet them: 
failure to meet budget in these companies can be tantamount to resigning.
“At the other extreme, we found companies such as BOC, Lex and STC, who
- believe that the centre should have a leadership role, giving direction to the 
business units, and helping to develop strategies that support the corporate 
objectives;
- expect the centre to be involved in major decisions and to coordinate plans 
between different units within the group;
- emphasize the value of strategic, long-term planning;
- set targets mainly in terms of progress against competitors and seek 
motivation from a shared commitment to these goals.”
Between these two polar opposites, Goold and Campbell found a variety o f 
intermediate styles. In a diversified company the centre owns the subsidiaries and thus 
has ultimate control e.g. Hanson Trust, British Petroleum. However, in Lloyd’s the 
centre does not own the syndicates in the sense o f owning the capital base but may 
effect rules which exert control over the activities o f the syndicates i.e. the role o f the 
centre is primarily as a regulator. Under the Lloyd’s Act 1982, the role o f the Council 
is to manage the affairs o f the Society and has the power to regulate and direct the 
business o f  insurance at Lloyd’s. Furthermore, the Council has the power to “make 
such byelaws as from time to time seem requisite.... and for the furtherance o f the 
objects o f the Society...” (Section 6(2), Lloyd’s Act 1982). The formation o f Equitas
170
was effected under this section o f the Act, although the Council o f Lloyd’s asked the 
membership to vote to accept the formation o f Equitas.
Goold and Campbell (1987) have proposed eight management styles based on their 
research into diversified corporations. These management styles are:
• Holding company;
•  Centralised;
•  Strategic Planning;
•  Strategic Programming;
•  Strategic Control;
•  Strategic Venturing;
•  Financial Control;
• Financial Programming.
Lloyd’s may be likened to a Strategic Venturing Business which Goold and Campbell 
define thus:
“...the centre delegates the development of strategies to business units, and 
makes few attempts to challenge their proposals. Controls are flexible, 
allowing time for the business units to build a position in the market. But the 
centre does more than in the Holding Company style. It monitors results 
being achieved, is willing to intervene if serious problems are emerging, and 
retains discretion over major resource allocation decisions. This style is 
similar to that used by venture capital companies.”
However, unlike a diversified company, the “centre” o f Lloyd’s, the Council and 
Corporation, do not own the business units i.e. the syndicates. The development o f 
each syndicate’s strategy is a role performed by the syndicates and the managing 
agencies. Mintzberg (1991) describes the role o f the headquarters in a diversified 
company as to exercise performance control and to develop corporate strategy. The 
Council and Corporation o f Lloyd’s cannot direct the strategy o f each syndicate, but 
may assist each syndicate in achieving its objectives such as obtaining licences to trade 
in foreign countries. For instance, Lloyd’s Japan Inc, a vehicle to underwrite insurance
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in Japan, was pioneered by various Lloyd’s underwriters but received considerable 
input from the Corporation’s International Department.
Whilst the Council and Corporation o f Lloyd’s are essentially charged with the 
regulatory aspects o f the operations o f the Lloyd’s market, the centre will intervene in 
the operation o f the market if this is deemed necessary “for the furtherance o f the 
objects o f the Society” (Lloyd’s Act 1982). For instance the Council proposed the 
setting up o f Lioncover Insurance Company in 1987. This company has reinsured the 
liabilities o f Names on syndicates formerly managed by PCW Underwriting Agencies 
Limited, WMD Underwriting Agencies Limited and Richard Beckett Underwriting 
Agencies Limited and on Syndicates 2 and 49 (the PCW syndicates). Following a 
settlement in 1987 with the members o f the PCW syndicates, the Society is liable to 
fund the amount by which Lioncover’s liabilities exceed its assets. Similarly, the 
Equitas project was devised by the Council, implemented by the syndicates and 
approved by the membership.
Whilst there is a similarity between Goold and Campbell’s Strategic Venturing 
Company and Lloyd’s, there are some major differences. The capital base o f  Lloyd’s is 
not owned by a central body, but by the individual business units. There is also 
competition between the business units which is unlikely to occur in a diversified 
company such as Hanson pic. The essential feature o f Lloyd’s is the tension between 
cooperation and competition. Cooperation requires an agreement between firms or, as 
is the case o f the subscription market, it occurs as a function o f the business process.
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The culture o f Lloyd’s is an important aspect o f its operations. Culture concentrates on 
the collective interest and the building o f a unified organisation, through shared systems 
o f beliefs, habits and traditions (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1991). Lloyd’s has a rich history 
stretching over 300 years, its own coat o f arms with the motto “Fidentia”, and in that 
time has evolved from being an organisation to being an institution. In Selznick’s 
(1957) terms, the organisation has converted from an expendable “instrument” for the 
accomplishment o f externally imposed goals into an “institution”, a system with a life o f 
its own. It “acquires a self, a distinctive identity” .
The subscription system is the method by which Lloyd’s has historically traded with its 
customers. Given that Lloyd’s is a major international market, the question arises as to 
whether the success o f Lloyd’s is due to its being a subscription market. Is this 
cooperative arrangement at the heart o f the success o f Lloyd’s?
Lloyd’s is a market which is centered on the primacy o f underwriting; furthermore it is 
a market which is centered on individuals - underwriters - rather than on corporations. 
It is a market where, historically, talented underwriters have been able to start up their 
own syndicates rather than working for a large company. This entrepreneurial culture 
encourages new syndicates to form and thus creates a market o f small insurance 
entities. This author suggests that the only method by which such a group of small 
insurers can compete with competitors such as the Munich Re and Swiss Re is by 
cooperating with each other. The subscription market allows the transfer o f 
information between syndicates and thus the customer’s risk is reviewed by many 
underwriters, each of whom will have the opportunity to make comment as to the
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insurance coverage provided. From the perspective o f the client, the security o f one 
syndicate is the same as that o f another as the solvency rules laid down by the Council 
o f Lloyd’s are applicable to all syndicates. The Council o f Lloyd’s furthermore does 
not prescribe rates nor requires rates to be filed, as is the case with US admitted 
insurers who have to file rates with the Insurance Commissioner o f each State in which 
they are licensed. This allows syndicates great flexibility in pricing each risk.
Lloyd’s therefore has a culture o f entrepreneurial underwriters where decision making 
lines are very short - the active underwriter will make the final decision whether to 
underwrite a risk. There is little underwriting “by committee” as there is in some US 
insurance and reinsurance companies. This is coupled by an ability for underwriters to 
work together and share information on risk assessment. This is a competitive 
advantage unique to Lloyd’s compared to other markets such as the Illinois Insurance 
Exchange. This author suggests that the subscription system of risk placing together 
with entrepreneurial underwriting are the prime reasons for the historic success o f 
Lloyd’s.
Cooperation can also occur within Lloyd’s as a result o f  the rulings o f the Council o f 
Lloyd’s. In this way the Lloyd’s market cooperates en bloc because decisions are made 
by a third party, the Council o f Lloyd’s, the rulings o f  which are mandatory for all 
syndicates. The formation o f Equitas - the pooling o f all 1992 and prior liabilities into a 
central vehicle - is cooperation but this was only possible because the decision was 
made by the Council.
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Each syndicate is bound by the decisions o f the Council; thus no syndicate has complete 
freedom with which to conduct its business. The price o f  cooperation is to sacrifice 
some freedom. There is a culture in Lloyd’s whereby syndicates, brokers, managing 
agents and members’ agents will agree to act together “for the good o f the Society”; 
the implementation o f Lioncover and Equitas are examples o f such cooperation. Such 
acts o f cooperation are deemed to prevent damage to the Society’s name i.e. protect 
the reputation o f Lloyd’s. For some syndicates that had traded profitably and had built 
up substantial reserves, the Equitas project removed their funds. However, for Names 
on loss-making syndicates such as those managed by Gooda Walker they were offered a 
settlement and the opportunity to resign from Lloyd’s.
The cooperative nature o f the market goes beyond the sharing o f risks and sharing o f 
administrative functions such as the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office and the Lloyd’s 
Claims Office. The nature o f Lloyd’s is that it is simultaneously a competitive 
marketplace, i.e. syndicates compete for business with each other, and a cooperative 
marketplace. Lloyd’s can therefore act as a single entity, as it had to with the 
implementation o f the Equitas project, but also each syndicate is free to develop its own 
business and compete with every other syndicate for business.
One o f the most intriguing questions, and one that was not addressed in the Lloyd’s 
Task Force Report, is why is there no comparable Lloyd’s-type entity elsewhere in the 
world. Lloyd’s has been trading for more than three hundred years and it is one o f the 
largest reinsurers in the world. Why has it not been imitated? Williams (1992) states:
175
“Success brings on imitators who respond with superior features, lower 
prices, or some new way to draw customers away. Time, the denominator 
of economic value, eventually renders nearly all advantages obsolete”.
I f  Williams is correct then there should be other Lloyd’s-type entities in the reinsurance 
and insurance market. In reality there is, and only has been, one Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s was 
not founded by any particular individual but evolved from a group o f merchants trading 
insurance in a Seventeenth Century Coffee House and, as Lloyd’s developed, a 
structure to the trading o f insurance also developed. Fundamental to this structure are 
the syndicates and the subscription system of risk sharing (the coinsurance market). 
This author suggests that this structure, or architecture, is difficult to imitate and this is 
the reason why Lloyd’s has remained unique.
5.4 Towards a model of Lloyd’s.
As already mentioned the structure o f  Lloyd’s resembles Chandler’s large diversified 
firm where responsibility is pushed down to the business unit and to profit centre 
managers. However, whilst Lloyd’s possesses a centre - the Corporation o f Lloyd’s 
and the Council o f Lloyd’s - these cannot direct the business written. They can only 
formulate rules in which all syndicates should operate. The strategy o f the syndicates is 
a concern for each syndicate and cannot be directed by the centre. The Council o f 
Lloyd’s does not instruct a syndicate to underwrite a certain type o f business nor direct 
the personnel recruitment o f each syndicate, or set profit targets for each syndicate. 
The Council can only prevent a certain type o f business being written, for instance 
financial guarantee insurance, or monitor the writing o f certain classes o f business. The 
function o f the Council o f Lloyd’s is primarily regulatory. The 1993 Lloyd’s Business 
Plan which was commissioned by the Council o f Lloyd’s is thus not a business plan in
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the accepted sense. The “business plan” o f Lloyd’s is the sum o f all the business plans 
o f the syndicates.
As each syndicate is a separate business operating within the same market, although not 
all syndicates will operate within the same market segment, there will be competition 
between syndicates for the available business. However, the subscription system 
creates cooperation between syndicates and the Council o f Lloyd’s can direct that all 
syndicates should cooperate on certain matters - for instance, the implementation o f 
Equitas and the future funding o f Lioncover Insurance Company which is funded from 
contributions from the Central Fund. Yet the subscription system is not a formalised 
agreement, but rather the customary method o f transacting business within Lloyd’s and 
the London market. It is a cultural characteristic o f  the London market.
When Lloyd’s cooperates, it is unified. When Lloyd’s acts together, the Society in 
effect becomes a single insurance entity with £10 billion o f capacity- the third largest 
reinsurer in the world. A £50 million syndicate, for instance, can thus gain the 
competitive advantage o f a £10 billion insurer. By being united in the formation o f 
Equitas, each syndicate is offering security that will not be affected by any deterioration 
on 1992 and prior years.
Cooperation, other than through the subscription system, occurs in Lloyd’s because 
there is a third party which can create rules and enforce them. Cooperation is only 
possible if all syndicates agree to be bound, by the rules laid down by the third party - 
the Council o f Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s can thus act as a single insurer o f £10 billion capacity
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or as a thriving market o f 170 independent insurers all competing with each other and 
companies for business.
This author suggests that a diagrammatic model may be developed for Lloyd’s. At the 
centre o f the model are the syndicates, individual business units that compete with each 
other for business. Surrounding these syndicates is a “cooperative agent”, a body that 
enables the syndicates to cooperate. Surrounding the cooperative agent is the 
“amalgamated business unit”, synonymous with the entirety o f Lloyd’s i.e. the Society 
o f Lloyd’s. The amalgamated business unit and the individual business units co-exist 
simultaneously. The cooperative agent is the Council o f Lloyd’s. The model is shown 
in Figure 5.1. This model attempts purely to describe the structure o f Lloyd’s in terms 
o f the syndicates operating within Lloyd’s. It does not show, for instance, the capital 
structure o f Lloyd’s nor the competition between syndicates within Lloyd’s and 
between syndicates and insurance and reinsurance companies.
5.5 Institutions comparable to Lloyd’s.
It has already been stated that there is no similar entity to Lloyd’s in the world. The 
closest is the Illinois Insurance Exchange in Chicago, USA. This exchange was created 
in 1980 as “an innovative response to the cyclical shortages in capacity for excess and 
surplus lines risks”. (Marketing Literature “Who we are - a market o f opportunity ”, 
Illinois Insurance Exchange). The underlying concept behind the Exchange was to 
develop a Lloyd’s o f London-style market for insurance risks that are hard to place in 
the traditional insurance marketplace because o f the lines o f coverage, the exposures, 
or a uniqueness that requires creative or individual rating and underwriting.
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Individual Business Units equate to the Syndicates. 
Cooperative agent is the Council o f  Lloyd's.
Amalgamated Business Unit is the entire entity called Lloyd's.
F ieure 5.1: A Descriptive M odel of Lloyd's (proposed bv this author^
I There are currently twelve syndicates with a total o f $441 million in assets and
policyholders’ surplus. Gross written premium income for 1995 was $150 million
I Investment in the syndicates has come from private individuals and insurance
companies. For instance all shares in Prime Syndicate Inc are owned by twenty-seven 
individuals; shares in Geneva Assurance Syndicate Inc are owned by Geneva 
Management Inc, an insurance holding company incorporated in the State o f Illinois.
5.6 The Operations of the Illinois Insurance Exchange
I
I
The Exchange consists o f three separate entities: the Central Processing Facility, the 
marketplace - the Exchange syndicates, and the Illinois Insurance Exchange Guaranty 
Fund Corporation and Immediate Access Security Association. The Exchange is 
designed to be a marketplace in which insurers and prospective insureds can be 
matched by brokers. The Central Processing Facility provides all the administrative 
functions, facilitates premium collection and disbursement, facilitates claim collection 
from syndicates and disbursement to brokers and performs all audit and regulatory 
oversight functions authorised by the Illinois Department o f Insurance.
The Exchange is managed by a Board o f Trustees who are charged with the control o f 
the operations o f the Exchange. The Board is composed o f representatives o f nine 
syndicates and four public members. Control is effected by through various 
committees, in conjunction with Exchange staff. There are three committees: Audit 
and Regulatory Oversight Committee, Operations Committee and Brokers Members 
Committee. The Audit and Regulatory Committee monitors the financial condition of 
each syndicate as well as adherence to Exchange rules and regulations. This
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Committee is also responsible for reviewing new applications for syndicate membership 
on the Exchange. The committee also performs the necessary due diligence prior to 
making a recommendation for admission to the Board o f Trustees.
The Operations Committee is responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations o f 
the Exchange such as the transfer o f premiums and claims to and from brokers and 
syndicates.
The Brokers Members Committee reviews new applications for membership as well as 
monitoring the activities o f existing Exchange brokers. The Committee also markets 
the Exchange to brokers and to potential customers.
The organisational structure o f the Exchange provides a means for regulation o f the 
syndicates and brokers. Corrective actions will be enacted by the Board if necessary. 
These actions may consist o f restrictions on writings, injection o f funds for additional 
surplus, restructuring o f reinsurance and the issuance o f cease and desist orders.
The Exchange has a Guaranty Fund similar to the Central Fund o f Lloyd’s. The 
Guaranty fund provides for claims to be paid to insureds in the event o f the insolvency 
o f an Exchange syndicate. There are two components o f the Fund. The first is a 
surcharge o f 1% o f each syndicate’s gross written premium income. This Premium 
Surcharge Fund is the first source to be drawn upon in the event o f an insolvency. The 
second component is the requirement that each syndicate deposit $1 million o f its assets 
into a Guaranty Fund Custodial Account, half o f which is available to pay claims
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against any one insolvent syndicate if the Premium Surcharge Fund is insufficient. As a 
further safeguard, Exchange rules require that each syndicate maintain half o f its capital 
and surplus in an Immediate Access Account, a custodial account controlled by the 
Exchange. This serves as a warning device to the Board o f Trustees as a syndicate 
approaching an insolvent position would need access to these funds and permission to 
use them must be sought from the Audit and Regulatory Oversight Committee.
Unlike the Lloyd’s Central Fund, the Exchange has per-claimant limits as well as a cap 
for an insolvency. The current claimant limit, is $300,000 per insolvency and $15 
million for any one insolvency (Rudolph, 1992). The maximum any syndicate can 
provide to fund another syndicate’s insolvency is $500,000, and there is an aggregate 
o f $1 million applicable to all insolvencies. In the event o f  a withdrawal o f a syndicate 
from the Exchange, the custodial accounts and the Immediate Access Account must be 
maintained for three years following the year o f withdrawal. All business brought to 
the marketplace must be presented by a broker member o f the Exchange which will be 
either an independent broker or a syndicate’s captive broker.
5.7 Regulation of the Illinois Insurance Exchange
The Illinois Department o f Insurance retains the overall responsibility for the regulation 
o f the Exchange. However, the authority to perform syndicate audits has been 
delegated to the Exchange, although the Department o f Insurance receives and 
approves audit reports. The Exchange acts as a self-regulating body, but the 
Department has ultimate authority in the continued licensing o f the Exchange as a 
marketplace. Currently, the syndicates have admitted status in Illinois only, but are
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eligible surplus lines insurers in forty-six states and approved reinsurers in twenty-two 
states.
5.8 Comparison of the Illinois Insurance Exchange and Lloyd’s
The most striking difference between the Illinois Exchange and Lloyd’s is the nature of 
the capital base. The Exchange consists o f shareholders with limited liability which 
contrasts with the unlimited liability o f Names in Lloyd’s, although corporate capital at 
Lloyd’s has limited liability. Another related difference is the level o f  capital required 
to be an investor in a syndicate on the Exchange. As little as $30,000 may be invested 
in an Exchange syndicate which then becomes the maximum that the investor can lose, 
instead o f the significant larger minimum investment and the unlimited personal liability 
o f a Lloyd’s Name.
Structurally the Exchange and Lloyd’s are very different in that the Exchange is not a 
subscription market. An Exchange syndicate does not coinsure with other syndicates 
on the Exchange - there is no culture o f cooperation on risk sharing. Cooperation 
exists in the form o f shared services rather than shared underwriting. A summary of 
comparisons between Lloyd’s and the Illinois Insurance Exchange is given in Figure 5.2 
below.
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Feature Illinois Insurance Exchange Lloyd’s of London
Capital base Limited liability Mixture o f limited liability and 
unlimited liability
Services Shared between syndicates Shared between syndicates
Subscription market No Yes
Who is the regulator? Little self-regulation. 
Essentially regulated by Illinois 
Department o f Insurance
Self-regulation
Central Fund A Guaranty Fund exists but 
there is a per claimant cap and 
a cap per insolvency
A central fund exists - no cap 
per claimant or insolvency
Policy wordings Each syndicate develops its 
own
Common . policy wordings 
used by all syndicates
Business underwritten USA business only Worldwide business
Minimum investment $30,000 (£20,000) £250,000 ($375,000)
Number o f syndicates 
in 1996
12 171
Premium income $150m (in 1995) £7,35lm  (in 1995) net o f 
commission.
£8,927m (in 1995) gross o f 
commission
Figure 5.2: A comparison of the features of the Illinois Insurance Exchange and Lloyd’s.
Source: Illinois Insurance Exchange, Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s (1996) and this author’s 
analysis.
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes and evaluates the nature o f entrepreneurism within Lloyd’s and 
the reasons for its development. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the 
possible influence that the change in nature o f the capital base may have on the 
entrepreneurial spirit o f the Lloyd’s market.
6.2 The Nature of Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship has attracted a plethora o f  studies from various scholars. These 
studies may be divided into three categories: what happens when entrepreneurs act; why 
they act; and how they act. In the first o f these categories, scholars are interested in the 
results o f the actions o f the entrepreneur. This is a line o f research taken by economists 
such as Schumpeter, Kirzner and Casson. The second category deals with the 
entrepreneur as an individual and that the individual, a person with ideas, goals, values 
and motivation, is the real object o f the analysis. In the final category researchers 
analyse the characteristics o f entrepreneurial management and how entrepreneurs 
achieve their aims.
A study o f entrepreneurship must start with a definition o f the term “entrepreneur” . 
There are two approaches to such a definition: a functional approach and an indicative 
approach. In the functional approach an entrepreneur is defined by what he does, i.e. a 
definition based on the attributes o f an entrepreneur. The indicative approach provides 
a description o f the entrepreneur by which he may be recognised. The functional
Chapter Six: Innovation, Entrepreneurism and Lloyd’s.
184
definition may be quite abstract, but the indicative definition is simpler as it defines an 
entrepreneur in terms o f his legal status and his relationships with other parties. The 
majority o f scholars have adopted the functional approach thus defining an entrepreneur 
as belonging to a particular group o f people with certain characteristics. Casson (1982) 
defines an entrepreneur as “someone who specialises in taking judgmental decisions 
about the coordination o f scare resources.” In this definition the entrepreneur is seen 
as a person, not a team, nor a committee, nor an organisation. The definition 
emphasises that the individual is able to make decisions and captures the fact that the 
entrepreneur is an agent o f change in that he coordinates scarce resources.
Stevenson and Gumpert (1985) describe entrepreneurship with such terms as 
innovative, flexible, dynamic, risk taking, creative and growth orientated. Drucker 
(1985) states that the entrepreneur in the United States is often defined as one who 
starts his own, new and small business. However, few scholars would agree that 
anybody who starts a new business is an entrepreneur. Consider the family that opens a 
small corner shop. They are indeed taking a risk but all they are doing is what has been 
done many times before. Few researchers on entrepreneurial activity would consider 
such an act worthy o f study. However, McDonald’s did not invent anything new in 
that its product was what American restaurants had produced for many years. But by 
applying management concepts and management techniques (asking, ‘What is “value” 
to the customer?’), standardising the product, designing process and tools, and by 
basing training on the analysis o f the work to be done and then setting the standards it 
required, McDonald’s both drastically upgraded the yield from its resources, and
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created a new market and a new customer (Drucker, 1985). Scholars would agree that 
McDonald’s is an example o f entrepreneurship.
The growing literature on corporate entrepreneurship suggests that entrepreneurial
activity may be found within mature organisations implying that Drucker’s definition
given above needs to be re-examined. There is thus a problem in defining
entrepreneurship, although the problem is semantic. Any definition too narrow is likely
to founder in that the nature o f entrepreneurism is broad, but as Stevenson and Jarillo
(1990) point out too broad a definition may make entrepreneurship equivalent to good
management, thus effectively dissolving it as a specialised field o f study. This author
suggests that the following definition o f entrepreneurship given by Stevenson, Roberts
and Grousbeck (1989) is useful:
“Entrepreneurship is a process by which individuals - either on their own 
or inside organisations - pursue opportunities without regard to the 
resources they currently control.”
The essence o f this definition is that it captures the nature o f  the entrepreneur as a being 
an individual who is willing to pursue an opportunity which we may define as being a 
desirable future situation. However, before an opportunity may be pursued, the 
individual must identify that the opportunity exists.
6.3 Theories of entrepreneurism.
In conventional economic theory, the term “entrepreneur” is generally absent. In 
mainstream or neo-classical economic theory, the entrepreneur is viewed as someone 
who coordinates different factors o f production, but this role is viewed as non- 
important. The entrepreneur is synonymous with the capitalist employer, the owner-
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manager who has the wealth to enable production to take place, but otherwise does not 
have any special attributes. The notion that the entrepreneur has an important role in 
economic development has been developed by writers outside the mainstream of 
economic thinking.
For Kirzner, the entrepreneur is someone who is alert to profitable opportunities for 
exchange. The Kirznerian entrepreneur sees the entrepreneur as acting as a ‘middleman’ 
who facilitates the exchange. The entrepreneur is able to identify suppliers and 
customers and acts as the intermediary. The possibilities for profitable exchange occur 
because o f imperfect knowledge; the entrepreneur has some additional knowledge which 
is not possessed by others and this enables the entrepreneur to take advantage o f the 
opportunity. According to Kirzner, alertness to the disequilibrium in knowledge 
between the entrepreneur and others is the distinguishing feature o f an entrepreneur. By 
contrast the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is an innovator who introduces new 
technological processes or products. The entrepreneur is the prime mover in economic 
development, and his function is to innovate, or to “carry out new combinations”. Five 
different types o f innovation are distinguished: the introduction o f a new good (or an 
improvement in the quality o f an existing good), the introduction o f a new method o f 
production, the opening o f a new market, developing a new source o f supply o f raw 
materials or the creation o f a new type o f industrial organisation. The Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur develops new technology or products through innovation whereas for 
Kirzner the entrepreneur operates on opportunities that arise out o f  new technology. 
The concept o f the entrepreneur as an innovator is important. Lloyd’s underwriters
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have a reputation for innovation, for developing new products and thus according to 
Schumpeter are entrepreneurs.
Knight suggests that the entrepreneur is an individual who is prepared to undertake risk, 
and the reward - profit - is the return for bearing uncertainty and is an uninsurable risk. 
Knight identifies uncertainty with a situation where the probabilities o f alternative 
outcomes cannot be determined either by a priori reasoning or by statistical inference. 
A priori reasoning is irrelevant to economic situations and statistical inference is 
impossible because the situation is a unique event. For instance, the probability o f fire at 
a business premises may be determined from the large pool o f data on fire losses and 
thus may be insured against, but the probability o f that business failing is unknown and 
therefore such failure may not be insured against.
The entrepreneur as defined by Shackle is someone who is creative, imaginative and 
original. Whereas Kirzner’s entrepreneur perceives opportunities, Shackle’s 
entrepreneur imagines opportunities. The role o f uncertainty and imperfect information 
is crucial for the view o f the entrepreneur held by Shackle. Uncertainty gives rise for 
certain individuals to imagine opportunities for profit.
Casson’s definition o f an entrepreneur has been given above and in it he recognises that 
the entrepreneur has different skills from others and these skills enable him to make 
judgments and to coordinate scarce resources. Casson emphasises that entrepreneurs 
require command over resources and thus lack o f capital would be a barrier to 
successful entrepreneurship. Deakins (1996) suggests that Casson’s views are close to
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those o f Knight. The entrepreneur operates within a set o f technological conditions and 
by making difficult judgmental decisions entrepreneurs are able to enjoy profit from their 
ventures.
6.4 Attributes of the entrepreneur.
There is a diverse literature on the key personality characteristics that appear to be 
possessed by successful entrepreneurs. From this literature it is possible to argue that 
the supply o f entrepreneurs is limited to a certain number o f individuals who have a 
certain set o f characteristics which marks them out as entrepreneurs. Whether an 
“entrepreneurial personality” exists is, however, the subject o f debate. Deakins (1996) 
suggests that many o f the characteristics that researchers associate with entrepreneurs 
are the same abilities and skills that could be applied to successful managers and it is 
therefore difficult to separate out specific characteristics o f entrepreneurs.
Some early work on entrepreneurism was carried out by McClelland (1961) who gives 
the following key competencies o f  successful entrepreneurs:
•  Proactivity: initiative and assertiveness
•  Achievement orientation: ability to see and act on opportunities
• Commitment to others.
It seems reasonable that a key characteristic o f an entrepreneur is the desire to achieve 
a goal, or a desire to excel. High achievers are those that accept responsibility for 
decisions and for achieving solutions to problems (Deakins, 1996). There is a 
difficulty in trying to search for the characteristic traits o f entrepreneurs as such a
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study ignores the effects o f environmental factors that may be more important than 
personality traits.
A further list o f  personality traits is given by Meredith et a l (1982) who suggest that an 
entrepreneur has five core traits:
• Self-confidence
• Risk-taking activity
•  Flexibility
•  Need for achievement
• Strong desire to be independent
Given the above factors it may be inferred that profit or monetary reward are not the 
only motivating factors for the entrepreneur. A further feature o f an entrepreneur is that 
he likes to be “his own boss” i.e. an entrepreneur has a high internal locus o f control. 
The entrepreneur likes to be in control o f his own environment and, in turn, his own 
destiny.
6.5 The Entrepreneurial organisation.
Section 6.4 above gave the main characteristics o f an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs need 
to build and achieve personally set goals or targets through the establishment o f a firm.
Perhaps not surprisingly the features o f such organisations, which we may call 
entrepreneurial organisations, are similar to those o f the individual entrepreneur and, 
furthermore, the personal characteristics o f the entrepreneur will have an influence on 
the type o f firm that is created, and on the way that it is managed (Lafiiente and Salas
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1989). Cooper and Dunkelberg (1984) proved the existence o f a relationship between 
types o f work expectations and entrepreneurial tendencies. They distinguished between 
two primary types o f labour expectations and, consequently, o f entrepreneurs. The first 
is that o f “craftsman” expectations, which are characterised by the individual’s urge to 
decide what work he work he wishes to do, and by the desire to make that work free 
from someone else’s authority i.e. he wishes to be independent. The second type is that 
o f “managerial” expectations, defined by profit-seeking motivations and by the 
individual’s wish to manage and exert power.
Schumpeter (1934) has pointed out the vital role o f entrepreneurship in organisations.
Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) state that entrepreneurship is based on innovations
that require changes in the pattern o f resource deployment and the creation o f new
capabilities to add new possibilities for positioning in markets. Building such
capabilities may be undertaken at many different organisational levels, involve widely
differing combinations o f  resources and have a wide range o f outcomes. New business
venturing is usually associated with individual entrepreneurship, but as Burgelman
(1983) and Kanter (1983) indicate it may also be a feature o f large corporations. The
individual entrepreneur is able to take risks, innovate and make progress both in good
times and in face o f adversity (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992). In the
entrepreneurial organisation a single leader takes personal charge in a highly dynamic
situation, as in a new firm or a small one operating in a growing market, or even
sometimes in a large organisation facing crisis. The structure o f the entrepreneurial
organisation is often very simple. Mintzberg (1991a) describes it thus:
“...... typically it has little or no staff, a loose division of labour, and a
small managerial hierarchy. Little of its activity is formalized, and it 
makes minimal use of planning procedures or training routines.”
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In the entrepreneurial firm power tends to be focussed on the chief executive, who 
exercises a high personal profile and it is not uncommon for everyone in the 
organisation to report to the chief executive. Decision making is flexible, with a highly 
centralised power system, allowing for rapid response. Mintzberg (1991a) states that 
entrepreneurial organisations are often young and aggressive, continually searching for 
the risky markets that scare off the bigger bureaucracies. They are careful to avoid the 
complex markets, preferring to remain in niches that their leaders can understand. 
Their small size and focussed strategies allow their structures to be simple, so that their 
leaders can retain tight control and maneuver flexibly. Strategy making in these firms 
tends to be intuitive rather than analytical and is performed by men who have a “feel” 
for the business rather than by strategists. Strategies are not explicitly or formally 
elaborated but reside as the implicit and often vague vision o f the leaders (Miller, 
1983). In an entrepreneurial firm it is expected that there is a “leadership imperative” 
largely because the thrust o f the firm is so closely tied to one person, the chief 
executive.
Traditionally, a Lloyd’s syndicate has just consisted o f a single underwriter, perhaps a 
deputy, various ancillary staff to handle the administration involved with underwriting, 
such as recording the risks in a book or computer, and a person who handles the 
syndicate’s claims. Such an organisational arrangement is common amongst smaller 
syndicates, less than £75 million in capacity, for instance Syndicate 314, C.F. Palmer 
and others.
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The majority o f a syndicate’s administrative functions are sub-contracted to various 
Departments o f the Corporation o f Lloyd’s. Unlike policies for other insurance 
entities, a Lloyd’s policy is not issued by the syndicates but by the Lloyd’s Policy 
Signing Office (LPSO) on behalf o f all Lloyd’s underwriters who are party to the 
policy. In addition the LPSO collects premiums from brokers and distributes them to 
syndicates and collects administers the collection o f claim payments from syndicates to 
brokers. The LPSO thus provides an accounting function for the syndicates. If  an 
insured or reinsured makes a claim on his policy then the validity o f  this claim is 
assessed by the leading underwriter. If  he is in agreement with settling with the 
claimant, the claim is then passed to the Lloyd’s Claims Office (LCO) who will inform 
the following Lloyd’s market on the slip o f the claim. Thus, unless a syndicate leads 
business, the claims agreement function is outsourced to the LCO. Thus underwriters 
are able to concentrate on underwriting as the majority o f  the subsidiary functions are 
outsourced. However, the LCO and the LPSO are wholly owned by the Corporation 
o f Lloyd’s and are funded by fees charged to syndicates. The LCO and LPSO are 
dedicated to the Lloyd’s market; they do not work for non-Lloyd’s entities.
A syndicate may have several line underwriters each o f whom underwrites a certain 
account such as property catastrophe business, medical expenses, personal accident 
etc. However there will still be a single underwriter, the active underwriter, who is in 
charge o f the overall operation o f the syndicate. Such an organisational arrangement is 
common with large syndicates (over £75 million capacity) such as Syndicate 861 (M.E. 
Brockbank and others). '
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There are thus two underwriting structures for syndicates - one for small syndicates, 
under about £75 million capacity and a more complex structure for larger syndicates. 
(See Figure 6.1).
Syndicate structure A Syndicate structure B
Active underwriter Active underwriter
▼ ▼ ▼ T ▼ I
Deputy underwriter l i n e  u n d e r w r i t e r s
Figure 6.1: The underwriting structure of two syndicates (Source: This author's analysis)
A  Small syndicate 
B. Large syndicate
Because underwriters outsource many o f the administrative functions, this allows 
underwriters to concentrate on underwriting. The operation o f the syndicate is very 
much in the hands o f the active underwriter. This level o f focussed control combined 
with their small size, allows syndicates to be entrepreneurial. In addition, the capital 
base, when composed entirely o f individuals, did not have a say in the operation o f the 
syndicate or in the business underwritten. Indeed, few syndicates, until the 1990s, held 
annual general meetings o f their Names, as all communication with the syndicates 
occurred through a Name’s Members’ Agent. One retired underwriter remarked that 
he rarely spoke to Members’ Agents and never spoke to his Names. This author 
suggests that this detachment between the capital base and the underwriter allowed 
syndicates to be innovative as they could suddenly change course from underwriting 
one line o f business to another as opportunities arose.
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A good illustration o f the ability o f syndicates to move into a new class o f business was 
seen in the non-marine market during the last three months o f 1989. In this year there 
were a spate o f major disasters in the USA - Hurricane Hugo, the San Francisco 
earthquake and the explosion at the Phillips Petroleum Plant in Pasadena, Texas. 
Syndicates in Lloyd’s often purchase their reinsurance protection for twelve months 
incepting on 1st January. It is the custom in the London reinsurance market to provide 
one reinstatement for each layer o f  a syndicate’s outwards reinsurance programme. 
With the spate o f  losses in the USA, some syndicates believed that they would not 
have reinsurance protection for the last three months o f  1989 as their current 
protections would be potentially exhausted by the US losses. Hence during October 
1989 there were opportunities for syndicates to underwrite other syndicates’ 
reinsurance protections at highly inflated prices. The Lloyd’s market thus divided into 
sellers o f  reinsurance and buyers o f reinsurance.
6.6 The entrepreneurial nature of Lloyd’s syndicates.
The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is an innovator who brings about change through the 
introduction o f new technological processes or products. Following Schumpeter’s 
definition, an entrepreneur working in the sphere o f insurance will be someone who 
introduces new products or who remodels an existing product. Thus Peter Wood who 
founded Direct Line is an entrepreneur because his company has taken motor and 
household insurance and sold these products direct to the insuring public, via the 
telephone, without the commission expenses o f brokers. The competitive advantage o f 
Direct Line is its low' prices charged to customers compared to other insurance 
companies’.
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Lloyd’s has pioneered various new forms o f insurance, indeed it is often said that any
risk may be insured in Lloyd’s. This is not strictly true but there are numerous
examples o f Lloyd’s underwriters insuring unusual risks - wine tasters’ palates, film
stars’ legs to name a few. The essence o f the entrepreneurial underwriter is seen in
Cuthbert Heath (1859-1939). Gibb (1957) argues that insurance companies in the
early 1900s only issued policies that were o f their own formulation. Heath, however,
found out what he thought his clients required and then did his best to supply it. Heath
found reasons for accepting new enquiries rather than reasons for declining new
business. During the period from 1900 to the New York financial crisis in 1907,
America enjoyed a great burst o f prosperity. Coupled with this growth was the need
for insurance. Heath is credited with underwriting the first burglary policy in 1889
(Gibb, 1957), the first “all risks” property policy, the first jewellers block policy and the
first business interruption policy. Underwriters at Lloyd’s were able to provide the
policies that America required during its expansion. Gibb (1957) states:
“...if Lloyd’s underwriters could provide policies of the kinds that 
America wanted, America was ready to send her orders in profusion. It 
was just the place for the young non-marine market to sell its wares, and 
the new types of policies that had been thought out for British merchants 
began to be exported to the United States, while others which would have 
been unsaleable in Europe but were suited to America, were thought out 
for American consumption.”
Perhaps the most notable event during Heath’s underwriting career was the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake. Several American insurance companies failed at this time but 
Heath sent a telex to his agents in California telling them to pay all policies in full 
irrespective o f the terms of their insurances. This action has undoubtedly helped to 
secure the reputation o f Lloyd’s as an insurer that always pays its claims.
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The development o f aviation insurance during the early part o f this century was 
spearheaded largely by Lloyd’s underwriters. Indeed, London is and always has been 
the most influential market in international aviation insurance. Almost every single 
major risk will be led in London where the expertise in servicing these accounts and 
claims handling has been built up over many years. The importance o f Lloyd’s to the 
aviation market is shown in Figure 6.2 which shows the percentage o f international 
aviation (airline) insurance lead in Lloyd’s. Over half o f the world’s international 
aviation business, 54.5%, is lead in Lloyd’s by four syndicates - Ariel, Sturge, Maylam 
and Butler. London companies lead 27.5%. and the balance is lead by foreign 
companies. This illustrates the importance o f Lloyd’s as an aviation market. The 
purchase o f both the Ariel syndicate, managed by Methuen Underwriting Agencies, and 
the Sturge syndicate, managed by Ockham Underwriting Agencies, by the Bermudan 
insurer ACE Ltd has resulted in this company effectively leading 30% o f the world’s 
international aviation business.
1995 AIRLINE LEADS (International Business)
Figure 6.2: 1995 Airline leads. Source: Corporation o f Lloyd’s.
(Ariel, Sturge, Maylam and Butler are Lloyd’s syndicates. BAIG is the British Aviation Insurance 
Group. WAIG is the Westminster Aviation Insurance Group. La Reunion is a French insurance 
company)
197
Underwriters at Lloyd’s have historically been innovative; indeed one chief executive 
officer o f a major US property and casualty company interviewed by this author stated 
that innovation is Lloyd’s only competitive advantage. Macleod (1994) comments:
“Lloyd’s is the most critical market for difficult and high-limit risks.
Without a strong London market, the costs and availability of those
coverages would be problematic.”
Hatcher (1989) remarks that the strength o f Lloyd’s lies in the insurance and 
reinsurance o f catastrophic risks underwriters elsewhere in the world are not prepared 
to insure and that this has placed Lloyd’s at the “cutting edge” o f innovation. This 
theme is echoed by Wetherall (1993) who agues that much o f Lloyd’s reputation is 
built upon its ability to underwrite large and complex risks.
The innovation o f Lloyd’s underwriters is seen is a recently-launched commercial legal 
expenses insurance product (Gibb, 1994). The scheme is marketed by Litigation 
Protection Limited, London to companies who are in dispute and legal action has 
begun. For an agreed premium, individually assessed for each case, Lloyd’s 
underwriters will pay all legal fees and expert witnesses’ expenses o f both parties to the 
action, plus court costs up to £500,000. Litigation Protection Limited seeks legal 
opinion to assess each case and only provides insurance to those companies who are 
deemed by Litigation Protection’s lawyers to have a reasonable chance o f winning their 
case. Protection is given up to a maximum payout o f £500,000. The premium for this 
coverage is up to forty per cent o f the indemnity.
Successful innovation is a corollary o f talented underwriting, indeed Butt (1996) 
describes Lloyd’s as a centre o f underwriting skill and Agnew (1989) states that the
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success o f Lloyd’s is due largely to the ability o f each and every underwriter to develop 
personal relationships with brokers, to trust some and reject others, to question and 
search for truthful answers, to have the time and expertise to make a valid judgment on 
each risk.
Lloyd’s structure as a marketplace o f independent competing units offers brokers an
innovative and responsive environment in which to underwrite risks. The market
consists o f many small units with short-decision making lines which leads to a flexible
and agile environment able to tackle the most difficult risks. Thus the architecture o f
the market encourages innovation and entrepreneurism. Hiscox (1989) states:
“The success of the underwriting (of Lloyd’s) has been in no small part to 
the fact that Lloyd’s is split into many syndicates each of which is run 
autocratically by an individual underwriter. The ability to make decisions 
with the minimum interference and the fact that underwriting is still the 
dominant activity of most Managing Agents attracts the best underwriters 
to the market.”
A fundamental question is why is the Lloyd’s market associated with innovation? From 
interviews with brokers and underwriters, this author suggests there are four reasons. 
Firstly, syndicates are small and are generally lead by a single person, the active 
underwriter. Because much of the broking is conducted on a face-to-face basis 
between the underwriter and the broker, responses to enquires from potential clients 
can be responded to quickly. In the USA much o f the broking is conducted over the 
telephone and via fax, consequently response times are much slower. The face-to-face 
method o f broking encourages underwriters to be flexible to the needs o f their insureds 
and reinsureds as any issues can be handled directly between the underwriter and the 
broker. Secondly, the structure o f the syndicate is simple and non-bureaucratic
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allowing underwriters to focus on the underwriting function. Thirdly, the capital base 
o f  individuals is fragmented and therefore lacks any “voice” in the operations o f the 
syndicate. This allows underwriters to underwrite freely without undue interference 
from the capital providers. The final reason is that the subscription market allows 
underwriters to experiment. The nature o f the subscription market allows risk sharing, 
coinsurance, between underwriters. In a new form o f insurance coverage, there will no 
be no legal precedents for the interpretation o f the wording, the rating will not be based 
on historical data and the scope o f the coverage may not be fully apparent. Thus for a 
new product there is an element o f uncertainty. The subscription market allows 
underwriters to experiment with new products as each underwriter can take a small part 
o f the risk so that each underwriter is not overly exposed.
If  we view Lloyd’s as a single institution, then the individual components o f the 
institution have the dynamics o f entrepreneurial organisations. The Corporation o f 
Lloyd’s administers premium processing (through the LPSO), claims handling (through 
the LCO), arranges licences to trade for the whole market in foreign territories and 
ensures that deposit requirements are complied with. The marketing o f Lloyd’s 
syndicates is a function o f the Lloyd’s brokers - syndicates rarely market themselves, 
although several have corporate brochures. In addition, there are standard Lloyd’s 
wordings for all types o f coverages which all syndicates are able to use. There is thus 
an infrastructure to which all syndicates have access. Furthermore the Corporation o f 
Lloyd’s is dedicated to the Lloyd’s market and therefore has an interest in ensuring that 
syndicates continue to underwrite insurance. This infrastructure allows underwriters to 
concentrate on the role o f underwriting without being burdened by too much
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administration. This infrastructure is similar to that found in large insurance companies 
such as Royal Sun Alliance or Munich Re. Thus syndicates have the dynamics o f 
entrepreneurial organisations but also the infrastructural advantages o f a large 
company.
6.7 Corporate Entrepreneurship and Lloyd’s.
There is a growing body o f literature on the concept o f  corporate entrepreneurship. 
Though a term which is ill-defined, the literature identifies two broad types o f 
corporate entrepreneurship. One is the creation o f businesses within an existing 
business, often called intrapreneurship (for example Burgelman, 1983). The second 
type is the transformation or renewal o f existing organisations, i.e. the struggle o f large 
firms to renew themselves (for example Kanter, 1983). Corporate entrepreneurs help 
their organisations to pursue new territories and to move into the realm o f innovation. 
Guth and Ginsberg (1990) argue that the essential ingredient in corporate 
entrepreneurship is that decisions are made and actions are taken that result, in the 
words o f Schumpeter, in new combinations o f resources being carried out. This change 
in the pattern o f resource deployment transforms the firm into something different from 
what it was before. This transformation from the old to the new reflects 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Kanter (1983) argues that entrepreneurs have for the most 
part existed outside o f and apart from the corporation and that it is an open question 
whether large organisations can accommodate and take advantage o f individuals with 
an entrepreneurial spirit. Moreover, Kanter (1983) stresses the need for individuals in 
large organisations to have the opportunity to experiment (to be innovative) in order 
that the organisation might develop and grow.
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This author argues that Lloyd’s can behave as a single united body because all the 
syndicates are governed to a certain extent by the Council o f Lloyd’s. Whilst individual 
syndicates are entrepreneurial, the question arises as to whether Lloyd’s viewed as a 
single body, i.e. as the Society o f Lloyd’s, exhibits corporate entrepreneurism?
If the results o f Lloyd’s are viewed overall from 1988 onwards, then there is a dramatic 
deterioration from 1988 to 1992 with a recovery in 1993. Lloyd’s was facing a crisis in 
that the Central Fund was rapidly becoming exhausted (see Figure 2.2) because it was 
paying the losses o f Names who could not afford to pay their losses themselves. 
Lloyd’s was facing an uncertain time and journalists in the popular press frequently 
wrote that Lloyd’s would not survive. The response o f the Council o f Lloyd’s to the 
growing insolvency o f the Society was the publication o f the Lloyd’s Business Plan and 
the Reconstruction and Renewal document. Central to both these reports was the 
creation o f a run-off reinsurance company, Equitas, where all Names’ liabilities from 
1992 and prior years could be placed. Equitas quoted a premium to all the Names to 
assume all 1992 and prior liabilities. This in turn released the Names from future cash 
calls and allowed them to wind up their underwriting affairs at Lloyd’s. The Equitas 
strategy essentially mutualised all Lloyd’s 1992 and prior liabilities into one central 
company. Fearing that Names would not support an ongoing Lloyd’s, the Council 
recommended that incorporated capital be introduced into Lloyd’s.
The Equitas project has helped to save Lloyd’s from the verge o f bankruptcy. Figure
2.2 shows that the earmarkings o f the Central Fund as at 31st December 1995 
exceeded the funds available. Thus Lloyd’s was technically insolvent. Lloyd’s only
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passed the annual solvency test imposed by the Department o f Trade and Industry as at 
31st December 1995 by using the net assets o f the Society o f Lloyd’s, principally the 
Lloyd’s building, to set against the liabilities o f the Central Fund. The Equitas project 
pooled all Lloyd’s 1992 and prior liabilities, thus well-reserved syndicates could help to 
fund loss-making syndicates. Also a common reserving philosophy including 
discounting o f reserves could be applied to all the liabilities.
The Equitas project has created a fund o f money from which 1992 and prior claims will 
be paid. At the time o f writing, Equitas has not published its accounts and there is little 
reliable financial information within the public domain. One underwriter interviewed 
commented that the Equitas project will allow Lloyd’s time to have several years to 
trade before Equitas starts to run out o f money to pay claims. If  this is the case, and it 
is no more than speculation, a cost o f participation in the ongoing market, i.e. the 
“price” o f the Lloyd’s franchise, could thus be a levy to help keep Equitas solvent. 
The Lloyd’s market has always prided itself on the fact that it has always paid valid 
claims; indeed, this is an important component in the reputation o f Lloyd’s. I f  Equitas 
finds itself unable to pay claims at some future date, then the reputation o f Lloyd’s 
could be affected. Thus the ongoing market could be asked to pay a levy to fund the 
1992 and prior years.
The concept o f the Equitas project was first discussed in the 1993 Lloyd’s Business 
Plan which was commissioned by the Council o f Lloyd’s. The Equitas project is 
entrepreneurial as it has transformed Lloyd’s from being an organisation that was 
foundering to one that has now solved its problems and is looking to the future with
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confidence. The Council o f Lloyd’s has effected change across the whole o f the 
Lloyd’s organisation - a feature o f corporate entrepreneurism (Baden-Fuller and 
Stopford, 1992).
The ability o f Lloyd’s to change collectively is due to the structure o f  Lloyd’s in that 
the Council o f  Lloyd’s has a measure o f jurisdiction over the whole market; this gives 
the ability for major changes to be effected across all syndicates and brokers.
During 1990 the Council o f Lloyd’s effected a series o f changes which were intended 
to make it a stronger, more marketable and more competitive force in the insurance 
world. These changes were designed to benefit the policyholders that purchase cover 
from Lloyd’s underwriters, the brokers who place the coverage and the members who 
provide Lloyd’s with its capital (Shapiro, 1990). These changes were:
(i) Allowing fo r  the first time some business to be placed in the market without the use 
o f a  L loyd’s broker. Beginning in October 1991 personal lines and commercial 
automobile business could be placed with a “Lloyd’s entity” such as a service company 
operated by a Managing Agent.
(ii) The elimination o f market barriers on 1st January 1991. This decision was aimed 
to make Lloyd’s a more attractive marketplace for Lloyd’s brokers (Lloyd’s Press 
Release, 1989). Before 1st January 1991, Lloyd’s syndicates were constrained by rules 
broadly requiring that each class o f business be written only by those syndicates which 
operated within one o f the four traditional sectors o f the market: marine, non-marine, 
aviation and motor. The decision to remove market barriers was prompted by the
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needs o f some insureds to have a package or all-risks policy (Margolis, 1990). The 
removal o f market barriers has led to the development o f large composite syndicates 
such as S. Catlin and others.
(iii) Developing a unified claims system in 1991 whereby all four markets will use the 
same procedure to process claims. Before the implementation o f the unified claims 
system, aviation syndicates, marine syndicates and non-marine syndicates all had their 
own claims bureaux. This change was to ensure that claims are paid quickly.
(iv) The elimination o f premium and claims card advices from  the L loyd’s Policy 
Signing Office (LPSO). Premium and claims advices from 1st January 1991 were to be 
purely electronic. This change was implemented to reduce syndicates’ expenses.
(v) Life syndicates were allowed to accept business from  non-Lloyd’s intermediaries.
Despite this change, however, a guarantee would still be required from a Lloyd’s
broker. M otor syndicates are permitted to form service companies to acquire business
from the vast number o f non-Lloyd’s “High Street” brokers. This has been a successful
business move as Lloyd’s has the largest share o f the UK private motor business, some
25% (Mulrenan, 1991). This decision is seen by Mulrenan (1991) as offering
opportunities to sell term life business:
“The life syndicates will probably never compete head-on with the likes of 
Prudential or Norwich Union, but concentrate on niche products where 
they can deploy the traditional flexibility and innovation of the Lloyd’s 
underwriter.”
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(vi) Introduction o f consortium arrangements. During 1990 the Council o f  Lloyd’s 
permitted syndicates to set up consortium arrangements. A consortium enables a 
syndicate to write a line for a group of major insurance or reinsurance companies or 
syndicates in addition to the line for itself The advantages o f such an arrangement are 
twofold. First, the syndicate that underwrites for the consortium will earn commission 
and so some o f the syndicate’s expenses can be defrayed. Secondly, the Names on the 
syndicate bear no responsibility for the other partners in the consortium in the event 
that a consortium partner does not pay a claim.
Various consortia have been developed since 1992. These include the agricultural risks 
consortium set up by syndicate 55, an energy consortium set up by syndicate 65, the 
Marchant space consortium with syndicate 282 as consortium leader and the 
International Fire Consortium. The Marchant space consortium is one o f the largest 
lead underwriters o f satellite insurance in the world and has the capacity to offer cover 
o f  up to $60 million on any one launch, satellite or spacecraft (Gibson, 1994). The 
International Fire Consortium was initially set up to enable small and medium sized 
syndicates to see business that having been written by the large gross line syndicates 
such as C.E. Heath, Sturge and D ’Ambrumenil, went out to the company market to be 
finished. The inception o f the International Fire Consortium coincided with the demise 
o f these three traditional leaders and in part the Consortium took over the role o f 
leader. There are four accepting (leading) underwriters who are named individuals 
rather than “anyone” on a particular syndicate and they are linked with each other by a 
personal computer network so that the brokers cannot use one underwriter to quote 
against any other. All quotes, declinatures and firm orders are available to the following
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market on a weekly bordereau together with up-to-date aggregate exposures. The 
consortium holds monthly meetings open to all members to discuss progress. The 
Consortium writes direct and facultative property business. No North American and 
Canadian business is written but all other territories are considered. Written lines are 
considered on an estimated maximum loss (EML) basis. The object o f the consortium 
is for the panel underwriters to be empowered to write a combined line on behalf o f 
themselves and for all members o f  the consortium, on fire and/or all risks o f physical 
loss or damage and/or consequential loss business brokered at Lloyd’s. The 
Consortium hopes to be o f service to brokers in the placing o f risks and at the same 
time enable members o f the consortium to see business that individually they would 
probably not be shown. The Consortium was conceived as complementary to and not 
in substitution for the normal underwriting o f consortium members. If  a risk is declined 
by the panel on behalf o f the consortium, all members are free to underwrite the risk for 
their own accounts, if it be shown to them. Similarly, members are free to write second 
(i.e. additional) lines on a risk which carries a consortium line. The panel underwriters 
are given absolute discretion in deciding the risks to which they commit the consortium 
with the consortium panel being absolved o f any liability.
It is perhaps questionable whether these changes can be classed as corporate 
entrepreneurism. They are not particularly innovative, indeed those changes that were 
made in order to cut costs could be described as “good management” . Whilst these 
changes to Lloyd’s were promulgated by the Council o f Lloyd’s to improve each 
syndicate’s ability to compete with competitors, they cannot claim to have transformed 
Lloyd’s in the same way as the implementation o f Equitas. Nevertheless, such
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developments show that Lloyd’s can change and that such change is possible over the 
whole organisation because the Council o f  Lloyd’s are able to create new byelaws 
which affect all the syndicates and can open up new opportunities for syndicates.
6.8 Entrepreneurism and the introduction of incorporated capital.
A notable step taken by the Council o f Lloyd’s, was to permit the introduction o f 
incorporated capital, i.e. limited liability capital, into the Lloyd’s market. The capital 
base o f the syndicates is gradually changing from being unlimited liability Names to 
limited liability capital (see Figure 6.3).
ALLOCATED CAPACITY (£m)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Spread Vehicles 1,574.6 1,907.4 2,084.7 2,421.0
Dedicated vehicles 20.5 412.5 876.1 1,659.0
Standalone syndicate - 40.0 82.8 420.0
TOTAL 1,595.1 2,359.9 3,043.6 4,500.0
Figure 6.3: Corporate capital at Lloyd’s. 
Source: Corporation of Lloyd’s_____________
The providers o f  capital are also purchasing Managing Agents, resulting in a merger 
between the ownership o f the capital base and the ownership o f the management 
structure o f syndicates. As has been stated earlier, Lloyd’s syndicates are 
entrepreneurial organisations. It is the role o f the Managing Agent to manage the 
syndicate, ensure regulatory compliance and to provide essential “back office” 
functions such as accounting. The senior syndicate staff will be on the Board of 
Directors o f the Managing Agency. Essentially we can view the Managing Agency and 
the syndicate as synonymous. This author suggests that syndicates are able to be 
entrepreneurial because the capital base does not have a say in the day-to-day
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underwriting affairs; in this way underwriters can be innovative and experimental. With 
the change in the capital structure and the merger between the capital providers and the 
owners o f the management structure, the capital providers are likely to require a voice 
in the operations o f the syndicates. Thus an important question may be posed, namely 
to what extent will the entrepreneurial nature o f Lloyd’s underwriters be altered due to 
the change in the nature o f the capital base?
The new providers o f capital are large corporations such as CNA, ACE and USF&G.
There is a danger in the clash o f cultures between the small entrepreneurial syndicate
and the large more mature organisation. Large organisations tend to be more
bureaucratic, if only because o f their size and the number o f personnel employed.
However, there are large corporations that are innovative such as Intel and Microsoft in
the computer industry. The big business - small business clash is described by Leith
(1996) in the sale o f her catering company to a large international group thus:
“At the time of the sale we turned over £14 million, employed 350 people 
and made a very decent profit. But we never had a business plan, a 
budget, targets nor objectives. We had no sales department, marketing 
department, nor glossy brochures and we were totally decentralised. Head 
office consisted of me, my husband, and our joint secretary.
“All of the managers could have told on any day what last week’s profit 
was and event what the profit on the ice-cream sales had been the day 
before and month-end accounts were finalised for the group by the 9th of 
the next month. By the time our new owners had been in charge for a 
year, we had a sales department targeted entirely on volume not profit, 
with the result that we had: taken five new contracts all of which lost 
money, felled a forest to produce a corporate image of well-designed, 
expensive gloss, occupied a huge central office that ate every penny made, 
lost two of our best contracts, results were not finalised until the third 
week of the following month and we had an unhappy workforce.”
Leith (1996) explains frankly the problems that can arise with the takeover o f a small 
business by a larger group. The reason for the mismatch between the small catering
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company and the large international group lies in the difference in structure o f each o f 
them. Leith’s small company was entrepreneurial, employing a small number o f 
personnel and power in the organisation was focussed on the chief executive. 
Furthermore the distinction between management and staff was blurred. The large 
international corporation has a different structure more akin to Mintzberg’s “machine 
organisation”. This organisational structure is characterised by large-size operation 
units, formalised communication channels throughout the organisation and an elaborate 
administrative structure with a sharp distinction between managers and staff (Mintzberg, 
1991b). In the operating core o f the machine organisation, work processes are 
standardised with employees performing narrowly defined functions with little 
opportunity to move outside their job description. The machine configuration, which is 
typically found in mature organisations, and the entrepreneurial organisation are at 
opposite ends on the structural continuum, indeed the machine organisation can evolve 
from the entrepreneurial context as a result o f the growth o f the company. The synergy 
o f each organisation structure is different and this is the reason for the problems that 
Leith experienced. Interestingly, however, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) point out that 
corporate regeneration may be achieved in the machine organisation through a strategy 
o f acquisitions as well as intrapreneurship.
In this author’s interviews with ten clients o f Lloyd’s, all chief executives o f insurance 
companies, the innovative underwriting o f Lloyd’s was seen as its competitive 
advantage. One Chief Executive commented that if the innovative nature o f Lloyd’s 
changed, then the Lloyd’s market would have difficulty in attracting clients. If  Leith’s
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experiences o f a take-over by an international company are mirrored in the Lloyd’s 
market, then Lloyd’s competitive advantage could be threatened.
It seems a reasonable assumption that whether corporate capital providers will stifle the 
entrepreneurial spirit o f syndicates will depend on the nature o f the corporate capital 
provider - whether they are entrepreneurial or mature organisations. According to 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) there is a common preconception that it is almost impossible 
for large companies to be truly innovative, the problem being with large organisations 
that they are bureaucratic and the lack o f personal freedom o f employees bottles up 
innovation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the employees o f a large 
company are any less imaginative that those o f a small company, the difference is that in 
a small company the individual employee may be able to influence the direction o f the 
company. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) suggest that large companies, by investing funds 
in education and training, help to train entrepreneurs who perfect their skills in large 
companies before starting their own business. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) stress that 
the “role o f large companies in launching new companies is as vital as the role o f 
venture capitalists.” Given these authors’ thesis, the involvement o f  large corporations 
in the Lloyd’s market could generate better educated underwriters who may wish to 
start their own syndicates.
The original “spread vehicles” which placed corporate capital across a wide range o f 
syndicates as a passive investment are complementary to the traditional individual 
Names’ capacity in that the “spread vehicles” have little involvement with the day-to- 
day underwriting affairs o f the syndicates. However, corporate Names that have
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acquired controlling interests in Managing Agencies, could push for more structured 
decision making at the expense o f the freedom traditionally given to Lloyd’s 
underwriters. This author suggests that corporate capital vehicles could stifle the 
entrepreneurial nature o f the Lloyd’s market if  they make their Lloyd’s syndicates 
synonymous with a subsidiary or a branch office, with the underwriter having to refer 
certain risks to the home office. The counter argument is that large corporations which 
search for a syndicate in which to invest are being, if not entrepreneurial, risk takers and 
it could be argued that they would be unlikely to dampen the entrepreneurial spirit o f the 
syndicate.
A central question which develops out o f the change in capital structure o f  Lloyd’s is 
the future nature o f Lloyd’s. Will it become a bourse o f insurance companies, similar to 
the London International Insurance and Reinsurance Association (LIRMA) or the 
Institute o f London Underwriters (ILU), or will it remain primarily a market in which 
individual capital, i.e. Names, is strongly represented. This issue is o f vital importance 
as the different types o f capital supporting Lloyd’s have different strengths and 
weaknesses. There is a danger in that with the transition from the individual unlimited 
liability Name to various forms o f limited liability, Lloyd’s will lose some unique 
characteristics that have given it a pre-eminent position in insurance and its ability to 
meet policyholder claims.
A significant feature o f the individual capital structure o f Lloyd’s is that the solvency o f 
Names is carried out by'centrally by the Corporation o f Lloyd’s and in so doing uses the 
mechanism o f the Central Fund which comes to the assistance o f Names who are unable
212
to pay their losses. The result o f this is that all Lloyd’s Names and syndicates trade with 
the same security based on the Central Fund. An important consequence o f this 
procedure is that new syndicates can be established with the security o f Lloyd’s as a 
whole. The result is that new businesses can rapidly establish themselves as they will 
have immediate access to first class security and to the worldwide Lloyd’s licences. 
This feature is one reason for the entrepreneurial character.
Such a structure has advantages for Names in that it allows them to choose between 
syndicates both old and new. They are not restricted to supporting old established 
syndicates as they can support new syndicates that from time to time start up.
For the new corporate capital providers, this structure is not necessarily beneficial. For 
the “spread vehicles” - investment trusts that use their assets to support a wide range o f 
syndicates - they require new investment opportunities and so need Lloyd’s constantly 
to regenerate itself through the establishment o f new syndicates. For the dedicated 
corporate investors, whose underwriting is limited to a single syndicate or the syndicates 
o f one Managing Agent, the existence o f the Central Fund is not so advantageous. 
Whilst for a Name and a spread vehicle the Central Fund is a mechanism for ensuring 
the growth o f new syndicates, for a dedicated corporate capital vehicle the Central Fund 
is a means for promoting competition.
Consider, for instance, the Bermudan reinsurer who has purchased a Managing Agent 
and underwrites through the agency’s syndicates. The Central Fund mechanism requires 
an annual contribution o f 1.50% o f stamp capacity and the prospect o f a further levy if a
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competitor fails and the Central Fund requires bolstering due to paying the losses o f  the 
insolvent capital provider.
It is this central conflict o f interest that Lloyd’s has to resolve. This author believes that 
if  the Central Fund were abolished, Lloyd’s could lose its entrepreneurial characteristics. 
At present the distribution o f the different types o f capital providers is being left to 
market forces. Whilst the resilience o f the Names over the years 1988 to 1992 has been 
remarkable, there have been few new Names joining Lloyd’s. There is a dilemma in that 
the capital keen to invest in Lloyd’s, dedicated vehicles, has an interest in destroying its 
unique characteristics. The danger is that Lloyd’s could transform into an insurance 
bourse with no common Central Fund. Lloyd’s would thus be giving up its unique niche 
in the insurance industry to become similar in capital structure to its competitors. If 
Lloyd’s does not have common security and therefore does away with common licences, 
the Lloyd’s market would consist o f a collection o f medium-sized insurance companies 
none o f which could would be large enough to compete with large insurance and 
reinsurance companies such as General Re and Munich Re.
This author suggests that there is a need for a coherent capital strategy which balances 
the needs o f the Names and spread vehicles, on the one hand, and the dedicated vehicles 
on the other. This author suggests that there should be a balance between the three 
types o f capital providers which would allow the advantages o f each group to benefit 
the whole; perhaps the capital structure should be one-third o f each o f the three types. 
There is clearly an analogy with the London Stock Exchange ‘big bang’ which brought 
the London securities’ markets up to international standards by the injection o f the
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capital and skills o f foreign houses. A similar process would benefit Lloyd’s given that 
there has been criticism from Names for regulatory failure over the losses declared.
At the present time Lloyd’s does not need any extra capacity and probably a reduction 
o f the 1996 capacity o f £10 billion would have been preferable to an increase to £10.3 
billion for 1997. With rates in most sectors o f the insurance industry falling, there is no 
need for an increase in capacity and a decline to about £9 billion would probably have 
been sensible. It follows that Lloyd’s has no need to encourage new corporate capital 
and would probably be better to wait for the market conditions to improve. Such a 
lapse o f time would allow Lloyd’s to develop a capital strategy. Such a strategy would 
be developed by the Council o f Lloyd’s and could put a maximum limit to the capacity 
o f Lloyd’s for any one year.
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Chapter seven: The reputation of Lloyd’s
7.1 Introduction - what is reputation?
Nelson (1970) contends that consumers can obtain information on price or quality o f 
products either by search or through experience. Search involves the consumer 
evaluating each product available to him. His problem is to establish the utility o f each 
product; for instance, he can search for a suit and try several on and thereby establish 
the relative utility o f each option. For some goods the search procedure is 
inappropriate - goods for which it is less expensive for the customer to evaluate by 
purchase rather than by search. Nelson uses the following simple, but effective 
illustration:
“To evaluate brands of canned tuna fish, the consumer would almost 
certainly purchase brands of tuna fish for consumption. He could, 
then, determine from several purchases which brand he preferred. We 
will call this information process “experience”.
For tuna fish there is no effective search alternative open. At the low 
price of experience, there is insufficient demand for specialized 
establishments selling tastes of various brands of tuna fish.”
If  we take Nelson’s arguments one stage further, then how do consumers choose 
between products where goods cannot be inspected and are consumed only once, such 
as pension plans and funeral services? Search yields little information about the 
reliability o f a consumer durable such as a washing machine or a car or indeed o f the 
claims service o f an insurance company. Experience does yield this information, but 
such experience is costly. In these instances consumers will make choices between 
products based on the reputation o f the product and manufacturer.
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Reputation is the “estimation of the consistency over time o f an attribute o f an entity” 
(Herbig et al, 1994). This estimation is based upon the ability o f the entity to perform 
an activity repeatedly in a similar fashion. The reputation o f a firm develops over time 
and requires a consistency o f performance of the firm. A firm’s reputation will lower if 
it does not perform its actions consistently. Kay (1995) states that reputation is the 
name for a reiterated high-quality strategy in a market for long-term experience goods. 
Kay (1995) goes on to say:
“Producers of long-term experience goods characteristically draw 
attention to the long-established nature of their enterprise. There is no 
clearer statement that the firm is playing a repeated game than ‘founded 
in 1853’, and it is banks and insurance companies, rather than the 
producers of search and short-term experience goods, which make these 
claims.”
A reputation embodies the history o f other people’s interactions with the products or 
company in question. A good reputation increases the credibility o f the product, 
making the purchaser more confident that he will get what is promised. Marketers and 
advertisers know that an endorsement o f a product by a well-known personality will 
help to boost sales. This is because the reputation o f the personality is then linked with 
the product. Psychologically, consumers create a mental link between the personality, 
the product and the company that produces the product. Consumers are willing to pay 
higher prices for the good because it has been endorsed by the famous personality. 
Conversely, if  the personality is linked with scandal then the company will rapidly 
disassociate the personality from the promoted product. For instance, PepsiCo in the 
USA withdrew its advertisements featuring a well-known pop artist after accusations o f 
impropriety with a minor, even though no legal charges had been filed. By dropping 
the person from the advertising campaign, PepsiCo recognised the need to minimise the
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impact o f a potential major scandal on the company’s reputation. There are some 
syndicates in Lloyd’s that underwrite insurance which will cover the cost o f re-shooting 
the advertisement in the event o f such a scandal.
The process o f  building a reputation is central to the marketing o f many everyday
products such as soap, clothing, cereals and cosmetics. Companies that make these
products will promote them through advertising and marketing. Their aim is to
differentiate the product from similar goods i.e. to convert the product into a brand.
Companies spend considerable sums o f money on research, development, advertising
and promotion in order to develop brands and to maintain their uniqueness, appeal and
value. After the loss-making years o f 1988 to 1992, the Lloyd’s Marketing
Department produced various advertisements and literature to market the insurance
products developed by syndicates and brokers. One such advertisement stated:
“After more than 300 years, Lloyd’s of London is still at the heart of 
the international insurance market. One of the UK’s largest insurance 
organisations, Lloyd’s attracts more than half the international 
insurance premiums that flow into London, which is the world’s 
foremost insurance centre.
“This is neither coincidence nor nostalgia. Lloyd’s is efficient, 
innovative, responsive, competitive and secure. Leading independent 
brokers know that Lloyd’s underwriters’ willingness to consider the 
exceptional alongside the conventional makes a Lloyd’s policy suitable 
for clients whose needs may be out of the ordinary as well as those that 
are totally straightforward. Very little is too large or too small, too 
complex, too simple or too new to be too much for Lloyd’s. And once a 
risk is accepted, rest assured: throughout the world Lloyd’s is known as 
a market where a valid claim is honoured, come what may.”
(Quoted from “Insuring Your Business” published by Lloyd’s of 
London, 1991)
This advertisement stresses the innovative nature o f Lloyd’s underwriters and the 
security o f the Lloyd’s policy, both powerful marketing tools.
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Fombmn (1996) states that in companies where reputation is valued, managers will 
build, sustain, and defend that reputation by the following practices that firstly shape a 
unique identity, and secondly project a coherent and consistent set o f images to the 
public. Fombrun (1996) suggests that such practices include:
•  designing advertising campaigns that promote the company as a whole, not just 
its products and brands. The Corporation o f Lloyd’s has a marketing department 
which has developed press advertisements with the slogan “Lloyd’s covers the 
world”. (See also advertisement given above)
•  Carrying out ambitious projects that champion product quality and customer 
service with an eye on keeping customers happy. Lloyd’s, in its marketing 
literature, stresses that the Society has always paid valid claims.
•  Maintaining control systems that carefully screen employee activities for their 
possible reputational side effects. Lloyd’s has recently required that all staff 
employed by underwriting agencies be individually registered. This is a scheme 
whereby all individuals who are connected with underwriting or claims handling are 
required to give details o f their career and education. In this way the Underwriting 
Agents Department can monitor who is underwriting in Lloyd’s and thus try to 
prevent those underwriters with a bad reputation from operating within Lloyd’s.
Companies develop reputations by creating and projecting a set o f skills that customers 
recognise as unique, which in the case o f Lloyd’s is innovative underwriting and the 
security o f  the policy. For some companies this is achieved through differentiating 
themselves through innovation - nurturing new ideas, producing new products and 
marketing them well. In other companies uniqueness is achieved through operational
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excellence i.e. providing good service to the customer. In knowledge-based 
institutions, such as universities, consultancy firms, law firms and insurance companies, 
reputation is important. Their “products” or the services they provide are largely 
intangible. Economists call the services o f these institutions and companies “credence 
goods” (Darby and Kami, 1973) - goods that are purchased on faith, i.e. reputation.
Executives in the US insurance and reinsurance industry are very conscious o f how 
their companies are rated by the various rating organisations, such as A.M. Best, 
Moody and Standard & Poor. A poor rating can have negative reputational effects as 
investors get concerned as to the financial stability o f the company. If  it is down­
graded by a rating agency, then it will lose business. A rating is a reflection o f an 
insurance company’s financial strength and if its future is in doubt, this is reflected in its 
rating. It follows that insurance companies are very sensitive about their rating. A 
good rating can reinforce the reputation o f a company. Standard & Poor have 
produced stability rankings on all syndicates currently trading in Lloyd’s. The rating 
agency has identified various key financial performance characteristics that indicate the 
likelihood o f a syndicate ceasing to trade three or more years in advance. Key 
performance areas include underwriting exposure, ceded reinsurance, investments, lines 
o f business and reserves. Standard & Poor have assigned one o f five grades o f stability 
ranking based on how closely a syndicate’s financial characteristics match those o f 
syndicates that have voluntarily ceased trading. Rankings range from one crown (well 
below average performance) to five crowns (well above average financial 
characteristics). The crown ranking system is being used by some insureds and 
reinsureds as a method o f differentiating between syndicates, even though each
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syndicate is composed o f Names, both individual and corporate, who have to satisfy 
various financial tests and are all backed up by the Central Fund. It is interesting to 
note that Lloyd’s treated as a single entity has not been rated, only the constituent 
syndicates. A well ranked syndicate is likely to use its ranking to enhance its 
reputation.
Critical to the concept o f reputation is credibility which Herbig et a l (1994) define as 
“the believability o f an entity’s intentions at a particular moment in time.” Credibility is 
whether a company can be relied upon to do what it says. Herbig et a l (1994) further 
state that credibility is time-sensitive in that the perceived credibility o f a firm today can 
differ from the perceived credibility o f the same firm on a previous or future date. An 
established firm that has been trading for several years in a consistent manner is likely 
to perform in a similar manner in the future, thus established entities, such as Lloyd’s, 
can more easily persuade customers as to their credibility than younger firms.
The value o f a firm’s reputation is seen in its sales since as the reputation grows so do 
the sales (Shapiro, 1982). A firm with a good reputation owns a valuable asset - 
“goodwill” or reputational capital.
7.2 Reputation and Lloyd’s.
The following discussion on the reputation o f Lloyd’s is based on this author’s 
experiences as an underwriter and from interviews with underwriters and brokers. The 
reputation o f Lloyd’s is in two tiers - the reputation o f Lloyd’s as a whole (i.e. the 
perception o f Lloyd’s by the insuring public or reinsurance buyers) and the reputation
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o f individual underwriters and hence their syndicates within Lloyd’s. The reputation o f 
the Society o f Lloyd’s has been gained over the past 300 years. It is a peculiarly 
English institution - there is no similar institution anywhere else although its closest 
imitator is the Illinois Insurance Exchange in Chicago. Within Lloyd’s, each 
underwriter has his own reputation. Some underwriters are well known as non-marine 
catastrophe excess o f loss specialists - for instance the active underwriter o f syndicate 
51 (A.N. Taylor and others). If  a broker manages to get this syndicate to lead his slip 
then the broker will be able to get the risk fully placed. With a lesser-known leading 
underwriter, or one whose specialism is not catastrophe business, the broker may have 
problems in placing his business. The following market (i.e. underwriters who do not 
generally lead business) will not be confident to follow this underwriter.
In July 1995 Research International issued a report on Lloyd’s image among personal 
insureds in the U.K. Whilst this author was not granted access to this report, some 
findings were released. The report found that Lloyd’s strengths were seen as being an 
established name with history and tradition, and one o f the largest insurers in the world. 
Financial strength, although considered by those interviewed to be Lloyd’s fourth most 
important strength after a well known name, history and size, was only mentioned by 
14% o f those interviewed. Lloyd’s main weakness was found to be the recent bad 
publicity which has affected confidence in Lloyd’s among insureds. The report 
concluded that although personal insureds know and have views on Lloyd’s, it is not 
associated with personal lines, however it is recognised by insureds as a provider o f 
commercial insurance. •
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When a broker is placing his risk in Lloyd’s he will try to get certain underwriters to 
underwrite the slip. The presence o f particular underwriters on a slip says something 
positive for the quality o f the broker’s business. Thus the broker’s task becomes much 
easier to broke his business to other underwriters. Sometimes an underwriter may not 
write a slip if he does not see certain underwriters on the slip.
For a broker a good reputation is most important. On an individual level, a broker 
must always be truthful. Business in Lloyd’s is written on the basis o f utmost good 
faith as the broker will know much more about the risk than the underwriter. In 
insurance, the broker and his client possess all knowledge o f the risk, i.e. there is an 
asymmetry o f information between broker and underwriter. Thus the broker must 
always answer the underwriter’s questions truthfully and the client must also be 
truthful. If  a broker gets a reputation for being untruthful then no underwriter will ever 
wish to deal with him. Similarly, if the broker’s client is untruthful or tries to be 
underhand then underwriters will be suspicious o f dealing with that client again. Such 
information is passed down the successive generations o f underwriters, so it can be 
many years before a broking house or an individual broker recover their reputations. 
The broker-underwriter relationship and the underwriter-client relationship, are 
examples o f the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma can only be resolved if 
the game is repeated and there is trust between the two parties (Kay, 1995). Indeed, 
trust, utmost good faith, is central to the activities o f Lloyd’s.
In the motor market at Lloyd’s individual motor syndicates market themselves and 
develop their own brand names such as Admiral, Eclipse, MT M otor Policies. Such
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syndicates are not part o f the subscription market and therefore can trade under their 
own brand names rather than the name o f Lloyd’s. It is interesting to note that as 
syndicates grow in size, they are more able to underwrite a risk one hundred per cent 
rather than being part o f a subscription market and taking a share o f the risk. 
Syndicates, who have traditionally been part o f the subscription market, are now 
starting to produce their own brochures stressing their own capabilities. They are thus 
attempting to develop their own brand and market themselves rather than relying on the 
brokers and the Lloyd’s marketing department. As Managing Agencies align 
themselves with corporate capital providers, many o f whom are insurance and 
reinsurance companies, such branding may be an increasing feature o f Lloyd’s.
7.3 Who owns the reputation of Lloyd’s?
The Council o f Lloyd’s has certain powers to protect the name o f Lloyd’s, for instance 
the power to expel members from the Society and to ban them from underwriting under 
the Misconduct, Penalties and Sanctions Byelaw (No. 5 o f 1983). Thus, if in the view 
o f the Council, the Society’s name is being damaged the Council can take appropriate 
action. Under this Byelaw members and others defined within the byelaw are guilty o f 
misconduct if they:
(i) contravene or fail to observe any provisions o f Lloyd’s Acts 1871 to 1982 or any 
byelaw;
(ii) contravene or fail to observe any verdict, order, award, penalty or sanction made 
or imposed, or any condition or requirement imposed, or any undertaking given, 
pursuant to Lloyd’s Acts 1871 to 1982 or any byelaw;
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(iii) contravene or fail to observe (subject to certain provisos) any regulation or 
direction made or given under Lloyd’s Acts 1871 to 1982 or under any byelaw;
(iv) conduct themselves in a manner which is detrimental to the interests o f Lloyd’s 
policyholders, the Society, members o f the Society, underwriting agents, Lloyd’s 
brokers or others doing business at Lloyd’s;
(v) conduct any insurance business in a discreditable manner or with a lack o f good 
faith; or
(vi) conduct themselves in any manner whatsoever, which is dishonourable, disgraceful 
or improper.
The penalties which may be imposed upon those found guilty o f misconduct are 
dependent upon the category o f person concerned. In those cases where a member o f 
the Society is concerned, he can be:
(i) excluded or suspended from membership o f the Society; or (ii) required to cease 
underwriting at Lloyd’s permanently or temporarily and either totally or in part.
Where the misconduct is by underwriting agents, they may have their permission to act 
as agents revoked or suspended totally or in part. Similarly, Lloyd’s brokers may have 
their permission to broker business revoked or suspended totally or in part.
In those cases where an individual is involved, his right o f admission to the Room and 
the other parts o f the premises o f Lloyd’s may be suspended, permanently or 
temporarily. In the above cases, the following sanctions are also applicable:
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(a) a suspension, permanently or temporarily, o f the right to transact, or be concerned 
or interested in the transaction of, the business o f insurance at Lloyd’s or any class or 
classes o f such business, either totally or in part;
(b) a fine;
(c) the posting o f a notice o f censure in the Room;
(d) a reprimand.
The Council o f Lloyd’s also has the power to direct that a Lloyd’s person may be 
administratively suspended. The rules concerning administrative suspension are laid 
down in the Administrative Suspension Byelaw (No.7 o f 1987). The power o f 
administrative suspension is used to protect the interests o f Lloyd’s policyholders and 
the Lloyd’s community. Administrative suspension is not a disciplinary penalty but is 
rather a mechanism to avoid damage which might otherwise arise had the power not 
been exercised.
An example o f where administrative suspension is used is in the case o f a Lloyd’s 
member who fails the “annual solvency test” . The member is suspended from 
underwriting until he provides sufficient funds to make good his solvency shortfall. In 
this way the security behind the Lloyd’s policies is preserved.
A direction o f administrative suspension can only be made in one o f the following two 
circumstances: (i) in the case o f a Member with a solvency shortfall; and (ii) in cases 
where the Investigations Committee administratively suspends a Lloyd’s person as a 
result o f matters emerging during the course o f an inquiry.
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The Byelaws discussed above give the Council o f Lloyd’s power to protect the name of 
Lloyd’s and thus its reputation. However, by the time such disciplinary action is taken 
the damage to  the reputation o f Lloyd’s has probably already occurred. Thus all the 
Council can do is to react to the situation. The fact that the Council o f  Lloyd’s can act 
to prevent or control damage to the name o f Lloyd’s suggests that ownership o f the 
reputation o f Lloyd’s is vested in the Council.
It has already been stated that the reputation o f Lloyd’s exists on two levels - the 
overall reputation o f the institution (what might be called the public perception of 
Lloyd’s) and the reputation o f the individual syndicates within Lloyd’s. A pertinent 
question is - Who owns the reputation o f the syndicates?.
The reputation o f a syndicate is generally centered around the active underwriter, even 
in those syndicates that possess class underwriters. This is because syndicates are small 
entities both in terms o f their premium income (compared to international companies) 
and their staffing levels. The active underwriter receives praise if the syndicate is 
profitable and criticism if the syndicate makes a loss. Furthermore, the role o f the 
active underwriter is further enforced by the fact that the syndicate is almost always 
named after him, e g. the active underwriter o f Syndicate 314 (C.F. Palmer and others) 
is Clifford Palmer; the active underwriter o f Syndicate 991 (A.E. Grant and others) is 
Alan Grant.
The reputation o f a syndicate is dependent on its central figure, the active underwriter, 
or more accurately, the underwriting decisions made by the active underwriter. If the
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active underwriter is removed, the added value to the syndicate given by the active 
underwriter is lost. This is the reason that, when the active underwriter is nearing 
retirement, Managing Agencies always stress that the active underwriter’s successor is 
very competent (pers. comm, a Members’ Agent).
The agency agreement between a Managing Agent and a Members’ Agent grants a 
Members’ Agent the right to place members on a syndicate up to an agreed capacity. 
The Name will pay a fee to the Managing Agent which is a percentage o f the Name’s 
capacity on the syndicate. The Name will also pay a similar fee to the Members’ 
Agent. If  the syndicate is profitable then the Name pays profit commission to both the 
Managing and Members’ Agents.
The Managing Agent has the right to withdraw the agency agreement between itself 
and the Members’ Agent. Similarly the Members’ Agent can exercise its right to not 
place Names on the syndicate if it so wishes.
There is a symbiotic relationship between the two types o f  agents. A Managing Agent 
employs the active underwriter and staff o f the syndicate and manages the affairs o f the 
syndicate; although in reality the day-to-day affairs o f the syndicate are likely to be 
dictated by the active underwriter. A Managing Agency can only receive capacity to 
operate its syndicate from a Members’ Agent and, as from 1994, from corporate capital 
providers. The access to the active underwriter is controlled by the Managing Agent as 
this entity can grant agency agreements to Members’ Agents. However, a syndicate 
cannot underwrite without capacity and this is accessed only through a Members’
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Agent. This implies that Managing Agencies own the expertise o f the syndicate, i.e. its 
staff, but the capital is owned by Members’ Agents. The syndicate can only exist if the 
two agents are present thus implying that the reputation o f the syndicate is jointly 
owned by the two types o f agents. However, if this reasoning is extended then the 
reputation o f the syndicate must in part be owned by its Names as these individuals 
provide capital.
In February 1994 the Council o f Lloyd’s formed a working party to develop a system 
for enabling members to create and realise the value o f belonging to a Lloyd’s 
syndicate. The report o f the working party, entitled “Value at Lloyd’s”, was published 
in May 1994. There were two main recommendations. Firstly, that existing members 
o f a syndicate should be given the right to participate on a pro-rata basis in any 
proposed increase in that syndicate’s capacity, i.e. the Member should be given pre­
emption rights. Secondly, Names should be given the right to transfer a participation in 
a syndicate for future years o f account to another Member, i.e. a system o f assignment. 
These proposals were radical in that they in effect stated that the member owned the 
reputation o f the syndicate rather than the Agents. Prior to the “Value at Lloyd’s” 
document, Managing Agents could agree to have a certain capacity from a Members’ 
Agent and the Managing Agent had the sole right in determining for future years o f 
account whether that allocation should increase or decrease (assuming that the 
Members’ Agent wished to continue supporting the syndicate). If  a member wished to 
resign from the syndicate then the Members’ Agent had to request the permission from 
the Managing Agent to re-allocate that capacity to another person.
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The system o f assignment was expanded in a document published by Lloyd’s in 1995 
entitled “Capacity Allocation by Auction”. The document states:
“The essence of the auction process is that members of Lloyd’s who 
wish to surrender their right to underwrite on one or more syndicate(s) 
for the 1996 year of account can now do so via a series of four weekly 
public auctions to be held (in August). Under the auction process, 
members of syndicates in 1995 will be able to realise any value 
attaching to 1996 capacity on surrender. On the other side, members 
will be given access to all syndicates. There will be a single price (the 
“execution premium”) for each syndicate in each auction which will be 
determined by supply and demand. The execution premium may vary 
between different auctions.”
The auction process is not intended to resemble a full market but rather, its primary 
function is to provide members with access to syndicates and to enable members to 
achieve value for their existing participations. Trading is not permitted (Rule 7(4)(a)) 
thus members will not be able to subscribe or tender in one auction and then attempt to 
reverse the transaction in a subsequent auction.
The system o f realising value places a quantifiable monetary figure on the value o f the 
capacity o f  each syndicate which, in turn, gives a qualitative indication as to the 
reputation o f each syndicate. It therefore provides a mechanism to compare syndicates 
with each other based on the auction value o f the capacity. The fault o f  the system of 
realising value is that it views the reputation o f the syndicate as being wholly owned by 
the Name as it is only the Name who profits from selling his future participation. As 
the reputation o f the syndicate is jointly owned by Names and the Managing Agents it 
would be equitable that, since Names are allowed to realise the value o f their future 
participation in the syndicate, then Managing Agents should be granted the ability to set 
their own level o f fees. However, one o f the resolutions o f the 1993 Business Plan was
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the mandatory cut in Managing Agents’ fees to 0.4% for the 1995 year o f account 
(section 9.4).
The danger o f  the system o f realising value is that Managing Agents lose control o f 
which agents have capacity on syndicates. One Members’ Agent could purchase the 
capacity o f  another Members’ Agent, for instance. The syndicate may not wish to be 
too dependent upon one Members’ Agent as the ownership o f a large percentage o f 
capacity could wish to exert its influence in how the syndicate is managed. However, 
Section 8.4 o f the “Capacity allocation by auction” guidebook (1995) states that 
Managing Agents may prohibit subscription orders which would result in a member’s 
or a MAPA’s prospective participation in a syndicate for 1996 exceeding ten per cent 
o f the syndicate’s estimated capacity. This rule therefore does give Managing Agents a 
control over the sources o f capital.
7.4 Conclusion
As services have no tangible shape or form, customer satisfaction is less readily defined. 
Indeed, in life assurance, it could be argued that there is no appreciable satisfaction at 
all! Insurance is a peculiar commodity because it is a promise to pay a sum o f money 
on the occasioning of an event such as fire or death. An insured can only evaluate his 
level o f satisfaction once a claim is made. In insurance, experience is o f little value in 
evaluating the product as people do not often claim from their insurers. A pertinent 
question must be - What factors influence the purchase o f insurance? Insurance is a 
long term experience good only if the consumer claims on his policy, i.e. “experiences” 
the product. Insurance is not a search good because the policy o f one company is likely
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to be similar to that o f another company and the consumer may not have sufficient 
specialist knowledge with which to compare policies. However, reinsurance may be 
regarded as a search good as the purchaser - the insurance company - will have 
specialist knowledge o f the product he wishes to purchase. This author suggests that 
reputation is the only gauge a consumer has to satisfaction in the personal insurance 
market. Insurance companies advertise in order to enhance - or create - a reputation. 
For instance, the Commercial Union, we are told from the television advertisements 
will not make a “Drama out o f a Crisis” . In the personal insurance market pricing is 
important, as consumers are influenced by the premium charged. The success o f The 
Royal Bank o f Scotland’s Direct Line is due both to its ease o f access (via the 
telephone) and its inexpensive policies compared with other carriers. Pricing is 
therefore a source o f competitive advantage. However, the personal insurance market­
place is very competitive and if one company is charging less than its competition, its 
competitors will often follow suit in their pricing. Once pricing ceases to be a source o f 
competitive advantage, companies will need to stress their service they offer the 
policyholder. For instance, the recent radio advertisements for Direct Line stress the 
efficient claims-handling o f the company.
In the reinsurance market, the purchasers are sophisticated buyers and the factors 
influencing their decisions are likely to be different from those that influence the choices 
made by buyers in the personal insurance market. Buyers will have to balance price and 
policy terms with the quality o f security required. Long-term relationships between 
reinsureds and their reinsurers are important, as reinsureds are likely to want to trade 
with a market that is stable.
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From interviews with brokers and underwriters, this author found that all interviewees 
agreed that the reputation o f Lloyd’s is based on the ability o f Lloyd’s underwriters to 
be innovative and to be flexible to the needs o f the client. Also Lloyd’s reputation for 
security was seen as an important factor in the growth o f the reputation o f Lloyd’s. 
This author suggests that the innovative nature o f Lloyd’s is due to its structure, or 
architecture, as a subscription market and also the entrepreneurial nature o f Lloyd’s 
underwriters. Thus the reputation o f Lloyd’s is a direct result o f its structure.
One o f the features o f  Lloyd’s is that the Society has always honoured valid claims. 
This is a corollary o f  the nature o f the capital base, namely unlimited liability investors. 
Whilst all insurance companies have unlimited liability for losses, a limited liability 
company has quantifiable assets supporting its liability. At Lloyd’s the assets 
supporting the underwriting liabilities are unquantifiable. The question arises as to 
whether the unlimited liability o f  the capital base is a competitive advantage and 
therefore a possible explanation for the reputation o f Lloyd’s? In an address to a 
conference on the future o f Lloyd’s, Hagen (1988) stated that “Lloyd’s offers the 
strongest policies in the world”. However, the Cromer Report stated that “...(brokers) 
did not attach great significance to unlimited liability as a selling point for Lloyd’s 
policies”. Indeed with the losses experienced by Lloyd’s in recent years the very 
concept o f unlimited liability has been called into question. Illingworth (1994) remarked 
“ ...Lloyd’s, the world-renowned insurance market, (has) come to symbolise 
monumental failure.” The underwriters interviewed by this author all expressed the 
opinion that the security o f the Lloyd’s policy was o f the utmost importance for
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maintaining the reputation o f Lloyd’s. One underwriter stated that if the Central Fund 
were abolished, this would signal the end o f Lloyd’s.
The reputation o f Lloyd’s which has been gained over the past 300 years is an 
important feature o f the institution. Indeed, during the loss making years o f 1988 to 
1992, the capacity o f the Society hardly decreased at all and new capital was attracted 
to Lloyd’s, thus demonstrating the steadfastness o f  the reputation.
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Chapter eight: Conclusions and recommendations.
8.1 Conclusions and recommendations
This author’s research has examined Lloyd’s within the theoretical framework 
developed by Kay, namely architecture, innovation and reputation. This examination 
has revealed that the distinctive capability o f Lloyd’s is its innovative underwriting. In 
this author’s opinion, such innovation has historically been derived from four 
distinctive aspects o f the architecture o f the Society -
(i) Lloyd’s syndicates are small entrepreneurial organisations focussed on 
underwriting.
(ii) the subscription system o f risk placement which has enhanced the ability o f 
syndicates to be innovative in their underwriting. The subscription system is an 
example o f the cooperative nature o f Lloyd’s and ensures that information on risk 
assessment is passed from underwriter to underwriter. This results in many 
underwriters being able to have an input into the coverage and rating o f the risk.
(iii) a capital base o f individual members (“Names”) who had little, if any, involvement 
in the underwriting process. This gives underwriters freedom to underwrite and to 
experiment in new classes o f business and to capitalise quickly on any opportunities.
(iv) the presence o f the Central Fund which has ensured that all the syndicates offer the 
same level o f security and, moreover, has allowed new small syndicates to form giving 
the entrepreneur the opportunity to set up his own syndicate. This has meant that 
Lloyd’s has been able to foster new underwriting talent which has encouraged the 
constant regeneration o f the ‘market’.
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For the 1994 year o f account onwards, a new type o f investor - corporate capital - 
was allowed to invest in Lloyd’s. This author’s research suggests that the 
introduction o f this type o f capital may have a profound influence on the four 
distinctive aspects o f the architecture o f Lloyd’s thus resulting in Lloyd’s losing its 
distinctive capability - innovative underwriting. Also the presence o f two types o f 
capital, unlimited and limited, challenges the current regulatory structure. 
Furthermore, the current capital architecture o f Lloyd’s is underpinned by the Central 
Fund. This author suggests that the interests o f corporate capital may not be 
compatible with the existence o f the Central Fund.
This author’s research has revealed that there are two major issues facing Lloyd’s as a 
result o f the introduction o f corporate capital: (1) the future regulatory structure, and 
(2) the influence o f corporate capital on the distinctive aspects o f the architecture o f 
Lloyd’s.
8.2 Recommendations for regulatory reform
One o f the strengths o f Lloyd’s is that its structure o f  entrepreneurial underwriting 
units is bound together by a common set o f standards. These standards are set 
internally through the process o f self-regulation. This has certain advantages in that 
market practitioners, who have close knowledge o f the workings o f Lloyd’s, are 
regulating the Society rather than bureaucrats who may have little knowledge of 
Lloyd’s. With corporate capital entering Lloyd’s, some investors are subject to two 
regulatory authorities: the Department o f Trade and Industry for the regulation o f their 
insurance company and the Council o f Lloyd’s for their corporate syndicate. There is
236
thus logical sense in rationalising this situation. The question o f examining whether 
Lloyd’s should have statutory regulation rather than self-regulation has not been faced 
by the Society before. Lloyd’s is, however, subject to DTI regulation at present in that 
the 1992 and prior years are administered by Equitas Ltd which is a DTI-regulated 
company. This author recommends that Lloyd’s syndicates, agencies and brokers 
should be regulated directly by the DTI. This would give a positive marketing boost 
to the Society as self-regulation has come under scrutiny by various commentators, 
notably in the popular press, for having failed due to the large losses incurred by 
Names over the 1988 to 1992 years o f account. This author suggests that the 
imposition o f a new regulatory regime would help to instill confidence in Lloyd’s 
customer base. Furthermore, Corporate Capital providers would only be responsible 
to one regulatory body rather than two.
By removing the regulatory role from the Council and moving Lloyd’s into statutory 
regulation, the Society would be under the same regulatory framework as all UK 
insurers and reinsurers. This author suggests that statutory regulation is likely to be 
more widely accepted by overseas countries than self-regulation. Indeed, given that
the 1993 Business Plan states that “......we need to build our position in new markets
such as Continental Europe and the Far East.” (para 15.4), continued self-regulation 
may be a competitive disadvantage given that this regulatory regime has come under 
criticism as a result o f the losses suffered by the capital base.
It has been stated earlier in this thesis that Lloyd’s has traditionally been associated 
with innovation. This author suggests that one o f the reasons for this is that the
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Society is regulated by Lloyd’s practitioners who are unlikely to wish to see the 
entrepreneurial spirit o f the Society unduly hampered by excessive regulation. It is 
important that any external regulation must not influence the adaptability o f Lloyd’s 
and that regulation must be conducted within the liberal tradition that Lloyd’s has 
enjoyed. Indeed the DTI does not prescribe rates nor requires rates to be filed - as is 
the case with the USA regulatory system.
The corollary to external regulation is the need to find a new role for the Council o f 
Lloyd’s as their regulatory function would no longer exist. This author proposes that 
the Council o f  Lloyd’s should focus on being the spokesman for' the Society, have 
responsibility for ensuring the adequacy o f the Central Fund and act to protect the 
reputation o f Lloyd’s. The Lloyd’s Act 1982 confers a self-regulatory status on 
Lloyd’s and states that the “Council shall have the management and superintendence o f 
the affairs o f the Society and the power to regulate and direct the business o f insurance
at Lloyd’s.... ” (para 6.1). This author suggests that the regulatory function o f the
Council, which is currently administered by the Regulatory Board, be exercised by the 
DTI. As such, the Lloyd’s Act 1982 would require an amendment.
With external regulation, there would be no need for a Regulatory Board; its role may 
be reduced to liaising between syndicates and the DTI. This author suggests that the 
present Market Board should become a Business Development Board whose function 
would be to market the Society and advise and help syndicates to broaden their 
business base.
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The Lloyd’s Regulatory Board and the Lloyd’s Market Board were established in 
January 1993 and stemmed from the recommendations o f the Morse Report. This 
Report proposed that the two boards should operate under the authority o f  the 
Council. The Morse Report suggested that the Market Board should comprise a range 
o f Lloyd’s and outside expertise and saw this Board providing “the necessary focus for 
business leadership” and being the “driving force in the development o f  the Society” 
(para 6.1). These terms o f reference are difficult to define, especially in a market-type 
context such as Lloyd’s. This author suggests that the Business Development Board 
should focus on helping syndicates to achieve their business objectives. This author 
suggests that this Board should be able to direct the resources o f the Corporation o f 
Lloyd’s into projects that would benefit syndicates; an example is “Lloyd’s Japan”, a 
joint venture between the Corporation and managing agencies to underwrite Japanese 
insurance. Figure 8.1 (a) shows the current management and regulatory structure o f 
Lloyd’s and gives the proposed new structure.
Because the Business Development Board would be focussed on expanding the 
business base o f Lloyd’s, this author recommends that it should be largely comprised 
o f Lloyd’s practitioners who have a detailed understanding o f the Society and the 
insurance business. Such practitioners would be underwriters, brokers, members o f 
the Corporation and representatives from the market associations. This author also 
suggests that capital providers (Natural and Corporate Names) should also be 
represented on the Board. Given that this author recommends statutory regulation, the 
need for non-executive members on the Business Development Board to ensure a 
degree o f independent oversight would not arise. Figure 8.1 (b) gives a detailed
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Current management and regulatory structure
Department o f  Trade 
and Industry
Proposed new management and regulatory structure
Figure 8.1 (a): The current management and regulatory structure of Lloyd' 
(as given in the Morse Report) and the proposed new 
management and regulatory structure.
C u rren t m anagem ent stru c tu re  of Lloyd’s.
COUNCIL OF LLOYD’S (14)
6 4 4
WORKING NOMINATED EXTERNAL
MEMBERS MEMBERS MEMBERS
CEO AND HEAD OF REGULATION
IN ATTENDANCE
MARKET BOARD (15 or 16) REGULATORY BOARI) (14)
6 working members
(form the Committee)_________
2 working members from the 
Underwriting Associations 
1 working member from LUAA
1 working member from LIBC
2 or 3 non-executive members 
Chief Executive Officer of Lloyd's 
2 other executives from the 
Corporation of Lloyd's
4 Nominated members 
4 external members 
4 working members 
Head of Regulation 
Solicitor to the Corporation
Note: LUAA is Lloyd's Underwriting Agents Association (the members' agents association).
LIBC is Lloyd's Insurance Brokers Committee.
A working member is a member of Lloyd's who works in Lloyd's as a broker or as an underwriter. 
The Underwriting Associations are the various underwriters' associations - Lloyd's Underwriters' 
Association (for marine underwriters), Lloyd's Non-Marine Association (for non-marine 
underwriters), Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters Association (for aviation underwriters) and 
Lloyd's Underwriters Motor Association (for motor underwriters).
Proposed management structure of Lloyd's.
COUNCIL OF LLOYD’S (14)
6
WORKING
MEMBERS
4
NOMINATED
MEMBERS
4
EXTERNAL 
MEMBERS *
CEO IN ATTENDANCE
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BOARD (14)
6 working members - 3 underwriters & 3 brokers 
2 working members from the Underwriting 
Associations
1 working member from LUAA 
1 external Name (unlimited liability Name)
1 representative from corporate capital providers 
Chief Executive Officer of Lloyd's
2 other executives from the Corporation of Lloyd's
Note: * The external members of the Council should be two representatives from corporate capital 
providers and two natural (unlimited liability) Names.
Figure 8.1 (b): The composition of the Regulatory and M arket Boards and 
the proposed composition of the Business Development Board.
breakdown o f the current composition o f the Market Board and the proposed make-up 
the Business Development Board. This author suggests this new Board should 
consist o f fourteen members, i.e. a similar size to the current Market Board. As the 
Board will consist o f persons from all aspects o f Lloyd’s, this author suggests that this 
blend o f expertise will generate a worthwhile and creative committee. However, the 
importance o f underwriters and brokers in the development o f business for Lloyd’s is 
reflected in that they comprise some forty per cent o f the Business Development 
Board.
The current composition o f the Council o f Lloyd’s is six working members, four 
nominated members and six external members. The working members are senior 
executives o f  managing and members’ agents and senior executives o f  broking houses. 
The external members o f  the Council are Names and the nominated members are 
persons who are not associated with Lloyd’s and thus are able to provide a degree o f 
independent oversight. This author suggests that the current composition o f the 
Council is well balanced between the market practitioners (the working members) and 
the capital providers (the external members). However, there is currently no 
representation on the Council from Corporate Capital providers despite the fact that 
they provide some £4,500 million o f capacity for the 1997 year o f  account. This 
author suggests that the external membership on the Council should comprise two 
natural Names and two corporate Names in order to redress this inbalance.
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8.3 The influence of corporate capital on the architecture of Lloyd’s
The second major issue is the influence that corporate capital will have on the 
architecture o f Lloyd’s. The Names system has given underwriters much flexibility in 
their underwriting in that they have been able to underwrite freely without the 
intervention o f the capital base. This flexibility has encouraged entrepreneurism which 
in turn has been stimulated by the subscription system o f risk placement. The capital 
structure o f the Society is changing from multi-source (the Names) to single sources 
(corporate capital providers). This author’s research concludes that such capital is 
likely to wish to have a voice in the underwriting affairs o f the syndicates, which could 
hamper the freedom o f underwriters. Also there is the danger o f syndicates becoming 
little more than branch offices. Furthermore, there has been a growth in syndicate size 
over the past decade from an average capacity per syndicate o f £22.4 million in 1986 
to just over £60 million in 1996, as is shown in Figure 8.2. This is resulting in an 
increasing proportion o f  business being written one hundred per cent by a single 
syndicate rather than being shared amongst several syndicates through the subscription 
system. This author therefore foresees a two tier underwriting system developing; 
small risks will be written fully by one syndicate and much larger risks, such as the 
sums insured in reinsurance placements, will be placed within the subscription system. 
This author suggests that this process will be further accelerated as syndicates have 
access to large pools o f  dedicated capital. Lloyd’s could thus become a bourse along a 
line similar to the Illinois Insurance Exchange.
Since the introduction o f limited liability capital into Lloyd’s in 1994, there are now 
three types o f capital: (i) unlimited liability Names; (ii) spread Names (unit trusts), and;
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Figure 8.2: The average capacity o f syndicates from 1967 to 1996. (Source: Membership Department, Corporation o f Lloyd's; this author's analysis)
(iii) dedicated corporate Names. There has also been a gradual change in the 
ownership o f the managing agents, as most have now been sold to, or invested in by, 
corporate capital vehicles. Figure 8.3 shows that the managing agencies that manage 
almost 80% o f the capital base o f Lloyd’s have some investment by corporate capital.
One o f the traditional features o f Lloyd’s has been that the managing structure o f the 
syndicates (the managing agencies) has been independent o f  the ownership o f the 
capital (owned by the members’ agencies). With corporate capital being allowed to 
own the management structure and also able to invest in the syndicates they manage, it 
may well be expected that syndicates will over time become insurance companies with 
a single investor as the capital base, rather than a diverse capital base o f investors, both 
traditional Names and limited liability capital. Given this scenario, this author suggests 
that the traditional unlimited liability Name does not have a long-term future within 
Lloyd’s. Indeed, all those executives who were interviewed agreed that the traditional 
Name would not exist within ten years, although two stated there would still be a role 
for the high-value Name, i.e. the Name underwriting £1,000,000 or more.
The future o f  spread vehicles is also uncertain. Spread vehicles invest in a number o f 
syndicates, but with the ownership o f syndicate management being transferred to single 
corporate entities who in turn will wish to invest in their managed syndicates, the 
future o f spread vehicles is left uncertain. Some such vehicles have invested in 
managing agencies e.g. LIMIT’S investment in Bankside and Janson Green Managing 
Agencies, and Angerstein’s investment in JE Mumford and PB Coffey Underwriting 
Agencies. This author suggests that such vehicles will gradually become dedicated
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vehicles, investing in single syndicates, or a small group o f syndicates. Furthermore, 
such spread vehicles may start up their own stand-alone syndicates as has CLM 
Investment Trust. CLM has a £20 million capacity syndicate, number 1415, managed 
by CLM Managing Agency Ltd with CLM as the only member.
This author believes that the decision to allow corporate capital to invest in managing 
agencies was a mistake, as there is now no independence o f the ownership o f the 
management structure from the ownership o f the capital base. Furthermore, it was this 
independent structure that encouraged new syndicates to form as members’ agents, 
who controlled the capital within Lloyd’s, could identify and back new talented 
underwriters. This independent management/capital structure encouraged the 
entrepreneur and, in this author’s opinion, has helped to build the reputation o f Lloyd’s 
as a ‘market’ o f innovation. The start-up o f new syndicates is now more difficult as 
underwriters will have to raise their own capital from outside Lloyd’s, although 
perhaps corporate capital investors may start up their own stand-alone syndicates by 
identifying an underwriter and setting him up on his own.
An important question is how will corporate capital affect the role o f the entrepreneur 
in Lloyd’s. As has been stated earlier, the traditional capital base, the individual 
unlimited liability Name, did not have a say in the day-to-day underwriting affairs o f 
the syndicate. This gave underwriters much freedom and flexibility to underwrite. 
The managers o f corporate capital, in this author’s view, are likely to want to have 
more input into the underwriting, as they are responsible for the capital which is at 
risk. Indeed, £1,518.58 million o f capacity at Lloyd’s is provided by insurance
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companies, some 14.71% o f the total capacity o f Lloyd’s for 1997 (see Figure 8.4). It 
is difficult to assess whether corporate capital will adversely affect the entrepreneurial 
nature o f Lloyd’s underwriters, but the fact that corporate capital is likely to require an 
input into the portfolio o f business written suggests that Lloyd’s could well become a 
less innovative ‘market’ in future.
8.4 The Central Fund
One o f the most important questions that Lloyd’s faces is the issue o f the Central 
Fund. Ultimately all syndicates have the same security because o f the mutualisation 
mechanism o f the Central Fund. However, it is unlikely that dedicated corporate 
vehicles will wish to guarantee the claims paying ability o f competitors. This author 
suggests that syndicates supported by a single capital base pose a potentially more 
serious threat to the Central Fund than syndicates comprising capital from many 
sources, be they solely unlimited liability Names or a combination o f natural Names 
and corporate capital. With a dedicated vehicle, losses on consecutive years fall on the 
same capital provider. However, by contrast, with a conventional unlimited liability 
syndicate, the loss is spread across many capital providers and furthermore the 
constitution o f the syndicate changes from year to year. This situation is recognised to 
some degree in that a corporate capital provider pays a levy o f 1.50% o f its capacity to 
the Central Fund, whereas an unlimited liability Name is charged 0.60% o f capacity. 
This author suggests however, that the Central Fund would be more secure if the ratio 
o f funds at Lloyd’s to capacity for corporate vehicles were raised from its current 
figure o f 50%. This author suggests a reasonable figure would be 75%.
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Bermudan US Bermudan Total
Insurance Insurance Insurance Capacity
Insurance Company b a cker C o m p a n y  in v e stin g  a t L lo y d 's Industry (£m) Industry (£m) Industry (£m) (£m)
ACE ACE Limited 142.43 142.43
ACE ACE Staff Corporate Member Ltd 0.38 0.86 *
St Paul The St Paul Companies Inc (Camperdown) 57.50 57.50
Western General Catlin Westgen Ltd 91.50 121.99 *
Citadel Citadel Underwriting Ltd 4.86 4.86
CNA CNA Corporate Capital Ltd 47.97 47.97
Mid Ocean Mid Ocean 142.06 142.06
Capital Re CRC Capital Limited 39.75 39.75
Duncanson & Holt Duncanson & Holt Underwriters Ltd 98.85 98.85
Centre Re Euclidian pic 7.91 98.90 *
USF&G F&G UK Ltd 22.84 22.84
Frankona Frankona Capital Ltd 12.03 12.03
Global Capital R 'l Global Capital Underwriting Limited 6.50 6.50
TIG/AON Heraldglen Limited 33.93 33.93
Trident Partnership Hiscox Dedicated Corp Member Ltd 18,77 58.66 *
AON/Unionamerica Jago Capital Ltd 4.83 4.83
LaSalle LaSalle Re Corporate Capital Limited 16.33 16.33
Liberty Liberty Corporate Capital Ltd 185.00 185.00
Lumley Underwriting Management Lumley Underwriting Ltd 5.30 5.30
Medical Insurance Exchange of California MIEC Investment Company Inc 4.65 4.65
Allianz of America N. American London Underwriters Ltd 49.20 49.20
Navigators Navigators Corporate Underwriters Ltd 34.00 34.00
Nissan Nissan Lloyd's Underwriting Ltd 5.49 5.49
Chartwell Re Oak Dedicated Limited . 32.81 32.81
PX Re PX Re Limited 35.00 35.00
QBE QBE Corporate Ltd 59.08 59.08
Reinsurance Group of America (General American Life) RGA Capital Limited 2.79 2.79
Frankona RGB Capital Ltd 22.73 22.73
Navigators/Shelter Mutual Riverside Corporate Underwriters Ltd 26.76 26.76
AON + partner SVB Underwriting Ltd 4.81 12.01 *
Terra Nova Terra Nova Capital Ltd 183.70 183.70
TIG TIG Corporate Name (No. 1) Limited 20.00 20.00
Trident Partnership Venton Underwriting Ltd 91.75 91.75
Yasuda Yasuda Lloyd's Coip Member Ltd 2.02 2.02
Zenith Insurance Company ZIC Lloyd's Underwriting Ltd 5.05 5.05
TOTALS 71.89 745.36 701.33 1,687.63
Capacity of Lloyd's 10,323.60
Capacity supplied by the insurance industry 1,518.58
%  of capacity of Lloyd’s 14.71%
Notes: * - Balance of capital supplied from non-insurance industry sources.
i
Figure 8.4: 1997 Corporate Members with Insurance Industry Involvement
ISource: Lloyd's Corporate Membership Department) !
The presence o f the Central Fund has ensured that small syndicates are able to thrive 
within Lloyd’s as they have the backing o f this large fund and, more importantly, 
Lloyd’s has been able to obtain licences to trade in foreign countries for all syndicates. 
The Fund helps the Society to renew itself which in turn encourages the entrepreneur 
who wishes to start his own syndicate. Without the Central Fund, Lloyd’s would 
become little more than a building housing various insurance companies, similar to the 
London Underwriting Centre. This author suggests that the abolition o f the Central 
Fund would completely alter the nature o f Lloyd’s. Indeed, Lloyd’s, as known today, 
would not exist.
Because all syndicates are underpinned by common security, i.e. the Central Fund, the 
capital structure o f Lloyd’s is analogous to that o f a firm where there is a common 
‘pool’ o f capital supporting the business operations. The nature o f  this capital 
structure gives Lloyd’s a single identity in that the security (i.e. solvency) o f one 
syndicate is identical to that o f another. This is an important aspect o f the 
effectiveness o f the subscription market. Furthermore, without common security and 
common levels o f  solvency, syndicates will not be able to compete with competitors, 
such as Munich Re and Swiss Re.
8.5 Conclusion: The future structure of Lloyd’s
In conclusion this author offers his assessment o f the future capital structure o f Lloyd’s 
within five to ten years. This will consist o f syndicates o f various sizes, both large and 
small, some generalist insurers and others specialists in niche areas. The syndicates 
will share the backing o f the Central Fund to which they will all contribute. They will
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also share licenses, central services, a communications infrastructure and perhaps a 
blanket financial strength rating covering the whole o f Lloyd’s. Each syndicate will 
have its own source o f capital and there will no be unlimited Names and no spread 
vehicles. Syndicates will underwrite each risk in full, although the subscription system 
of risk placement will still exist but only for the very large capacity risks such as a 
catastrophe excess o f loss reinsurance placement. There will therefore be less 
cooperation between the syndicates and less information flowing between 
underwriters. This author predicts that Lloyd’s will be a less flexible and less 
innovative ‘market’ as the capital base will largely dictate the portfolio o f business 
underwritten.
Members’ agents will no longer exist as there will be no unlimited liability Names. All 
the Names will have either left Lloyd’s or be investing in syndicates via corporate 
vehicles. Syndicates will no longer be annual joint ventures, which write business for 
one calendar year and close their books after three years, because there will be 
permanent capital and not individual investors. Syndicates will be thus able to 
underwrite multi-year contracts, be able to purchase long-term reinsurance and be able 
to create free reserves to smooth results from year to year.
This author suggests that the importance o f the broker as the sole conduit o f business 
will gradually change with the introduction o f Electronic Placing Support, although 
this system is still in its infancy. This author recommends that syndicates should be 
able to trade direct with customers, if this is the most cost-effective method o f placing 
the business. Reinsurance business such as catastrophe excess o f loss is a class o f
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business that can easily be traded direct as many o f the Bermudan reinsurers are doing. 
This view is at variance to that expressed in the Task Force Report which reinforced 
the role o f the broker as the primary source o f business (Para 13.28). A possible 
future role for the broker may be to become the marketing arm o f a managing agency. 
This would require an amendment to the Lloyd’s Act 1982 which in Sections 10 and 
11 prohibits the investment o f Lloyd’s brokers in managing agencies and vice versa. 
However, the American broker Aon Inc has acquired a 49% shareholding in the Jago 
Managing Agency and has signed a letter o f intent to acquire a shareholding in the 
managing agency Spreckley Villers Bumhope and Co Ltd. Through the formation o f 
various holding companies, Aon Inc has circumvented the provisions o f  the Lloyd’s 
Act 1982.
This author suggests that brokers will be focused into complex placements where their 
knowledge o f the world-wide market is essential. Commodity-type business, such as 
personal lines and motor, will be transacted via a service company outside the Lloyd’s 
system.
This author recommends that managing agencies should be able to establish branch 
offices overseas. Such overseas establishment could come through a joint venture 
between groups o f managing agencies, or via a Corporation/managing agency joint 
venture such as Lloyd’s Japan. With the introduction o f corporate capital into many 
managing agencies, there is the funding available to finance such offices. Indeed, this 
author interviewed a prominent US regulator who stated that Lloyd’s should open a 
contact office in New York. He stated that Lloyd’s is seen to be too remote by being
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based in one central location. The competitors o f Lloyd’s, such as Munich Re and 
Swiss Re, are continually expanding their operations by opening new offices. For 
instance, Munich Re was the first western insurer to open an office in Moscow. In 
order for syndicates to compete effectively, they must be able to attract new business 
by methods other than waiting for business to arrive in London.
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Appendix
Interviews
During the course o f this research various interviews were undertaken both to test this 
author’s hypotheses and to obtain input on issues from practitioners within Lloyd’s. 
Initially, a questionnaire was sent out to twenty syndicates but this did not generate 
any meaningful response, indeed very few replies were received. It was then decided 
to hold interviews as this would be a more productive method to gain information and 
opinion.
Interviews were held with ten active underwriters from syndicates, five brokers, three 
corporate capital providers and two Members’ Agents. Many more people were 
approached by this author but declined to be interviewed. The Lloyd’s Planning 
Department and the Lloyd’s Information Centre also provided valuable assistance, 
guidance and information.
The questions asked were as follows:
1. How do you believe the capital base o f Lloyd’s will develop over the 
next ten years?
2. Should Lloyd’s have external regulation or remain as a self-regulated 
body?
3. What do you see as the future o f the Council o f Lloyd’s?
4. What do you believe to be the reason for Lloyd’s having a reputation for 
innovative underwriting?
5. How is the growth o f syndicates affecting the subscription system o f risk 
placement? What is the future o f the subscription system?
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6. Do you believe that there will be further consolidation in the number o f 
syndicates operating within Lloyd’s?
7. Given that corporate capital is becoming more important as the capital 
base o f the Society, do you agree with the view that Lloyd’s will become 
an insurance bourse like the Illinois Insurance Exchange?
8. Should Lloyd’s be allowed to trade direct with certain classes o f 
business?
9. Do you believe that the divestment rules should be modified so that 
managing agents can purchase broking groups?
10. What do believe the effect o f corporate capital will have, if  any, on the 
entrepreneurial nature o f Lloyd’s underwriters?
11. Should Lloyd’s syndicates be allowed to establish themselves overseas, 
or be permitted to have foreign offices?
The opinions o f  those interviewed form a central feature o f  this thesis and the 
information gathered from the interviews is discussed within the main body o f the text.
The au tho r’s propositions
In this thesis there are four major propositions which were developed by the author 
during the research (see pp 71, 77, 100 and 124). In order to test these propositions, 
they were presented to the interviewees for their comments. The propositions were put 
to the interviewees as the opinions o f the author and they were invited to agree or 
disagree and give their reasons. The responses o f the interviewees are shown below.
Proposition One Lloyd’s should abandon self-regulation and be 
regulated by the D epartm ent o f T rade and 
Industry
Underwriters
Brokers
Corporate capital providers 
Members’ Agents
Number in Number in Number 
agreement disagreement undecided
8 . 2 o 
3 2 0 
3 0 0 
2 0 0
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Proposition Two The current Market Board and Regulatory 
Board should be replaced by a single Business 
Development Board.
Underwriters
Brokers
Corporate capital providers 
Members’ Agents
Number in Number in Number 
agreement disaareement undecided 
7 2 1 
4 1 0 
3 0 0 
1 1 0
Proposition Three Over a ten year period all natural Names will 
incorporate and the capital base of Lloyd’s will 
consist of entirely incorporated limited liability 
capital.
Underwriters
Brokers
Corporate capital providers 
Members’ Agents
Number in Number in Number 
aareement disaareement undecided 
10 0 0 
5 0 0 
3 0 0 
2 0 0
Proposition Four The role of brokers will be focused into complex 
placements with simple business being handled 
outside the Lloyd’s system.
Underwriters
Brokers
Corporate capital providers 
Members’ Agents
Number in Number in Number 
aareement disaareement undecided 
7 2 1
1 3 1 
3 0 0
2 0 0
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